Micheál Martin (Cork South Central, Fianna Fail)

I debated the issues with Deputy Higgins on Committee Stage. Section 2 makes provision for the interpretation of key terms as defined in the conventions on cluster munitions and the ban on anti-personnel mines. The key issue is consistency with what has been negotiated with all the other states. The success of the Dublin convention was the fact that up to 114 different countries arrived in Dublin and we managed to reach an agreement. If different states were to define these key terms in their domestic legislation in different ways, co-operation between the parties to the convention would become extremely complex and would inevitably frustrate future coherent implementation of the convention itself.

The area of definitions was one of the most difficult in agreeing the convention. It is important that when we are negotiating with other states that we demonstrate our bona fides subsequently. It could cause considerable difficulty in the future when one is working with like-minded states to develop international conventions on other issues. If, subsequently, each member state does its own thing there would be a breakdown in terms of collegiality and the sense of confidence that is necessary when like-minded states work together.

The impact of the amendment would be to blur the distinction between an anti-personnel mine and an anti-tank mine equipped with an anti-handling device. The first is prohibited by the anti-personnel mine ban convention, while the second is not. In essence, there would be an undesirable level of uncertainty concerning anti-tank mines equipped with anti-handling devices if we were to accept the amendment.

Let me return to the fundamental point. Applying standards in our laws that differ from those being adopted by other states party to the convention would risk, at best, severely complicating international co-operation in the implementation of the convention. As I stated on Committee Stage, of equal importance is the fact that the proposed amendments would effectively prevent the Defence Forces from participating in peacekeeping or other similar missions with almost any other country, whether it was a party to the convention, because we would have implemented a different standard of prohibition. The prohibition relates not just to the use of the defined munition — in this case, an anti-personnel mine — but also to assisting any other country that might use it. If the Irish definition is different from the agreed convention definition, other countries may very well be using a munition prohibited under Irish law but permitted by the convention. The purpose of the convention is, conversely, to standardise prohibitions.

On the proposed repeal of section 30(1)(e) of the Defence Act 1954, I have consulted the Minister for Defence, as I said I would do on Committee Stage. His position is that he cannot accept the amendment. The provision concerned is an enabling one only permitting the Minister for Defence to lay mines. However, it must be exercised in accordance with the State's international legal obligations, including the anti-personnel mine ban convention, the convention on certain conventional weapons and the Geneva Conventions.

The term "mines" in the 1954 Act is not restricted to anti-personnel mines but includes anti-tank mines and sea mines. The laying of any of these mines may only be done in accordance with applicable international law. In the case of anti-personnel mines, that means only for the purpose of training in mine clearance techniques, in accordance with the provisions of the convention. Moreover, repeal of the section would raise doubts as to the lawfulness of laying any mine because the statutory power to do so would have been distinguished. This, in turn, would greatly complicate the ability of the Defence Forces to train for clearance and destruction, among other purposes. That is the rationale for not accepting the amendment.

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