Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)

I move amendmentNo. 38:

In page 13, to delete lines 1 to 47, and in page 14, to delete lines 1 to 17.

Amendment No. 38 encapsulates my intention in respect of this section, which deals with electronic monitoring of certain persons who have been given bail. We argued the practicalities of and the flaws relating to the electronic tagging system last year when we debated what became the Criminal Justice Act 2006. I remain unconvinced as regards the system but that is not my key point.

My main point regarding the electronic monitoring of persons on bail is that it impinges upon the presumption of innocence. In my view, tagging represents a dangerous development. The Tánaiste stated last year that his support for it was waning but I have not seen anything since which indicates that his enthusiasm has been re-energised, particularly when one considers that provisions enacted last year have not yet come into effect and the pilot scheme has not commenced. Reviews carried out in England, which has a similar scheme, indicate that it has proven to be twice as expensive to electronically tag offenders as it would be to have them supervised by members of the probation and welfare service. I have argued that the proper resourcing of the probation and welfare service here would go a long way towards addressing the key concerns that sparked some people's interest in electronic monitoring.

There is also a presumption that electronic monitoring will prove to be the be all and end all and that it will solve some of the problems to which others referred as regards people associating with known gang members, etc., and in respect of restricting their movements. Electronic tagging or monitoring only confines people to specified areas or allows them to be tracked; it does not deal with those who visit such individuals — be they repeat offenders, bail offenders or whatever — or those who become involved in a common cause with them.

Rather than privatising an aspect of Irish criminal law, I urge that we should use the traditional methods and provide proper funding for the probation and welfare service in this regard. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report on the service in 2004 indicated that it was effective and provided good value for money. However, it has not been properly resourced to ensure that it can deliver at a higher level than has been the case in recent years.

The main point regarding electronic tagging, and the concerns I raised in the past, has been echoed in some of the observations made by various groups in respect of this matter. If we had more time to debate the Bill, we could have examined this matter in greater detail and considered evidence as to the effectiveness or otherwise of tagging. We could also have investigated whether it impinges on existing rights. The Human Rights Commission has cited a number of rights it believes would be impinged upon. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, it has been stated that tagging would amount to the surveillance of people who are presumed innocent, that it would equate to their being monitored electronically, and would interfere with their rights to private and family lives and to freedom and peaceful assembly and association. There are also rights guaranteed under the Constitution upon which this provision could potentially impinge.

The other aspect of this matter relates to the wide discretion that is given regarding the type and content of orders that can be granted in respect of electronic monitoring. As already stated, potential exists in the context of the violation of fundamental human rights. I accept, however, that we are discussing people who would have been charged with, in some instances, violating the human rights of victims and interfering with their right to private and family lives.

As stated earlier, there is a presumption in the justice system in this State that a person is innocent until proven guilty. However, this provision, and some of the other measures introduced in recent years, cuts back on that presumption of innocence. Electronic monitoring involves tagging people with something similar to the yellow star that Jews in Nazi Germany were obliged to wear. Most tagging systems involve the wearing of some type of device which sets a person apart from others. The bail system does not set people apart. It does, however, respect the presumption of innocence and allows individuals, until such time as they are either found guilty by the courts or set at liberty having being found not guilty, to continue their working and family lives and to draw up a proper defence. People are not made outcasts under the bail system because they are not obliged to wear electronic devices or whatever.

I have already argued the case in respect of giving away responsibility for another aspect of our criminal justice system to the private sector. However, it is terrifying that the State is increasingly delegating its responsibilities in respect of crime control and justice to the private sector without providing a full explanation as to how companies which operate in that sector will be held to account and monitored, the level of expertise they will possess and what the cost will be to existing services such as the probation and welfare service. I ask that this part of the Bill be struck out and at the very least that we see the results of the pilot programme promised, by the Tánaiste when the Criminal Justice Act 2006 was passed, dealing with the electronic tagging of people who were convicted. This was a different matter altogether and although I had problems with it, it had more logic than the provision suggested here.

See this speech in context