Pearse Doherty (Donegal South West, Sinn Fein)

Tá an leasú reachtaíochta atá os ár gcomhair anocht faoi éascú dara chlár déine na Gréige, a d'aontaigh Rialtas na Gréige agus an troika an mhí seo a chuaigh thart.

Tá go leor tráchtaireacht aineolach faoi cheist na Gréige sna meáin Éireannacha na laetha seo, agus tá an cuma air gur maith le daoine an locht a leagan anuas go sonrach ar ghuaillí mhuintir na Gréige iad féin, maidir leis an ghéarchéim.

Ar an drochuair, níl rudaí chomh simplí sin. Ní dabht ar bith ná go gcaithfidh rialtais na Gréige cuid mhaith den fhreagracht a ghlacadh as an ghéarchéim shoisialta agus eacnamaíochta mhillteanach atá ag daoine na tíre sin faoi láthair, ach mar an gcéanna le hÉirinn, leis an Phórtaingéil agus leis an Spáinn, is ar na droch bhearta a rinne na Rialtais sna blianta roimh an ghéarchéim i 2008 agus droch pholasaithe airgeadaíochta Bhanc Ceannais na hEorpa, an ECB, is mó atá an locht.

Chuir ballraíocht an euro suimeanna ollmhóra de chreidiúintí íseal-riosca saora ar fáil do eacnamaíochtaí laga cosúil leis an Ghréig. Mar gheall ar easpa rialacháin, ag leibheáil náisiúnta agus ag leibheáil Eorpach, ligeadh do bhancanna san eurozone iasachtaí millteanacha dóchreidte a thabhairt amach. Ar tharraing Rialtais na Gréige iasachtaí agus ar chaith siad i bhfad níos mó ná mar a bhí acu roimh ghéarchéim 2008? Is cinnte go ndéarna siad sin. Ar éascaigh cuid de bhancanna na hEorpa, Banc Ceannais na hEorpa san áireamh, agus ar éascaigh an easpa rialacháin airgeadais an cineál mí-iompair gan stuam seo? Is cinnte gur éascaigh.

Cé go bhfuil scála na géarchéime sa Ghréíg difriúil le tíortha eurozone eile atá i bhfiacha ollmhóra, níl na cúiseanna agus an dinimic chomh difriúil sin in Éirinn, sa Phortaingéil nó sa Spáinn, creid é nó ná creid. I gcás na Gréige agus na Portaingéile, ba é barraíocht iasachtaí Rialtais príomh chúis na géarchéime. In Éirinn agus sa Spáinn, afach, b'iad iasachtaí iomarcacha an éarnáíl phríobhaideach a ba chiontaigh.

Ach sna ceithre cás, is é an éascú a rinne na bancanna móra Eorpacha ar iasachtaí ollmhóra gan chéill, agus "codladh ina sheasamh" agus neamhshuim na rialtóirí baince a ba chiontaigh, Údarás Baincéireachta Eorpach san áireamh. Tá seo chomh soiléir le rud ar bith agus tá a fhios ag achan duine seo ach ní féidir barraíocht iasachtaí neamhréasúnacha a tharraingt - cé acu sin Rialtas nó forbróirí príobhaideacha - mura bhfuil siad sin atá á dtabhairt amach toilteanach iasachtaí iomarcacha a thabhairt amach. Ní féidir le hiasachtaí iomarcacha tarlú ach nuair a theipeann ar na rialtóirí náisiúnta agus Eorpacha a jab a dhéanamh.

The problems in Greece, as well as in Portugal, Ireland and Spain, are not just domestic in origin. They are a consequence of policy failures at domestic and European level. This means that responsibility for the crisis must be borne at domestic and European level. Unfortunately, the approach of the European Union and, in particular, the European Central Bank, ECB, has been to punish the Greek people for failures for which they are partly responsible. Such an approach is not only unfair, it is also destined to fail. For evidence of this failure one need only consider the bailout package agreed between the troika and the Greek Government last month. In 2010, when the eurozone crisis first gripped Greece, that beleaguered country secured emergency funding of €110 billion. In return, it was obliged to increase taxes, cut social spending and dramatically reduce the size of the public sector.

The scale of the austerity foisted on the people of Greece was of a level unimaginable in most other European countries. The figures speak for themselves. By the end of 2011, 21% of Greek people were officially out of work and almost 50% of young people were jobless. The level of homelessness had increased by 25% and poverty by 28%. One in five people living in poverty could only afford meals with meat every second day. The Athens suicide hotline reported that the number of calls it received had doubled to 5,000 in 2011. In conjunction with this human hardship, all the economic indicators were revealing that the austerity programme was not working. Greece remained locked out of the bond markets and its government debt continued to spiral out of control. According to every available social and economic indicator, the first Greek bailout was not working. Did this provoke critical reflection on the part of Greek and European politicians and policymakers? Did anyone in power ask if the reason the first bailout was not working was it was so badly designed? The answer is clearly not. Just as those in power blamed the Greek people for the crisis, they were now blaming them for the failure of the first bailout programme.

Almost two years after the first austerity programme for Greece, we are being asked to approve a second such programme which is based on exactly the same policies which gave rise to the former. The scale of the emergency funding being made available, some €130 billion, is even greater than that for the first programme. The chances of the second programme being successful are even lower than for the first programme. Another 30,000 jobs are to be culled from the public sector in Greece, modest pensions are to be cut by 20%, the minimum wage is to be lowered, taxes on low and middle income earners are to rise dramatically for the second year in a row and state assets to the value of €50 billion are to be sold off. All of these measures will further damage Greece's economy and its society. They will lead to increases in unemployment and poverty which, in turn, will further depress the economy. This will make a return to economic growth impossible in the medium term.

One of the most obvious aspects of the first bailout programme was the failure to restrain the spiralling level of government debt. Following months of difficult negotiations, private sector lenders, including some European banks, are to write off 53.5% of the money owed to them by the Greek Government. However, the deal on this debt write-down has yet to be concluded and remains fraught with difficulties. Many commentators believe that even if banks fully participate in the write-down, Greece still will not manage to lower its debt to below 120% of GDP. Meanwhile, the Greek Government must bring forward a plan for the recapitalisation of the country's banks. The cost of this recapitalisation remains unknown. There is little doubt that the Greek people are being punished for the failure of their own politicians and that of political leaders across the European Union.

The deal we are effectively being asked to endorse will mean more hardship for ordinary Greek citizens. It will give rise to further unemployment and poverty and further assaults on the incomes and living standards of those already unable to cope with the cost of the first bailout. We are informed that this is the necessary price which must be paid to fix the broken Greek economy, that it is the harsh medicine required to cure the sick Greek patient. Unfortunately, even a cursory examination of the bailout programme demonstrates that this is not the case.

Let us consider the position on tax reform, for example. While the austerity programmes being heaped on the Greek people dramatically increased tax revenue by €2.32 billion in 2011 and will increase it by a further €3.38 billion in 2012 and 2013, they do nothing to redistribute the tax burden in a fair way. Tax evasion and avoidance will continue among the very wealthy. A recent article in Der Spiegel, the German current affairs magazine, indicated that in Greece "it is mainly a small wealthy class that manages to cheat the authorities out of €40 billion in tax each year". Nothing in the second bailout programme will address this issue. Rather, the burden of increased taxation will fall on low and middle income earners, pushing them further into poverty, while also further depressing consumer demand and blocking economic recovery.

The conditions attached to the second Greek bailout are a mistake. They are bad for the people of Greece, the Greek economy and the eurozone. While the Bill before the House does not detail these conditions, supporting it means giving our consent to them. As a result of the conditions to which I refer, the loans being provided will not solve the structural problems blocking Greece's return to economic stability, nor will they assist in bringing stability to the eurozone. Only this morning the Austrian Chancellor, Werner Faymann, said Greece would probably need a third bailout in the coming years. Separately, a leaked troika report which was seen by the German magazine Der Spiegel indicates that Greece may need a further €50 billion in 2015. In itself, this is an admission that the austerity programme we are being asked to endorse is doomed to failure.

Everything I have stated proves the point Sinn Féin has been right all along in this House since 2008, namely, that the approach taken by the Government and those across Europe is not working. Austerity does not work. One cannot cut and tax one's way out of a recession, let alone the type of debt crisis with which we are faced. The continued human tragedy and economic catastrophe in Greece are evidence of this.

There is an urgent need for a new approach across the European Union which must be based on investment in growth, real debt write-downs and a real cleansing of the European banking system. Investment in jobs is urgently required in the eurozone, particularly in those countries on its periphery. This can be achieved by combining the resources of member states - in our case this would be the €5.4 billion in the discretionary portfolio of the National Pensions Reserve Fund - with an enlarged investment fund in the European Investment Bank. The existing funds of that bank should be supplemented by a once-off investment on the part of EU member states on a proportional basis. This would be made not as fiscal transfers between states but rather in the form of sound investments that would provide sound returns.

In addition, the matching funding criteria for member states should be amended to a 75:25 ratio, with the European Investment Bank providing the larger portion. With this enlarged fund, the European Investment Bank would work in partnership with those member states experiencing severe recession to roll out major projects in order to generate employment, increase competitiveness and improve the social and economic infrastructure. This would, in turn, lead to both immediate and long-term economic growth. In the first instance, this EU-wide investment programme would aim to kick-start those economies experiencing recession and assist them in reducing their deficits. An enlarged European Investment Bank working with member state governments would not only provide assistance in dealing with the immediate problem of under-investment, it would also help to address the underlying imbalances in the eurozone between those member states with excessive surpluses and those with excessive deficits.

In parallel with this major investment programme, there is a need to reduce the debt burden of certain member states. I refer, in particular, to Greece and Ireland which have unsustainable levels of debt. This can only be achieved by writing down a portion of the debt held by the sovereigns. In Ireland's case, this could be done by writing down debts that were originally banking debts, while continuing to honour real sovereign debt. In the first instance, this would require lifting the obligation on the State and the taxpayer in respect of the Anglo Irish Bank promissory note. This could be achieved by agreement with the ECB and would reduce our debt to GDP ratio by up to 20%.

There is also an urgent need to cleanse the banking system of the as yet undisclosed and unquantified toxic assets on balance sheets. This could only be done by imposing rigorous stress tests, including not only in respect of banks' loan books but also their exposure to sovereign debt and all special purpose vehicles used for toxic assets such as credit default swaps and collateralised debt obligations. These new stress tests should be followed by a process of writing down portions of the banks' toxic debts and deleveraging assets in order to refocus the banking system on the needs of the real economy. Only after such a process should the European Central Bank provide any capital required for the recapitalisation of the cleansed banks.

Sinn Féin will not be supporting the Bill. Whereas some will argue that it is a demonstration of solidarity with the people of Greece, the opposite is the case. The emergency funding being provided for Greece comes with conditions attached that are nothing short of an assault on the economic and social well-being of the Greek people.

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