Michael Noonan (Limerick East, Fine Gael)

In the time available tonight, this extraordinary Bill will receive little scrutiny. The Minister is proposing to take to himself extraordinary and very strong powers. I mean no disrespect to the Minister and his Department when I say their banking policy has not inspired confidence up to now. The proposal to make the Minister the sole agent of the development of future banking policy, with little or no recourse to the Governor of the Central Bank, no recourse to this Parliament and no requirement to consult the Government, is absolutely extraordinary.

Deputy Burton, who has proposed this amendment, is correct in her fear that the Minister is taking to himself one of the roles of the Parliament. The power being taken is, in effect, tantamount to the power to develop new law, using some kind of order as a mechanism. That is a very dangerous precedent. If one examines the measures being proposed in the Bill, one will have serious constitutional doubts about the Minister's approach. I cannot understand why the Minister does not amend the various sections of the Bill in which he takes powers onto his shoulders in a manner that seems quite arbitrary. I suggest that the term "the Minister may, on the instructions of the Government" should be included in such sections. It is extraordinarily peculiar that emergency legislation of this nature has such a long recital, which refers to "the public interest", in order to ensure its constitutionality. It seems the Minister will be able to act as a sole agent without recourse to the Government. I would have thought that a Government decision, on which the Minister of the day would act, would be a prerequisite in anything like this. That is not how the legislation has been phrased, however.

The Minister is encroaching on the constitutional role of the Parliament. There are serious doubts about whether he is also encroaching on the separation of powers with the courts. Various sections of the Bill propose to limit access to the High Court, the scope for appeal to the Supreme Court and the power of judicial review. Another section proposes that a person who loses his or her job directly by order of the Minister of the day, or through a person appointed by him or her, cannot take a case under the Unfair Dismissals Act. I would have thought that one of the rights provided for under that Act is the right of a person to vindicate his or her constitutional rights. It is not just a right in statute law - it is founded on a constitutional right. The Minister is proposing to remove the right of such a person to access a decision on whether his or her dismissal is unfair.

The relationship the Minister will have with the Central Bank under this Bill is peculiar, to say the least. It is not in accordance with what I know of bank resolution legislation across the European Union. The Minister is ignoring the Governor of the Central Bank, in effect. Some of the Bill's provisions will require the Minister to consult the Governor, but none of them will require the Minister to take the advice of the Governor at any point. The requirement is confined to consultation. Another peculiar provision will allow the Minister to issue a directive in writing, indicating what the role of the Governor of the Central Bank is, and what the role of the Minister is, in the exercise of these functions. It seems to me, from the manner in which the section is drafted, that the Minister will be able to send a letter to the Governor telling him it is not his business to interfere with what the Minister is doing under the provisions of this legislation. It is a very peculiar approach to law.

Not only is this Bill draconian in its intent, but it is unnecessarily draconian in the manner in which it empowers the Minister. I presume it has been signed off by the Office of the Attorney General in the normal way. The Government is relying heavily on the preamble to the Bill as a kind of force majeure clause. It seems to suggest the power to ride roughshod over the Constitution is required by the Minister because things are so bad. I am not sure that, in practice, the courts will see eye-to-eye with the Minister if this legislation is challenged. I do not understand why the Governor of the Central Bank is not being given a greater role. The token provision that he be consulted is no more than a nod in his direction. Nowhere in the Bill is there an obligation to take the Governor's advice.

One peculiar section of the Bill before the House gives the Minister the power to delineate in writing where the power of the Governor of the Central Bank stops and the power of the Minister begins. I would have thought the independence of the Central Bank in law was a fundamental aspect of the monetary policy of this country. I appreciate that the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator have been criticised in recent years, but that does not detract from the principle that the Central Bank should be independent. The role of the Governor of the Central Bank is enshrined in law. He is independent in the exercise of his functions. That is a very important cornerstone of our fiscal and monetary position. However, the Minister seems to be proposing to do violence to all of that.

I know the Minister will not read the advice of the Attorney General into the record, but perhaps he can justify the legal approach being pursued in this Bill. I refer especially to the proposal to cut people off from accessing the courts.

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