Alan Shatter (Dublin South, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I thank the Deputy for tabling this amendment because it highlights an important element of discussion in regard to this issue, on which it is worth spending a few minutes.

The Deputy's amendment No. 159 essentially concerns repossession applications before the courts. It does not relate to personal insolvency arrangement applications as provided for under this Bill, although I understand the Deputy's point regarding how the law in this area could impact on the negotiation stance taken by a financial institution. Section 100 concerns matters in regard to a debtor's principal residence to which regard must be had, primarily by a personal insolvency practitioner, in preparing a proposal for an arrangement on behalf of the debtor. There is no involvement of the court under this section. Applications for repossession of property are not dealt with in the Bill. These are properly the matter of the court concerned and cannot be treated in the same context.

I accept that the Deputy's motivation in this amendment is to offer further elements of protection to home owners in arrears who may be facing repossession proceedings. His proposal is well intentioned and laudable, but it is not relevant either to this section or to the Bill in general. I understand his point regarding the negotiation mode a financial institution might assume. I assure him that in the context of any necessary revision of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 following the Dunne and other judgments, I will consider the inclusion of a provision to address the Deputy's concerns. This might be along the lines of section 138 of this Bill, which provides that in the context of a bankruptcy petition, the court is required to consider whether the matter might better be dealt with by way of one of the non-judicial processes set out in the Bill.

Amendment No. 182 seeks to amend section 116 in respect of the grounds upon which a creditor may appeal to the court to set aside a personal insolvency arrangement which was agreed by majority vote. These provisions are standard, referring to both procedural deficiencies and any fraudulent type behaviour on the part of the debtor. It would not be appropriate to attribute unreasonableness to a creditor seeking to exercise lawful rights.

I must reject these amendments for the reasons I have outlined, but I thank the Deputy for raising the issue. There is a need for legislation to address the Dunne judgment and work is already under way in my Department in this regard. We have given greater priority to the legislation before us today in order to facilitate arrangements of a reasonable nature being entered into, where appropriate, through the use of a personal insolvency arrangement in circumstances where there are mortgage difficulties. The Deputy's proposal is a very worthwhile one, and it will certainly inform the preparation of the other Bill I mentioned.

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