Trevor Sargent (Dublin North, Green Party)

Tá díospóireacht thar a bheith tábhachtach ar siúl anseo. Nuair a foilsíodh an dréacht den reachtaíocht seo ar 30 Iúil i mbliana, cuireadh tús leis an díospóireacht. B'shin an cuspóir a bhí ag an Aire Airgeadais ag an am. Tá sé tábhachtach go mbeadh díospóireacht chuimsitheach againn.

In the time during which the debate has been held we have all been reminded that we are not here for the first time. Many of the problems under discussion have been aired previously, especially when my party was in Opposition. I refer to the way in which the property bubble was overheated and the unsustainable nature of that practice. Unfortunately, this has all been borne out in subsequent events. However, going back will not help us other than to allow us to appreciate that this has not taken place recently but has been brewing for a long time.

There is no one Minister for Finance or Government that represents the beginning and the end of this matter. However, I hope that everyone, having considered the matter, can appreciate that one of the mistakes we made was to treat money as a commodity. It was considered more important than food, caring or any of the other important responsibilities in society; it was an end in itself. However, such a commodity is not like cars or computers or the tangible parts of an economy which we all need. In fact, it is no more or less than a mechanism of barter. That may be difficult for people who deal with money all the time to appreciate because they are so sucked up in the accumulative nature of money, which is based around the economic growth model that has taken root. However, it is important to bear in mind that it is a mechanism of barter which allows people to specialise, and for all that it is very necessary and useful.

It means that not everyone has to be a mechanic because we can pay someone to repair the car. Not everyone has to be a farmer, but we can pay a fair price to people to grow our food. Not everyone has to be a builder either because others can build the houses we need. There are people who like to be a jack-of-all-trades and good luck to them, but they are rare and very special people. Ultimately, money allows us to have specialists so that society can develop and the quality of life improves as a result. However, we now have an urgent problem that cannot be debated for much longer. We need to act and that action requires some type of asset management agency. It is a painful readjustment strategy and must succeed because I do not want to contemplate failure.

It has to succeed in rebuilding trust and recapitalising our money system. Essentially, that trust is where I feel we need to do more work in the Green Party. We need to ensure that the social dividend aspect of the legislation delivers on the deal. The public is being asked to share the pain, so it must ensure that it gets the gain also. That is part of the equation. If it is to be trustworthy, it must deliver sufficient regulation. We have had a failure of regulation, which is clear in hindsight. Countries like Canada, which are not currently in the same difficulties - although they have a recession and there is much unemployment - were very strict when banks wanted to merge and would not allow that to happen. They could not overlook that situation. Likewise, the windfall tax is an aspect of community gain if a community has to take pain. There has been disquiet among IFA members, for example, on that situation, but people must distinguish between somebody who needs to build a house for a son or daughter, which is not a developer-style or re-zoning situation, and somebody in the large-scale developer league, with which we are all too familiar. I hope discussions can take place which will clarify and satisfy those concerns.

I have received a number of e-mails and would like to read part of one into the record. It is from a senior member of staff in a money-brokering division of a large stockbroker firm. To my mind, the correspondent has elucidated what people need to hear. I do not wish to name this person but the House will understand when I read part of the e-mail. As regards NAMA, he thinks it is a clever piece of legislation and the safeguards included are more than sufficient to safeguard the taxpayer. From his e-mail address, one can see that he works in a well respected stockbroking firm. One might say, "He would say that, wouldn't he?", and he is obviously inviting people to be suspicious, but if Members listen further I think they will agree that he has something worthwhile to say.

The area he works in is highly specialised. He is in a managing director's role in a money-brokering division and is probably best placed to see the effects the funding crisis has had on the banks. He states that the crisis has been brewing since May 2007 and he adds that it is fair to say that our institutions are close to pariah status in international money markets. He firmly believes that the NAMA proposal will solve this, as it will improve the loan-to-deposit ratio so significantly that it will see a flow of new funding into the country by next spring. He states that we will have the first set of clean balance sheets in Europe and a significant first mover advantage. He asks provocatively if it is a bailout for the banks and he answers: "Absolutely." He also asks if the banks deserve to be nationalised for their behaviour and the answer again is "Absolutely". He then asks if there is an alternative to the NAMA plan, but he does not believe there is a radical one. There may be variations on a theme, but no major alternative.

In his opinion, based on 20 years as a money broker, the implications for sovereign and bank funding if AIB and Bank of Ireland were to be nationalised would be nothing short of catastrophic. The flow of funds out of the country would be so significant that, he states, we would have the ECB and IMF here within weeks of it happening. People may ask why but, he states, the answer is evident from the flow of funds out of Anglo Irish Bank since it was nationalised, which he estimates to be in excess of €15 billion. Why does this happen? Simply put, an investor with €100 million to lend to Ireland this time last year lent €20 million to AIB, €20 million to Bank of Ireland, €20 million to Irish Life & Permanent and €20 million to Anglo Irish Bank and bought €20 million of Irish Government bonds. Once the crisis started, the overall limit of €100 million was probably reduced by anything from 20% to 100%. Let us assume the investor reduced his overall limit by 20% to €80 million and his individual limits to €16 million each.

See this speech in context