Dáil debates
Wednesday, 21 September 2011
European Financial Stability Facility and Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment) Bill 2011: Second Stage (Resumed)
1:00 pm
Shane Ross (Dublin South, Independent)
I take Deputy Donohoe's point about those who oppose this Bill having an obligation to state from where the necessary money will come, which is a fair debating point. It does not mean one cannot be critical either of what has been going on or of the bones of this Bill. However, perhaps the Opposition, like all Oppositions, should make suitable suggestions - not a popular thing to do - about where there should be cuts in public expenditure or increases in taxation in order to bridge the gap of €15 billion.
I wish to address this Bill and the extraordinary lack of urgency, alluded to by Deputy Pringle. The Minister will know this was agreed initially in June, ratified in July and has now come before the Dáil in September. One assumes it will be passed shortly by the Seanad and will then become part of our law. However, it will be delayed by a large number of problems further away in Europe, particularly by the fall of a government in eastern Europe, and therefore will not be ratified in that quarter for a certain period.
It seems to me there is an extraordinary lack of urgency both about what is happening in Europe and the attack on this problem. I mentioned this on Leaders' Questions today. I would have thought it would be embarrassing for the leaders of Europe, the Commission and Heads of Government to come under such attack from external and impartial independent sources such as the IMF as they have recently done. Without any doubt, they have been accused of being bunglers and should take much more dramatic steps than those they are taking. The expression used by the chief economist yesterday, namely, that they should get going and act in a much faster way is criticism of a major sort on the part of the IMF to a body that has apparently been posturing with regard to taking action about its problems.
It is not only the fact that this particular piece of legislation will not be passed by all the member states for many months but also that a series of so-called suggestions was suggested which has not got us anywhere. I would be interested to hear the Minister's comments on the reaction to Mr. Geithner at the weekend. The result of the meeting he attended in Poland was, to outsiders, desperately disappointing because no decisions were taken. It seems that Europe is paralysed in its response to the debt problem in a way which could be fatal for certain currencies and the sovereign debts of certain nations. It is very hard for observers to believe in the credibility of the two principal leaders in Europe when they have met so often and so often emerged from meetings with sticking plaster solutions. They meet specifically to satisfy the markets and in an effort to reassure them that the two great powers are in charge, are doing something about the debt problem, will move everybody else into order and Europe will move ahead as a single entity. The reality, of course, is that these two people who are leading Europe in its supposed crusade for a way out of this problem are paralysed politically and are working to very precise political agendas. One is thankful that their agenda is not one which the Government, or our Minister for Finance, must necessarily dance to - they do not have the same electoral timetable.
The realpolitik is that when President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel meet, apparently to produce solutions, they produce nothing other than a few sticking plasters such as this one. They emerge from these meetings and suggest that all is well but on each occasion in June, July and September, the markets have turned on them, unconvinced by what they have had to say. That is not a satisfactory way out of what is a very deep problem. When both the Treasury Secretary of the United States and the IMF claim that the problem is not being tackled and that the leaders should get on their bikes and do something about it we should wake up and take notice. It appears that we must wait for elections in France and Germany before it can be resolved in any meaningful way or even that there be any resolution or determination to resolve it.
I question the credibility of the President of France in giving any leadership on this issue. As every Member present knows, France is fatally exposed to the Greek banks. Two of the three principal French banks were re-rated and downgraded last week by the ratings agencies simply because of that exposure. It means that they are in the same sort of boat as are many of the other banks in Europe. Therefore, the unthinkable must be thought. For Mr. Sarkozy to be presented as giving some kind of stable leadership is just not credible and the markets have recognised that. These two leaders and their meetings to sort out the problem are the worst thing that could have happened. I believe Alan Dukes said as much on a radio programme. They should be stopped from meeting because it damages the efforts being made by people of goodwill in the Commission and elsewhere. It damages the efforts of nations running good, strong economies when someone from a country with an economy which is weak and vulnerable to the same attacks as those being endured by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece poses as the person who is going to solve the problem. That individual is not going to be successful. We should remove President Sarkozy from the pitch, in so far as is possible, and tell him to solve the problems in France rather than informing us how we should solve ours. The main difficulty relates to the agendas to which these people dance.
The EFSF is fatally flawed to some extent. It represents an effort to intervene in the debt markets. Essentially, it involves establishing a fund to be used to engage in the buy-back of bonds in these markets. That is a completely artificial operation. I gained experience in this area during my time as a stockbroker and when I was involved with investment trusts. I have witnessed what happens when one engages in a buy-back. I have approved buy-backs and I am aware that they only work in a very temporary way. If they are not accompanied by fundamental attacks on the problem, they will only last a few minutes or a few months. Whereas it is obviously the policy to increase the €440 billion by a great deal, the markets see that figure as a target. That is all. It is a sum of money, an artificial way to prop up an economy without necessarily attacking the fundamental problems by which that economy is beset.
We have lost a huge amount of valuable time as a result of the two principal leaders in Europe stating the funding available to the EFSF is going to be increased, that the facility's powers will be expanded, that it will have greater scope to intervene in markets and that this will solve the problem for now. It is not going to solve it. It may provide temporary relief, but the only action that will convince the markets is the leaders of the two main nations in Europe stopping jumping to the tune of the domestic political agendas in their countries and stating they are going to try to save the euro in a meaningful way. That includes tackling the problems relating to debts, deficits and other matters in their own countries.
I would be interested to hear the Minister's comments on Mr. Geithner's suggestion at the meeting in Poland that the fund should be leveraged up. That would be a dangerous development. Leveraging means borrowing. I understand Mr. Geithner to be suggesting we should go into the markets, obtain a facility which is five times the size of the facility we already possess and then show this to these markets and state "This is our firepower". Again, that would be filling a larger hole in the dyke. I am not sure whether the Minister should necessarily regard Mr. Geithner's suggestion as a solution. When the amount to which the latter refers proves to be insufficient, are we supposed to seek even more money? The markets will attack any weakness they perceive.
Eurobonds are put forward by many of the weaker states as being one of the solutions to this intractable problem. Is it true that the weak states are in favour of their introduction and that the strong states are opposed to them? These bonds are seen by the weak states as a way of supporting their economies. The strong states, particularly Germany, are against them because they do not wish to underwrite European debt in its entirety.
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