Thomas Byrne (Meath East, Fianna Fail)

I might talk a little bit about Grangegeeth if I run out of steam on this. One would have a raft of legal cases and could get damages from each one. Section 10 will provide for a general rule, which is a sensible one, that only one cause of action will lie in respect of multiple publication. The Bill allows a person to bring, with the consent of the court, actions in respect of multiple publications in certain circumstances.

I have slight concerns about section 11. I look forward to discussing this Bill in the Oireachtas Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights, of which I am a member. This is a very good committee and we will miss its former Chairman, Deputy Peter Power, who has been promoted to a junior Ministry. When we discuss this Bill, we will address section 11, which allows a body corporate, such as a company or even a Minister, who is a body corporate, to bring a defamation action, regardless of whether the company has suffered financial loss from the alleged defamation. Companies must have rights to sue for defamation where their reputation has been damaged but we cannot have multinationals bullying members of the public like a certain multinational did in the McLibel case, which was a bit heavy-handed.

I have seen cases in my constituency involving a legal issue or row where a writ for slander or libel, which is really there to silence people, is issued. I am concerned about the proposals for body corporates. Perhaps there should be some restriction on companies bringing libel actions. There should be some restriction on people bringing actions which are just used to silence people and which are not really part of the main dispute. At the same time, a body corporate needs to be able to defend itself and can incur huge losses if lies are printed about it.

It is very important to remember that, by virtue of the Constitution and this Bill, anything we say in this Chamber cannot be taken up in any court proceedings, be they libel, slander, tribunals or cross-examination. I know that the court action brought by Deputy Bertie Ahern in respect of this has been successful in the High Court, which I very much welcome. We can say what we like in here without being worried about being sued for libel or slander but it is a heavy responsibility on us. The Standing Orders of the House provide some regulation in respect of that but it is an internal regulation of the House and is not something for which we can be answerable before the courts.

Traditionally, there were a number of defences to libel and slander, what we will now call defamation. One of them was known as the defence of justification. This Bill will rename it truth, which it always was. The justification simply meant that something was true so if one said something about someone, one went to court and said that it was true. Of course, one had to prove that it was true. If one did this, there was no case for defamation. It is very sensible that the law of justification, as it was called, is kept but is renamed the truth, which is what it is. Justification is an obsolete word if it ever meant truth.

Section 15 deals with absolute privilege. This is where there are circumstances where one can say what one likes without the person concerned having any recourse. Utterances in this House are the subject of absolute privilege. This is guaranteed by the Constitution but is also reiterated in this legislation. Members of the European Parliament have the same privilege, as do members of Dáil committees, although we are often reminded that witnesses coming before the committees do not have the same absolute privilege as members. A judge has absolute privilege in performing his functions in court. That is to be welcomed, is sensible and does not need explanation.

The Bill goes on to mention statements made in tribunals. They have absolute privilege but, again, it is incumbent on tribunals to be aware, as they are, of their responsibilities to regulate their use of absolute privilege. That is to be welcomed. An example would be a coroner who has absolute privilege in the course of his verdict or inquiries during an inquest. Absolute privilege will remain. There is no action for defamation; a person can say what they like. It is in the public interest and the public good that a judge or Member of the Oireachtas does not have to worry about being sued.

Section 16 gives a statutory basis for qualified privilege. As far as I know, this is a new provision that was developed under court decisions over many years. Qualified privilege means that one has privilege to say something but it is not absolute and can be withdrawn in certain cases. Generally speaking, this covers people who have a duty to receive information. If one reports something to the gardaí in good faith, qualified privilege applies. One cannot be sued for it unless, under the old law, one did it with malice, which is different from doing it maliciously. One did it with malice, as legally defined. One could not be sued because it is in the public interest that this be done and that people would go to the gardaí before they would think of being sued for reporting a crime or on someone who they believed had done some wrong. The person receiving the information has a duty to receive it, but the person giving it must have an interest in doing so. That is the double requirement. This qualified privilege, where one has a defence to libel and slander and cannot be sued in certain circumstances, is removed if one knew at the time that it was not true. Traditionally, the phrase was that one did it with malice.

The Bill goes on to set out in section 17 the different requirements. The fact that they are being set out is welcome. The word "malice" was badly defined and many people did not necessarily know exactly what it meant. It is welcome that the Minister has set out exactly what is required. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant did not believe the statement was true; that the defendant acted out of bad faith, spite, ill will or improper motive; or that the statement bore no relation to the purpose of the defence and so on. It is good that this has been set out very clearly because often these things can be the subject of considerable debate in court. This only adds to legal costs and court actions and makes things less likely to be settled when the law is not set out clearly. It is welcome that this be done.

A very important provision is section 20 which will allow an offer to make amends. This allows a person who has published a statement that is alleged to be defamatory of another person to make an offer to make amends. This must be in writing, must state what it is and must state what it is talking about, namely, whether the person is retracting the entire statement or is only talking about part of it. An offer to make amends includes things like making a correction, issuing an apology and paying damages and legal costs, if necessary. That is very important because it encourages people to settle these cases where a newspaper has made a genuine mistake and does not want to go down the road of court action. Under current legislation, a plaintiff, someone who has been the victim of defamation, might feel it more worth their while to go to court and not settle if they feel that a jury would be beneficial to them. We know that juries, who are only used in libel and slander cases in the High Court, are very unpredictable. Sometimes they can give massive amounts of money because they value the damage done to the victim, while at other times they can give a decision that makes one wonder how they came to that decision.

Decisions on defamation in the High Court are solely the preserve of a jury. They are some of the few cases left where a jury makes a decision in a civil case.

In the Circuit Court there is no jury and the decision is made by the judge. The threshold in the Circuit Court, generally, is approximately €38,000. That has been increased for defamation cases to €50,000, which is a nice round figure. This provision may encourage more people to go to the Circuit Court rather than the High Court where, hopefully, the cases can be dealt with expeditiously. However, there are some Circuit Courts in the country where there is an enormous backlog of cases, which is not the fault of the judges. In those circumstances, people might not want to go to the Circuit Court because they could be waiting for some years and might opt instead to have their cases heard in the High Court, which may be quicker.

The Bill introduces welcome reform to the area of defamation. Members on all sides of the House will support anything that makes the law less complicated. This legislation has already been examined in the Seanad and will be scrutinised by the Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights. The old offences of criminal libel, seditious libel and obscene libel are abolished. I do not believe they have been used in this country for some time although I recall that Ms Mary Whitehouse tried to bring prosecutions for such offences in England over certain publications. If those provisions are not being used by the Director of Public Prosecutions in day-to-day practice and do not relate to modern-day living, it is as well that they are abolished. There is no point in having offences listed on the Statute Book that are not used as it makes a mockery of the law.

The limitation period for the initiation of a case is being reduced, which I welcome. Currently the limitation is six years for libel and three years for slander, and this is to be reduced to one year, although in certain cases the court can allow for a longer period. Shorter limitation periods are the way forward. Certainly a victim must be given sufficient time to decide whether to take a case but the old six-year limitation period was too long. A plaintiff could bring proceedings against a defendant five years and ten months after the event, making fair proceedings very difficult. A period of one year is reasonable. Of course, in any defamation action, it was always deemed to be a bad mark against a plaintiff if he or she did not take the action quickly. A judge or jury, in those circumstances, would ask what the plaintiff was doing in the intervening period and wonder why he or she was not worried about his or her reputation or good name.

I welcome this Bill, which is one of many items on the desk of the new Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I hope that the Dáil and the Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights works through the Bill as quickly as possible so we can get it on to the Statute Book. The Bill will reduce costs to the court system, to plaintiffs and defendants. It will also allow the media some more leeway through the creation of a new defence of honest opinion. This will give newspapers and the media generally a little more freedom, but that carries with it a responsibility which they must exercise judiciously. They must report the news and their opinions, with which we have no problem, but they must respect people's right to their good name and that of their family. The media have a lot to gain from this Bill in terms of more freedom and less worry but they must give something in return. If they continue to do their job properly, we will continue to support them.

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