Shane Ross (Dublin South, Independent)

Like every other speaker, I welcome the motivation behind this Bill. There is no doubt that it is a recognition of an extraordinarily acute problem which is growing by the day and which probably should be tackled even more urgently than it is being tackled. It has not been properly recognised by the banks but politicians are now beginning to recognise it because of the awful difficulties which they are finding among their constituents on a daily basis, in particular in the area of mortgage debt, although not exclusively mortgage debt as there are bigger debts and smaller debts. This Bill certainly attempts to tackle these problems in a methodical, forensic and genuinely well motivated way to relieve the distress of many people who are suffering absolutely insuperable problems.

What worries me about the Bill is that it seems to be guided by extraordinarily conservative and institutionalised thinking. Although there are some novel suggestions in the detail, and it is new territory, there seems to be a pattern that those who are controlling the strings in our lending policies and institutions are still in positions of great strength. I suppose the predecessor of, or the forerunner to, this Bill was the Keane report on mortgage arrears published last October, which shows the length of time it takes to get from pillar to post in problems of this depth. The Keane report, whatever its recommendations - I do not think I will deal with them because they have been superseded - contained the thinking of institutionalised and official Ireland. I say that because I could not understand when the Keane group was set up how and why the particular personnel were chosen. Whatever the merits of the group, it was almost inevitable that it would come out with a report which was very acceptable to those who were in powerful positions in the lending institutions in Ireland. It was stuffed with civil servants of great calibre, but certainly of a particular way of thinking, and two bankers for a reason I cannot understand.

Perhaps it is all right and justifiable in a group with a membership of that size to have to bankers on it. All the bankers in this saga are undoubtedly those who have the greatest case to answer but the following question has to be asked. If the Government is tackling a problem of this nature, which is so serious for so many citizens and individuals, why did it not put on that group people who are directly affected by this problem and who are not sitting in some sort of self-interested ivory tower directing the operations? Why was there not a representative of MABS, FLAC and of the enormous number of consumers and borrowers who are suffering? Instead we got the usual suspects handing down a so-called solution or suggestions on mortgage arrears from the top. It reflected conventional thinking.

It is no wonder that after the publication of the Keane report, the first to welcome it was the Irish Banking Federation. If one is going to get a panacea or a solution to a human problem of this sort, which is welcomed by the Irish Banking Federation, one must ask whether the input of this lobby group is stronger than the input of the people who are suffering? As Deputy Nolan and other Deputies said, wherever the responsibility for this problem lies - I do not wish to allot it politically at this stage - the primary responsibility lies with the reckless lenders. Certainly some of the responsibility lies with those who borrowed. They included individual, responsible citizens who went to their banks, borrowed far too much and are now in serious difficulties. They surely have a responsibility, too, but the primary responsibility across the board lies with banks and bankers.

The three main categories dealt with by this Bill include the debt relief notice category, which involves very small borrowings. The banks have a responsibility whether it concerns unsecured or secured debt, mortgage debt or even bigger debt. The pattern is that the banks were drip-feeding citizens, businessmen and irresponsible people, playing on their weaknesses and handing out vast sums of money which they could not possibly have been able to afford to pay back. To suggest now that those institutions are the ones that should be the greatest influence on the preliminary solution is bad enough. The problem, however, is that their influence on this Bill is very detectable as well.

The Irish Banking Federation has criticised one or two elements of the Bill, which I suspect is tactical. The Bill, however, fails to recognise that the villains of the piece in the insolvency problems faced by Ireland are the same people today as they were in 2008 and before that. The apparent influence they have had on this Bill is both obvious and regrettable. Let me be more specific. Everybody knows that the IBF beat a path to every Minister's door. Some Ministers are more accessible than others but it is clear that in the case of all Ministers the IBF has a major influence. The power of the banks has not been broken or reduced. When it comes down to the nitty-gritty, they have had an absolutely unacceptable input into legislation. The threat which they carried with them on 29 September 2008 is still there and they are still listened to as though they have some sort of authority. They have got power but they should not be given the same deference today as they were given in 2008.

The problem is manifest in this Bill when it comes to the arrangements being made between debtors and creditors. It seems clear that the arrangement being made between debtors and creditors - however many intermediaries there are, and whatever insolvency monitoring goes on - unequal. This is because the debtor, particularly in cases of house mortgages, only has one weapon. The creditor, which is nearly always the bank, has several. The arrangement which is made leaves the debtor with one option if he or she does not like it - bankruptcy. The bank can walk away and veto it. There is no doubt that there is a bank veto on the debtor, certainly in cases of mortgage arrears which have not been paid. The idea that 65% - in value not in votes - is in some way a protection for the debtor is completely unacceptable. Everybody knows that if a person has a mortgage, whatever the size, it is almost inevitable that it is, first, their largest debt and, second, it is a debt which is nearly always held by one bank or building society. Even if it is not, it is not inconceivable that the banks, as they always have done, will gather together and gang up against the debtor. It is an unequal relationship.

I suggest there is only one way of removing the bank veto from an arrangement of this sort and that is by removing the bank. That is what I mean by institutionalised thinking. The idea that this Bill should give that power to those who have proved themselves to be manifestly unsuitable in their treatment of citizens and in their reckless lending in the past is unacceptable. I do not understand why the Government did not decide to take the banks out of the equation. As it is, they are certainly due back the money that is owed to them, which is the basic premise of this Bill. The thrust and purpose of the legislation is to find a solution by which the borrower can pay back.

Some months ago, there was a Fianna Fáil Bill before the House which did not go far enough. What was to stop the Government from setting up a body - I do not care whether it is judicial or non-judicial - that could call on both parties to be subject to its adjudication?

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