Róisín Shortall (Dublin North West, Labour)

I have at least two. It is not running out, though. As I stated, the details of the proposals are far greater in scale than had been indicated by Government. The harsh unpalatable reality for the taxpayers, their children and grandchildren is that they have been lumbered with a huge debt for the foreseeable future as a direct result of the failure of Government policy. The Government's incompetence in handling the banks means the crisis is much deeper than it needs to be.

At no stage has the Minister for Finance, Deputy Brian Lenihan, taken charge. Given that he had provided a State bank guarantee scheme with such a wide scope, he was in a position to deal with the bondholders. There was a need to share the risk with the subordinated tier-two bondholders. He could have easily indicated he was considering nationalisation or letting Anglo Irish Bank go altogether. In that context, he was in a strong position to negotiate with the tier-two bondholders. The Government should have also negotiated with the tier-one bondholders; the ones who took the highest risks must realise there is a price to be paid. If the Minister had dealt with the crisis adequately, he could have told them he would not have bailed them out and sought a sharing of risk.

We are told there is a guarantee of a 4% return on the promissory notes for Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide. There is absolutely no guarantee of such a return, like we saw with last year's recapitalisation.

The Minister for Finance denied cuts in public sector pay are funding a bailout for the banks. This is simply untrue as for the next 15 years the State will face an annual bill for €1 billion to bail out Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide.

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