Thomas Pringle (Donegal South West, Independent) | Oireachtas source

I welcome the opportunity to contribute to the debate on this important legislation. The Bill comes before the House following years of inaction, but I commend the Government on putting those years of inaction to an end. I will support the Bill, although it does not go far enough in a number of cases, which I will outline, and it provides for a number of penalties, which should not be included. As previous speakers said, the people are way ahead of politicians on this issue and they have shown much more compassion and understanding of the difficult situations in which many women find themselves. The issue of terminating a woman's pregnancy to save her life, or even her physical and mental well-being, is much less controversial outside the House than inside, and this has been the case for much longer than people care to realise.

Although the eighth amendment to the Constitution, made after the 1983 referendum, asserts that the unborn have an explicit right to life from the time of conception, subsequent referendums strongly suggest that public opinion began to focus on the rights of the mother. In the immediate aftermath of the X case, the Government put three referendums to the people: the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth proposed amendments to the Constitution. The twelfth amendment provided for the removal of suicide as a ground for abortion, the thirteenth amendment provided that women be given the right to travel outside the State for abortion, and the fourteenth amendment provided that information about abortion be available in the State. If Ireland is as opposed to abortion as suggested by some, one would have expected the twelfth amendment to pass and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to fail, but the opposite happened. By a two-to-one majority the people voted to reject the twelfth amendment, thereby endorsing the Supreme Court's decision on X. They also voted to allow women the right to travel for abortion and the right to information about abortion. In doing so, a majority of the people demonstrated their support for abortions in line with the X case.

A decade after the original case, the then Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, held another referendum, effectively asking the same question as in the failed referendum in 1992 regarding suicide. The people gave the same answer: "No". In 2013 this issue has again become the topic du jour although, despite the controversy, opinion polls show that a clear majority support legislating for the X case, including the so-called suicide clause, and polls even show a majority in favour of terminations in cases of fatal foetal abnormality, incest or rape or when a woman's health is at risk. By continuing to ban abortion, we do not prevent it; we just export it, disguise it and deny it, instead of addressing these women's genuine needs, not all of which are provided for in this Bill. I am sceptical about accessibility for those that are addressed, but I recognise that this is a step forward.

While I understand that provision for abortion for instances of rape and incest would need to be put to the people, there is scope to legislate for abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality without infringing the Constitution. It is possible to interpret Article 40.3.3° in such a way that "the unborn", which is protected therein, does not include foetuses with fatal abnormalities. The courts have not considered this legal issue and there is no binding precedent excluding such an interpretation. Moreover, the Legislature has the power, and the duty, to legislate under the Constitution. When Mr. Justice McCarthy criticised the Legislature for failing to regulate the terms of Article 40.3.3° in the X case in 1992, he was speaking of a duty that existed prior to that case. The interpretation and regulation of Article 40.3.3° is not limited to the circumstances arising in the X case. That case showed how the general principle of vindicating unborn life with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother justified a termination in the particular circumstances of suicide risk. A different set of factual circumstances, such as those of fatal foetal abnormality, could also legally justify a termination of pregnancy given that these unborn foetuses will not live independently. It is, therefore, within the Legislature's power to act on this possibility and regulate for these circumstances and, in such instances, the Legislature has a moral as well as a legal duty to act now and include abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality in the legislation. The State argued in the European Court of Human Rights that if the women had gone before the Irish courts, there was a strongly possibility they would have ruled in their favour, and, therefore, the question of constitutionality does not arise.

I would like to address a number of arguments and misconceptions regarding this Bill, which it is important to clarify. There has been much discussion to the effect that the lack of a time limit in the Bill will result in late-term abortions, but this is not an accurate assumption. However, the omission of a timeframe for termination of pregnancy is necessary in order to deal with instances in which a woman's life is at risk late in pregnancy. If there was a timeframe, legally, the mother would be left to die, and in that instance both the mother and foetus would die, thereby contravening the protection of life. Where the foetus could live independently, the pregnancy would be terminated - whether as a result of risk to life from physical illness or from suicidal ideation - by induction rather than abortion. This aspect in particular is causing a great deal of confusion. There is, unfortunately, an opinion spouted by some that women will fake suicidal ideation, but this is a flawed argument. While everyone speaks of removing the taboo from mental health, in this debate some people are suggesting that women would go so far as to lie to a three-member panel of medical practitioners because they feel like having an abortion. If a woman truly felt that way, she would get the boat to the UK. The scenario is so restrictive in the Bill that someone who is suicidal would probably travel to the UK anyway to avoid such scrutiny. However, overall, this argument results in further stigmatisation of the sensitive issue of mental health and is most unwelcome to the debate.

Let us not forget that the Bill will not amend the law on abortion. It is legislating for something that has been deemed legal since 1992 by conservative middle-aged men in the Supreme Court and it is a far cry from abortion on demand and the inaccurate perception that the same thing that happened in the UK will also happen here. If people cared to read the British legislation enacted in 1967, they would realise that a referendum would be needed to allow legislation even remotely similar to that Abortion Act, and there is no possibility of the same thing happening here through this Bill and the Constitution.

I have concerns about the legislation. Conscientious objection allows for a personal opinion to interfere with a professional duty. I understand that not all relevant medical practitioners would be comfortable with carrying out the procedure, but if that is part of their job, I can see this being problematic in the longer term if and when such cases arise.

What will happen in an emergency situation, for example, where no other practitioner is available to carry out the procedure at that point in time? The Bill should include a provision to the effect that medical practitioners with a conscientious objection have a duty of care to patients in those types of emergency situations to ensure they are transferred without delay to the care of another professional who does not share that objection.

I also have concerns regarding the powers the legislation bestows on the Minister, especially the power to suspend a service where there is an ongoing investigation. While I appreciate the need to ensure these provisions are not exploited by any person or institution, it is also important that no Minister should have the capacity to exploit the legislation. Suspension of service must take place only when it is completely necessary and should be revoked as soon as possible to avoid potential loss of life during the suspension period.

It is vital that any procedures deemed permissible under this legislation are carried out without undue delay. In cases of risk to life from physical illness, any such risk should not have to be immediate or inevitable before doctors can act. The certification process envisaged in the legislation should include a timeframe for terminations to take place in order to ensure that any delay does not lead to an emergency.

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