Alex White (Dublin South, Labour) | Oireachtas source

I thank all the Deputies for their contributions throughout this very good and extensive debate, which was very respectful to all the positions that have been articulated. I did not hear any attacks by any colleagues on the character of others who have taken a different view, as was suggested earlier. All the contributions have been measured and there has been a very good analysis of the Bill and the constitutional context in which we operate. The Dáil has done itself proud in the level, nature and content of the debate. It could not be suggested by anyone that this Oireachtas has failed to debate the issue or consider all the views, and there have been at least four occasions I recall in the past year or so when the issue has been quite rightly debated on the floor of the Dáil. The health committee has also treated the matter on two lengthy occasions, and the issue has been well ventilated, with a good quality of debate. It is important that this is so as that is what we have been expected to do in this Chamber.

As has been indicated since the intention to legislate in this area was first announced, the sole purpose of the Bill is to make provision for procedural rights for a pregnant woman who believes she has a life-threatening condition so that she can have certainty as to whether she requires or is entitled to this treatment or intervention. The purpose of the Bill is not to confer new rights for termination of pregnancy but to clarify existing rights. It will make existing rights actually available; there is little point in a constitutional point that cannot be exercised, and it is arguable that the position has been that a right has existed that could not be exercised. This Bill is setting out a procedure for the exercising of an existing constitutional right, and we are doing so within the parameters of the constitutional provisions that pertain, and particularly those as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the X case in 1992 and in order to implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the A, B and C v. Ireland case.

Legislating with the X case is a serious and legally complex issue but this Bill strikes a balance between providing an accessible procedure for establishing whether a pregnant woman might undergo a medical procedure which will end the life of the unborn and ensuring that safeguards are put in place for the protection of the unborn, where possible, or in the precise terms of Article 40.3.3° where practicable.

I will address some of the main issues raised by Deputies during the debate, although I will not have the opportunity to address all the matters. One of the most common reasons for opposing this Bill is the fact that it includes suicide as grounds for permitting termination of pregnancy. The reality is that these grounds are already included in our law. In the course of the judgments in the X case in 1992, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court specifically recognised suicide as a lawful basis for permitting termination of pregnancy if it were established as a matter of probability that there was a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother that could only be averted by the termination of pregnancy. This principle was upheld, as many colleagues have stated, in two subsequent referendums on the issue.

The debate has been very interesting and informed in respect of the role of the Oireachtas. There has been much debate on whether the Oireachtas is obliged to legislate and the extent of that obligation etc. Many speakers referred to the issue but many have made the point in an astute manner. For example, Deputy Durkan, who spoke a few minutes ago, considered the role and function of the Oireachtas vis-à-vis the Supreme Court and the people, who are the ultimate arbiters and the owners of the Constitution. The people enacted their Constitution in 1937, amending it in 1983 before a question arose in 1992 as to the precise meaning of that amendment. The Supreme Court, doing its duty, set out what the amendment's provision, with Article 40.3.3° actually meant. The role of the Supreme Court is to interpret the Constitution where there is doubt or a question arising as to the precise meaning of the terms of the Constitution. Neither the Parliament nor the Government does this but where there is an issue of interpretation as to the meaning of a provision in the Constitution, the work is done by the Supreme Court. That is what was done in 1992.

People have often wondered if that was the end of the matter but it is not. If there is unhappiness with the interpretation set out by the Supreme Court, the people can be consulted again. To put it at its simplest, we showed the people what was put in the Constitution in 1983 and what the Supreme Court indicates that it means before asking the people if they want to revisit the issue. The proposal was to re-word the 1983 provision in a manner that might find favour with the people invited to vote on the potential amendment to the previous 1983 amendment. This was done not once but twice; it was done in 1992, shortly after the X case judgment, and again in 2002. On neither occasion did the people decide, in their wisdom, to exclude suicide as a ground for lawful termination of pregnancy in this jurisdiction. The opportunity was afforded to the people to make that decision and they declined to do so.

The position is that with the court having given its interpretation and with the people having decided not reverse what they decided in 1983, we are left with what remains our law, and there can be no doubt in that respect. Whatever other issues we can debate or disagree about, there cannot be any objection to the simple proposition that the Irish Constitution - the supreme and fundamental legal document of the State - allows for lawful termination to occur in circumstances including suicide.

As we heard from many people in the debate and with the evidence so often referred to arising from the health committee, suicide in pregnancy is real. We should all ask a question when the distinction is drawn so often between a physical threat and one arising from suicidality; does not the risk of death by suicide constitute a real risk to life? It is almost crass to put it in those terms but it must be put in simple terms. Somebody's life can be at risk from suicide, and although I respect those who make the point, I cannot understand how people have said in this House and elsewhere that although there is no difficulty with sections 7 or 8 and that the physical risks described therein are real, they cannot bring themselves to see the risk being addressed in section 9 as a risk at all.

That is a fundamental issue to which people have not faced up. Given that we accept that death through suicide constitutes a risk, I do not understand why people can feel there is a rationale for having a different view of that risk from the view they hold of the other risk, which is to allow these circumstances to pertain in our law. I accept that it is rare, but it does happen and when it does, it is always a tragedy.

Many have argued against including in the Bill a risk of suicide on the basis that a termination of pregnancy is not a treatment for suicide, which phrase has come up so many times. We heard from eminent psychiatrists during the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children hearings who informed us that there was no definitive treatment for suicide and that seems to be so. It is constantly used in the House as an attack line on section 9 that it does not stand up because abortion is never a treatment for suicide. I accept that abortion is not a treatment for suicide. The point is that what we are doing in the Bill is legislating for that very small but real possibility that terminating a pregnancy is necessary to save a woman's life. These circumstances include a risk of death through suicide and must include it.

Deputy Michael McGrath addressed this issue very carefully and closely and finished off with a rhetorical question. I hope I am not misquoting him, but I get the sense of what he said. When he spoke about section 9, he asked whether it was ever the case that a termination of pregnancy was the only way to save a woman's life. I think that is almost precisely what he said and I do not think I am being unfair to him in that regard. It was a rhetorical question to ask whether it was ever the case that a termination was the only way to save a mother's life in circumstances where there was a risk of suicide. With respect to him, the way we must pose that question as legislators is to ask whether we are saying it would never arise or whether it could be concluded that it would never be so.

See this speech in context