Eamon Gilmore (Dún Laoghaire, Labour)

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues with Deputies. For more than five decades, the Government has pursued a policy of complete opposition to nuclear weapons and in this has enjoyed strong cross-party political support in this House. This support has been important in enabling successive Ministers and officials to speak out strongly on issues important to us in international fora. I believe it is both appropriate and timely that, as the states parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty enter the treaty's 2015 review cycle, the House should be enabled to consider and discuss Ireland's position and role within wider international efforts to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and that I should set out some of the challenges currently facing those efforts.

Ireland has a long and distinguished record in multilateral efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In 1958, just three years after we were admitted to the United Nations, Minister Frank Aiken tabled the first of the so-called "Irish resolutions" in the UN General Assembly. These paved the way directly for the discussions which ultimately produced the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, NPT. The treaty remains at the heart of international efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons to this day. It contains the only international legal obligation to disarm nuclear weapons and it is a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. This was no mean achievement for a small, fledgling UN member state seeking to promote nuclear non-proliferation at the height of the Cold War arms race. Ireland's pioneering role in the NPT process was subsequently recognised when we were invited to become the treaty's first signatory. We were the first country to sign and ratify it, and we have been associated by name with it ever since.

The lasting achievement of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has been to diminish the spectre of nuclear war. The so-called "bargain"' at the heart of the treaty requires the nuclear-weapon states to undertake to disarm their nuclear weapons, in return for which all other states agree to forgo nuclear weapons. All states are granted the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to verification.

While it is crucial that the treaty is implemented in full across all three of its pillars - disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses - I must say, with regret, that progress in implementing its disarmament objectives has been much slower than progress under the two other pillars. I see this as being among the first challenges facing the NPT. The treaty's obligation to disarm is now more than 40 years old. If there were ever factors justifying the retention of large nuclear deterrents during the Cold War - there were not - these surely ceased to apply when the Cold War ended. However, even with the dissipation of Cold War tensions and with the indefinite extension of the treaty, progress on disarmament stagnated. In 2000, states parties agreed 13 practical steps towards accelerating nuclear disarmament. Ireland and her New Agenda Coalition partners, for whom disarmament is a key priority, played a central role in this regard. These steps were subsequently reaffirmed at the 2010 NPT review conference, but for the most part they remain unimplemented.

As we enter the 2015 NPT review cycle, it is estimated that more than 23,000 nuclear weapons remain in place. For as long as these weapons continue to exist, the threat which they pose to humanity will remain. If they are perceived to carry a political or tactical benefit, or even - for some - a sense of prestige, they will encourage proliferation and non-compliance with international obligations. It is of great concern that, long after the end of the Cold War, the old concept of deterrence is cited as a justification for retaining and, as we read this week, modernising arsenals.

In terms of establishing the foundations for success at the 2015 NPT review conference, Ireland will be among those states looking to the nuclear-weapon states to build confidence that they are seriously and in good faith fulfilling their obligation to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. They are legally obliged to do this by Article VI of the treaty, applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and enhanced transparency as they proceed. It is undoubtedly the case that progress towards complete disarmament will strengthen in turn the treaty's non-proliferation objectives, as any possible incentive for joining "the club" is reduced and eventually removed. As the 2015 review cycle progresses, we will therefore be looking for progress reports from the nuclear-weapon states along the way, particularly in 2014, by which date they have committed themselves to report to the wider NPT membership on progress.

There are a number of serious challenges to what the nuclear non-proliferation treaty seeks to achieve. First among these is the fact that three countries remain outside the treaty and are not, therefore, bound by its basic disarmament and non-proliferation imperatives. Two of those countries, India and Pakistan, are regional neighbours with a history of rivalry and dispute. Both are nuclear-capable states working to develop their missile capability.

The third non-NPT state, Israel, is presumed by many to possess a nuclear arsenal, although it maintains a policy of opacity in this regard and has never declared itself to possess nuclear weapons. Israel has claimed on a number of occasions that it faces an existential threat from its regional neighbours. In the case of two of these neighbours, Iran and Syria, many questions have been raised regarding their compliance with the NPT and their co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Iran claims that it is entitled to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, as I have made clear in this House on several occasions, in asserting that right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy Iran must comply fully with its NPT commitments. It must co-operate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding matters on its nuclear programme. It must also comply with successive resolutions of the agency's board of governors and the United Nations' Security Council on this matter. By the same token, Syria must comply fully with its IAEA safeguards agreement and with its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Both of these situations, in south Asia and in the Middle East, remain of considerable concern. They represent significant challenges to international peace and security. Ireland will continue to call upon all three states not yet party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to sign and ratify the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, and to enter into a full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We will continue to support international efforts to ensure compliance by all NPT states with their international obligations including, where necessary, through sanctions.

In addition to these situations, a fourth state - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK, or North Korea, remains of grave concern. In 2003 the DPRK announced that it was walking away from its NPT commitments. Since then it has conducted a number of nuclear explosives and missile tests. I strongly call on the authorities in Pyongyang to come back into full NPT and IAEA compliance and to desist from any further nuclear explosive or missile testing. The importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, system as a means of verifying the nuclear activities of member states and of ensuring minimum standards of safety and security cannot be understated. The terrible accident at Fukushima last year demonstrated that nuclear accidents do not respect borders and nuclear safety is a concern for all. The inherent dangers in a nuclear device falling into the hands of non-state actors are self-evident. The House may be assured we will continue to use every opportunity to support the agency in its work.

These are not the only challenges facing the international non-proliferation regime. More than 15 years after it opened for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, CTBT, is not yet in force. The treaty prohibits all nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, and thereby impedes the development and qualitative improvement of these weapons and the technological advancement of new types of nuclear weapons. It must enter into force without further delay. The provocative nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006 and 2009 clearly demonstrate that there is an urgent need for such a treaty.

To enter into force, all 44 countries listed in annex 2 to the CTBT must sign and ratify the treaty. These are the countries that were recognised as being nuclear-capable at the time of the treaty's negotiation. So far, 36 have ratified. Ireland has repeatedly called on all states, but particularly the remaining eight annex 2 states, to sign and ratify without further delay so as to achieve the treaty's entry into force. The United States has an important leadership role to play in this regard and I welcome the pledges by President Obama's Administration to pursue early entry into force. Ratification by the United States as one of the annex 2 states yet to ratify would encourage ratifications by others. In the meantime, the treaty acts as a strong international bulwark against nuclear test explosions. I expect the international community to react firmly in response to any such explosion.

A crucial element of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, CTBTO, is its international monitoring system, which offers an effective global verification system. The system is participatory and therefore non-discriminatory. It provides credible assurances of compliance and will also help in seismic and tsunami warning, as demonstrated during the tragic nuclear accident in Fukushima last year. I commend the progress achieved to date in the build-up of this verification regime and I stress the need to continue working towards its early completion.

In this respect, I am delighted that tomorrow morning I will be opening Ireland's CTBTO national data centre at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies along with Dr. Lassina Zerbo of the organisation's international data centre division. This reaffirms Ireland's strong and long-standing support for the treaty and represents another step in the build-up of the international monitoring system.

Since Ireland joined the Conference on Disarmament in 1999, the conference has been paralysed by its own rules of procedure. A rule whereby all decisions must be taken by consensus has created an effective right of veto. This cannot continue. Among the proposed programme of work is a treaty that would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Negotiations on such a treaty are long overdue and must begin at the earliest opportunity.

With so many security challenges facing us, we cannot allow the world's main disarmament negotiation body to become a by-word for institutional and policy failure. We are willing to examine a range of proposals and issues to assist the conference in getting back to work. These include the issue of its membership, its ties with civil society and its internal procedures. If the Conference on Disarmament cannot agree and implement a programme of work, the wider UN membership in the General Assembly will need to assume its responsibility to act. It would be deeply damaging to the UN and multilateralism if the current state of affairs were allowed to continue.

Having set out some of the challenges facing us as we strive towards a world free of nuclear efforts, I would like to set out some recent positive developments. The first concerns ongoing efforts towards a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, WMDs, and their delivery systems. The 1995 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, NPT, review and extension conference adopted a Middle East resolution that called for the establishment of a zone free of WMDs. It was part of a package deal that also included the indefinite extension of the treaty. Progress towards its implementation has been seen, therefore, particularly by Arab states, as important in terms of the treaty's viability. Ireland sees progress on the Middle East resolution as a key objective. At the 2010 NPT review conference, we brokered agreement on a text that emphasised the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 resolution and set out a number of practical steps, including the convening of a conference in 2012.

The appointment of a conference facilitator and a host government for the 2012 conference was announced in October 2011. Finland will host and the Finnish Under-Secretary of State for foreign and security policy, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, will act as facilitator. Mr. Laajava has not yet announced dates or other details for the conference. He is still consulting intensively with interested stakeholders, both within the region and beyond. Ireland strongly supports the facilitator in his work. Officials from my Department have given him detailed briefings on our experience of the process that led to the 2010 agreement. We have indicated that we remain at his disposal.

There is now a fair measure of understanding of what is required to achieve a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Despite the non-universality of the treaty, I believe the 1995 resolution contains most of the fundamental elements. What we need now is political will, both inside and outside the region, to take the process forward. The recent history of this island has shown that accommodation is possible, even on those issues that have been long regarded as intractable. What is important is that there is a willingness on all sides to engage constructively in a collaborative process moving forward.

I want to finish by referring to efforts towards a nuclear weapons convention. A number of Deputies would be supportive of such a convention. In October 2008, UN Secretary General Mr. Ban Ki-moon suggested that NPT states could "consider negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been proposed at the United Nations." Ireland has always been a strong supporter of complete nuclear disarmament. We support the objective of a nuclear weapons convention and the commencement of collective preparatory work in this direction.

However, given the current level of opposition to a convention - as many as 50 states are regarded as either sceptical or lukewarm and four out of five of the nuclear weapons states are opposed - we do not anticipate agreement being reached on a convention in the short term. Article VI of the NPT is the only legally binding multilateral commitment by the nuclear weapons states to disarm their arsenals. We are keen to protect this while remaining supportive of the idea of a convention.

Action 5 of the disarmament plan set out in the 2010 NPT review conference final document commits the nuclear weapons states to "accelerate concrete progress" on nuclear disarmament and to report in 2014. It is important that this be implemented. Work to achieve both objectives - full NPT implementation and steps towards a convention - should be mutually reinforcing. They should not distract from achieving implementation of agreed commitments by the nuclear weapons states. The 2015 review conference will take stock of progress and consider the next appropriate steps. This could, of course, encompass a nuclear weapons convention.

Much has been achieved by the NPT and the disarmament and non-proliferation regime built around it. However, we are still a considerable distance from where we all would like to be, that is, in a world free of nuclear weapons. It is important that the international community continue with this crucial work, which was launched by Frank Aiken in the late 1950s and which has given Ireland special prominence in the international efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. I assure the House that this will remain a top priority for the Government and I thank the House for its consistent support in this regard.

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