Tom Fleming (Kerry South, Independent) | Oireachtas source

I know. In respect of the sheer volume of work involved in the Nyberg report and the timeframe of six months, there was something in the region of over 1,500 documents per day on average to be perused and clinically and microscopically examined.

Disappointingly, the author of the Nyberg report said assigning the blame to a particular individual was not within his remit. He chose not to identify any individual, but he did identify organisations by name. However, he interviewed former bank chief executives such as Mr. Seanie FitzPatrick and Mr. Michael Fingleton. Without wishing to be over-dramatic, we are talking about two of the main culprits who are very identifiable and recognisable in this saga. What they said will probably never be revealed, unless and until such time as the documents are released to the National Archives in 2040, by which time the events will have been well buried in history. I hope we can resurrect matters, even at this late stage, to put things in order, hear proper explanations and go beneath the surface. What we know is merely the tip of the iceberg.

I ask the Minister of State to take that point into consideration. Perhaps a mechanism might be devised whereby these revelations and the compilation of facts by Mr. Nyberg can be revealed within the confines of this investigation by the Oireachtas inquiry. There may be a loophole, some means and way of getting at these facts in order to put them before the Oireachtas.

I refer to the Bills digest on the matter of Oireachtas inquiries. It states:

The power of parliament to hold inquiries into matters of great public concern exists in the vast majority of parliamentary democracies. The Joint Committee on the Constitution of the 30th Dáil, following consultation with legal and political experts, concluded that the Irish Parliament has much less power in this field of parliamentary inquiries than its international equivalents. In fact, the current case law indicates that the Houses of the Oireachtas do not, as a matter of constitutional law, have an inherent power to inquire into matters of public importance, beyond the remit of their functions as a legislative body, and in the case of Dáil Éireann, holding the government to account. In fact, one of the major findings of the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara case was that the Oireachtas had no inherent power to carry out inquiries of the kind it did in that case.

This statement is very revealing and gives even more urgency to the Government proceeding to put in place the proper provisions in this Bill.

The policy intent of the Bill is that in the light of the rejection of the constitutional amendment, the Government aims to provide a statutory framework for parliamentary inquiries within the existing constitutional framework as set down by the Abbeylara judgment. It follows a consultation process which aimed to establish the legislative underpinning required for Oireachtas inquiries and included pre-legislative scrutiny of the general scheme of the Bill by the Joint Committee on Public Expenditure and Reform. A key difference between the inquiries provided for in the Bill and those envisaged in an attempt to deal with the issue viaconstitutional change is that this Bill does not provide the Oireachtas with the power to determine the appropriate balance between the public interest and the individual's right to a good name. We need to address all of these relevant matters in the interests of justice, truth and ethics. There is a job to be done by the elected Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas. I hope we will proceed with vigour and a sense of fairness and justice to give this and relevant matters their rightful hearing in the very near future.

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