Dáil debates

Thursday, 6 December 2012

Report of the Expert Group on the Judgment in the A, B and C v. Ireland Case: Statements (Resumed)

 

6:05 pm

Photo of Mary Lou McDonaldMary Lou McDonald (Dublin Central, Sinn Fein) | Oireachtas source

I am conscious that after a 20 year delay, we have had a flurry of debates on this matter in the Dáil over the past number of weeks. The extent of the debate serves to highlight the extent of the delay which ran to two decades and the disrepute in which it places this Oireachtas. Many speakers have spoken about the sensitivity on the issue of abortion and I would not disagree with them. We all know from history, certainly in the 1980s, just how polarising was the issue and the debate. It is true that politics and politicians have taken a safety-first attitude to the issue and run for cover because it was considered too contentious. The fact that we are discussing legislation for the X case two decades later does politics, politicians and this institution no credit.

I am glad the report of the expert group has been published. My colleagues and I have studied it and I have a few things to say about it which I hope will be useful and in some way insightful. The main thing I want to say is that we cannot countenance any further delay. While it is very useful and indeed appropriate that the report is considered and debated and that every Member who so wishes has a right to put his or her views or misgivings on the subject on the record, this cycle of debates should not be used as a pretext for further delay. I say this to the Minister of State with the utmost respect and urge the Government now that it has the report and will hear the views of the Members of this Dáil to lose no time in making clear which option it will select and move that forward with all due haste.

It is very important that we understand that the kinds of restrictions the Constitution contains and the X case reiterates. The X case reiterates the need for legislation in very narrow terms. It is important that people, regardless of their views on the broader issues of women's reproductive rights and abortion, understand what is constitutionally permissible and stated within the X case. We are concerned with very restrictive circumstances in which a medical termination is permissible. There are two tests that must be met. The first is that the woman's life must be in jeopardy. It is not a matter of health, rather it is a matter of life and death. The second test is that in the event that the woman is heading towards death, only a termination can save that life. These are very important things to understand. There are many who would argue that this is far too restrictive but that is a debate for another day. As we debate in the here and now, that is the current position.

When we come to the element of suicide, it is in those circumstances that the restrictive nature of the judgment must be most particularly borne in mind. In order for a medical termination to allowable on the grounds of suicide, the woman's life must be in jeopardy. There must be a real peril to the woman, which is the first test. The second test for the suicidal person is that it would have to be established that only a termination could spare that life. Those are remarkably high thresholds. I found it disturbing that some commentators in the media sought to portray the X case and the grounds of suicide as some sort of permission for termination on the basis of mental health. That is not the case. In a scenario, heaven forbid, where a pregnant woman was suicidal, a doctor, physicians, clinicians and experts would have to judge the range of medical treatments that would be appropriate for that woman, be it hospitalisation, medication or the other full range of treatments.

We need to be very careful as we move to the point of legislating for the X case that we do not allow the public debate to be captured by a kind of hysteria, be it by accident or design, that would confuse mental health as a general category with a woman who is suicidal and who can only be saved by a medical termination. Those things are worlds apart from each other. Having said that, I hope the Government is not minded to legislate for the X case and somehow try to rule out the suicide risk. I do not believe this would be legally possible and would cause any legislation to fall at the first hurdle. It would also be very wrong to proceed on that basis because although the restrictions are in place but the law is clear.

If a woman's life is in danger and that danger can only be offset by a medical termination of pregnancy, it is legally allowable to do so.

Having studied the report it is evident that the expert group was not asked to arrive at any recommendation or conclusion. Perhaps from the Government's point of view there was merit in this to set out the options but it is a pity the experts, given their expertise, were not asked to make a clear-cut recommendation. As the Minister of State, Deputy Costello, stated, it set out four distinct options. When one reads the report, it becomes clear that primary legislation is necessary and that such legislation needs to be bolstered with regulation. Although the expert group does not recommend this, it is clear if one reads between the lines that it is the logical conclusion of its deliberations. The report states the legislative plus regulation approach fulfils the requirements of the judgment and provides for appropriate checks and balances between the powers of the Legislature and the Executive and would be amenable to changes that might arise out of clinical practice and scientific advances. This is sensible and it is the way to go. To reiterate, the powers of the Legislature and the Executive are fully bound by what is permissible within the Constitution. Therefore, this is not a blank cheque for anyone elected to this Chamber or anyone in a ministerial position to expand the horizons of where abortion is permissible in the State. This cannot happen without another constitutional referendum or without the say so and permission of the people.

There is some discussion in the document on the appropriate level of qualification of the medics who would make a determination in any individual case. It is a question of striking a balance between the best medical expertise which can be accessed as a matter of good practice and issues with regard to timing and promptness. Situations can arise where a woman's life is in danger and time is of the essence, and it will be for the Government to strike this balance to have in place the necessary expertise which can have the full confidence of the public, the Legislature and women who are having babies and using the maternity services. We must ensure we put in place a system which is sufficiently efficient and does not leave somebody in danger which might result in the loss of life.

Decisions must also be made in respect of the appeals procedures, and balances need to be struck in this regard being duly conscious of the rights of the woman and the needs of the medical profession, and some consideration must be given to whether a woman might have the right to make an application to the High Court for a review of a decision she might contest. On one level these issues are complex, and in another sense it is a matter of the Government finding an orderly, reasoned and reasonable approach to resolve these matters. Decisions can be taken on these matters quite speedily. I do not believe they will require months of deliberation.

I listened very carefully to the Minister for Justice and Equality, Deputy Alan Shatter, who made a very thoughtful and interesting contribution in the course of the debate on Deputy Clare Daly's legislation. I sensed from his contribution that he, or perhaps the Department and officials, are probably some way down the road in puzzling out the technicalities and architecture which might be contained in the legislation. I read this as a very welcome signal and I hope I am right.

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