Michael D Higgins (Galway West, Labour)

-----it could be an unsecured instrument or derivative that is without real value. Why are we in this difficulty? Why is there an absence of definitional exactitude in section 4 and a type of metaphysical chapter in section 70? I believe it is to cover the fact that €7 billion over the achievable value, regardless of what way one dances around it, is being transferred for assets to the banks. There were alternatives to that. Given the position of the agency being in place and purchasing loans and so forth, why is it not doing so at market value? If we had given what is an estimated market value and decided that the banks, in order to come on board in the context of liquidity, needed something extra and given them €7 billion, we would have got equity for it. It would thereby have been possible to have some form of control over the decision-making culture of the bank. I could see the intention in that situation.

The €47 billion plus €7 billion gives a total of €54 billion. It is crucial that the Minister clarify another fundamental point about the bonds that are related to this before we conclude this debate at 8 p.m. Who exactly will issue these? This must be clarified. Will NAMA or the SPV issue these bonds? If it is the SPV, there are huge implications with regard to the 51:49 ratio of participation and the yield which might flow to the private investors, whoever they may be.

A number of Members have referred to how the public views this scheme. Those of us who have a particular political position are regularly lectured about our inability to accept the disciplines of the market. In this case, however, banks and particularly their bondholders and shareholders are not asked to accept the disciplines of the market. Instead, the taxpayers are confronted with a curious proposition, that we must socialise the losses. If all these assets had been performing, there would not have been a socialising of the profits. One gets the idea that this is the old game of socialising the loss and privatising the profit. When we have finally understood the relationship of the SPV to NAMA and the bondholders, we will know precisely what the attractive yield is to the private component. It is crucial for us to know that.

I wish we were discussing all of these matters. The valuation chapter, which is section 70, should have been taken along with this. It is not entirely innocent that there is an absence of definitions in section 4 and a later chapter. We will not reach that chapter now, which is the point. It is not the Members who have sat on these benches for all of this debate who are delaying this Stage. We wanted all of these issues grouped so, for example, the two fundamental big issues that remain could be discussed in the amount of time available. One is the valuation chapter and the second is transparency and the appearance of the chairman and the chief executive before whatever type of committee that will be established. The likelihood is that we will not reach those, and I regret that. I hope the Minister will take the opportunity of replying on amendment No. 16 to anticipate the questions we will not reach in chapter 70.

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