Michael McDowell (Dublin South East, Progressive Democrats)

Reports from eminent persons which are critical of the Garda Síochána are not to be taken lightly. What I have said and, more important, done clearly illustrates that they have not been taken lightly. The programme of reform undertaken was recognition, even before the publication of the critical reports, that fundamental issues affecting the Garda Síochána had to be urgently addressed.

The State depends on the Garda Síochána for the protection of its citizens and its security against those who would threaten its existence. We are indebted to the vast majority of those upstanding, diligent and courageous members of the Garda who since the foundation of the State have served the Irish people with honour and distinction. We continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms the horrendous and reprehensible events of almost a decade ago. As we take radical steps to ensure such events never recur, we should not condemn and vilify the Garda Síochána as a whole but support the organisation in its radical transformation, under Commissioner Conroy and his team, into a modern, fully accountable and transparent professional police service. I am confident that this sentiment prevails among members of the public and the Garda Síochána and that there is support for the force as it continues its unprecedented expansion through a major recruitment drive for trainee and reserve gardaí.

I and members of the public still retain full confidence in the Garda Síochána as an organisation. Its members are in the front line in the fight against crime and deserve our full support. During my term in office and that of my predecessor, we have continually increased the financial and human resources made available to the force. Unlike our critics in the Opposition parties who oversaw a decrease in the size of the Garda Síochána when last in office, we have increased the size of the force. I have honoured the Government commitment and overseen the recruitment of a further 2,000 Garda trainees. The force is more than 20% larger in size than it was in 1997. Similarly, the Garda budget is more than €1.3 billion, 85% greater than in 1997. I have assured the Garda Commissioner that he will not lack resources to fight crime.

I turn now to those inquiries which have examined allegations of wrongdoing by members of the Garda Síochána. The House has an opportunity to address the issues raised in six of these reports, namely, the reports of Mr. Justice Frederick Morris on the Ardara, silver bullet and Burnfoot modules of his tribunal's work, Mr. Justice Robert Barr concerning his tribunal's inquiry into the fatal shooting of Mr. John Carthy, Mr. George Birmingham SC regarding his commission of investigation into the Dean Lyons case and Mr. Dermot Nally, Mr. Joseph Brosnan and Mr. Eamon Barnes in relation to the report submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland raising concerns about the alleged activity of certain Garda officers during 1998. On behalf of the Government, I look forward to a vigorous, balanced and responsible examination of their reports over the next two days.

I do not want to avail of the time afforded to me simply to reprise all the reports' findings. The findings of Mr. Justice Morris's reports on the Ardara, Burnfoot and silver bullet modules have been in the public domain since late August. The Government took the unusual step last May of issuing a statement on the contents of the reports, even though publication was not permitted by the High Court at that stage owing to an impending criminal trial. That step was taken because of the serious implications of the reports' conclusions for the force.

Detective Sergeant John White is a central figure in all three reports, notwithstanding that they all deal with separate incidents. He is also the focus of the Nally report to which I shall return later. The silver bullet module report concluded that Detective Sergeant White, with the co-operation of Garda John Nicholson, induced a member of the public, Mr. Bernard Conlon, for the promise of reward, to be "found on" Mr. Frank McBrearty's licensed premises after hours. In this context, Mr. Conlon was paid expenses from public funds to which he was not entitled.

The Ardara report concludes that the self same Detective Sergeant White was responsible for placing an explosive device on a telecommunications mast at Ardara in Donegal so that persons suspected of arson at the site could be falsely arrested under section 30 of the Offences against the State Acts. Perhaps the most damning report of all is the Burnfoot report, which concludes that Detective Sergeant White and Detective Garda Thomas Kilcoyne deliberately planted a weapon at a campsite of the Traveller community on Friday, 22 May 1998. This was done, it is alleged, with a view to ensuring that a search which was then planned and in respect of which warrants were issued under section 29 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 for the following day, would be successful. This, in turn, would facilitate an arrest under section 30 of that Act. Further, the tribunal concluded that Detective Sergeant Conaty, Garda Mulligan and Garda Leonard entered into a conspiracy, a primary motivation being to help Detective Sergeant White to escape a criminal charge.

Two of the foregoing members, Garda Mulligan and Garda Leonard, have since been dismissed. A further member, Sergeant Conaty, is retired and Detective Sergeant White is the subject of an ongoing disciplinary process under section 14 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005.

A common theme in both the Ardara and Burnfoot reports was a shocking abuse of process by members of the Garda Síochána to make the provisions of the Offences against the State Acts available to them when making arrests. The Burnfoot report indicates that the tribunal was disturbed by the manner in which search warrants under section 29 of the Offences Against the State Act are issued by Garda superintendents. The tribunal recommended that urgent consideration be given to vesting the power to issue warrants, under section 29 of the Offences against the State Act, in judges of the District Court and Circuit Court, rather than in officers of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent, as at present. The tribunal recognised that there are very limited occasions upon which time would be so pressing as to make it impossible to follow such a procedure and that, in any event, a residual power for such eventuality could still be vested in a senior officer of the Garda Síochána to be used in exceptional circumstances.

I share fully the tribunal's concerns about the abuse of warrants and accept the recommendation of the tribunal to the effect that statutory provisions in this regard should be considered. In light of the findings of the tribunal I did not proceed with proposals in the Criminal Justice Act, based on recommendations by an expert group on the criminal law, to extend the search warrant powers available to the Garda pending consideration of the issues raised by the tribunal. I propose to address this issue by way of amending legislation. My intention is to propose provisions which will replace section 29 so as to define as closely as possible the exceptional circumstances in which warrants may be issued by members of the Garda Síochána. I also intend to designate a rank higher than superintendent to perform this function, place strict timescales on such warrants and introduce an effective element of oversight independent of the Garda Síochána on the operation of such warrants.

I will return to the wider implications of these Morris reports but first I will say a word about the Nally report. As I stated, there is a link between the subject matter of the Morris reports and the subject matter of the Nally report, namely, Detective Sergeant John White. On 22 March 2002, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Mrs. Nuala O'Loan, an officer from outside the jurisdiction to whom Detective Sergeant White chose to make certain allegations, presented a report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the allegations in question. My predecessor then established a group under the former Secretary to the Government, Mr. Dermot Nally, including Mr. Joe Brosnan, former Secretary of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, and Mr. Eamon Barnes, former Director of Public Prosecutions, to examine matters arising from that report. The group's report came to hand in mid-2003.

This report has already been the subject of some debate in this House on two previous occasions, once in December 2003 and again in February 2004. On the latter occasion, I made a commitment to produce an edited version of the report once criminal proceedings against Detective Sergeant John White were disposed of. This commitment was given not on the basis that any public interest would be served in disseminating allegations which had been found to be baseless but in deference to the wishes of the families of the victims of the Omagh atrocity, an atrocity that marked one of the darkest days in the history of this island.

That commitment, however, was subject to the understanding that, even with the criminal proceedings being disposed of, I could not publish the report in full because of the security sensitivity of some of the information it contained. I indicated at that time that I would publish an edited version of the report in due course. The reason for this is that the subject matter of the report, to use the words of the group that prepared it,

deals with highly sensitive matters involving the security of the State and possible risk to the lives of individuals. It also describes Garda operational procedures and methods, public disclosure of which could adversely affect future operations.

I believe that I have given effect to my commitment by placing copies of a heavily edited version of the report in the Oireachtas Library and making copies available to all Deputies and Senators in advance of this debate. I also gave copies in confidence to the leaders of the two main Opposition parties. My inability to give a fuller account did not sit easily with me given the gravity of the allegations made. Consequently, I hope that this edited version will be seen as a legitimate balance between the public interest in full accountability and the exigencies of the security requirements of the State.

The main allegations made by Detective Sergeant John White against senior members of the Garda Síochána are a matter of public record, as are the principal findings of the Nally group. In essence, the Nally group concluded "that there is no foundation for the allegations made .... and that those allegations were a direct consequence of and were motivated solely by concerns arising from the difficulties in which he [Detective Sergeant White] found himself with his superiors in the Garda Síochána and with the criminal law".

In the House previously, I outlined the categories under which the Nally group characterised the allegations made but, in so far as Omagh is concerned, the main suggestion in the public domain was to the effect that the Garda failed to pass on to the RUC information which could have prevented the Omagh bombing. However, as can be seen from the edited version of the Nally report, no such allegation was ever made to the group. Rather, the core allegations about events preceding the Omagh bombing were that a senior Garda officer would have been prepared, if a vehicle had in fact been stolen, to allow it to go through to protect an informant and that no intelligence was passed to the RUC about information, alleged to have been received on the eve of Omagh that the Real IRA, which had been trying to steal a vehicle in the Dublin area, had obtained one elsewhere, with place, vehicle type and destination unspecified.

These allegations, although very serious, are quite different from allegations claiming that the Garda could actually have prevented the Omagh bombing. As I have already mentioned, the Nally group found that there is simply no basis whatsoever for these allegations and that they were motivated solely by base reasons, involving the dishonourable abuse of the grief of the Omagh victims' families.

In producing an edited version, I am conscious that there will be those who will question the transparency of the editing process and the validity of the product of such editing. I am, as I have indicated, in a difficult position in trying to respond to such concerns, as the only way to put them beyond doubt would be to detail what was edited out, which defeats the whole purpose of editing in the first place. Nevertheless, in an effort to allay any such concerns, my Department consulted all three members of the Nally group prior to placing the edited version in the Oireachtas Library. All three members of the group consider the edited version to be a fair account of both the allegations relating to the Omagh bombing and their findings on those allegations. As I have stated, I made copies available to the leaders of the Opposition parties.

The Barr report comprises 741 pages. It represents the fruits of approximately three and a half years of evidence-gathering and analysis, dealing at times with decisions that had to be made in seconds. In dealing with its findings, I urge Deputies to ensure that its conclusions are contextualised by reference to general circumstances of the so-called Abbeylara siege. The events at Abbeylara in April 2000 were grave and unique in the Irish police experience, difficult to contend with and a far cry from the crises for which the emergency response unit and the Garda Síochána were trained. These are not my words but those of Mr Justice Barr. Those words and that context were not well canvassed in public discourse on the matter and did a disservice to many of those who were involved. It is only fair to canvass them now in the context of this debate.

It is not our purpose here to second-guess Mr. Justice Barr's findings or the weight he chose to give to particular evidence and the analysis which led to his conclusions, some of which I have some difficulty with. Whatever one's views on the report, however, no Member of this House would wish to understate the difficulties faced by the Garda Síochána in dealing with situations such as these. While lessons must be learnt and changes have been made, we have to recognise that the Garda Síochána, in dealing with people using or threatening to use firearms, must not hesitate in taking whatever action is necessary to protect the lives of its members and those of innocent people.

Mr. Justice Barr criticised Garda performance in the Abbeylara siege, particularly with regard to command structures and training in siege situations where a person armed with a gun may be affected by mental illness. He also identified a need for the availability of additional specialised personnel at the scene of such incidents and asked that consideration be given to the use of non-lethal options. He favoured consideration of the need for ongoing training for local area superintendents, all Garda negotiators and, indeed, Garda recruits. Central to that training should be basic instruction on mental illness and how a person so afflicted should be dealt with.

The Garda Commissioner appointed a high level group to look into the issues raised by the Barr report. The group has extracted from the report the matters outlined in the tribunal's report which impact on the policing or operational areas. Each issue identified has been considered and commented upon. Where further action has been identified as being required, recommendations are made on how the group considers the matter may best be progressed.

Since the tragic events of 20 April 2000, significant developments have taken place within the Garda Síochána in the context of the management of critical events. Most significant of these was the issuance of the on-scene commander manual of guidance. It is also fair to say that the handling of the similar type occurrence in recent times by the Garda Síochána has shown that the force has learnt lessons from Abbeylara and is putting some of those into practice.

I have, in accordance with the provisions of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, forwarded a copy of the report to the chief inspector of the Garda inspectorate so that Garda procedures and practices for dealing with incidents of the type which unfolded at Abbeylara might be reviewed. I understand from the Garda inspectorate that work on a report in this regard is well advanced.

Chapter 13 of the report deals with gun licensing law and related matters and suggests consideration of proposed improvements to our laws. The Criminal Justice Act 2006, which was signed into law on 16 July 2006, provides for significant amendments to the Firearms Acts 1925 to 2000. The vast majority of the recommendations proposed for gun licensing have been legislated for in the Criminal Justice Act 2006. Certain provisions of the Act require a ministerial order before commencement. For example, my Department and the Garda Síochána are working together in the drawing up of new application forms for firearm certificates and authorisations, as well as appropriate guidelines. It is anticipated that all provisions will be commenced by mid-2007. The gun lobby wants a uniform approach across the country and many senior members of that lobby are dissatisfied with the patchy and inconsistent implementation of the law at present.

I will return later to issues of management arising from the Barr report which have something in common with those arising from the Morris report.

The Birmingham report offers a thorough independent analysis of the facts surrounding the false confession made by Dean Lyons based on the evidence of all relevant witnesses. It is the first report to be completed under the mechanism provided for under the Commission of Investigation Act 2004. Deputies will recall that mechanism was introduced by me on the grounds that the public and sometimes adversarial nature of tribunals of inquiry does not lend itself easily to timely and cost effective investigations. The commission of investigation mechanism contained several new features that were intended to achieve that goal without compromising or encroaching upon the proper conduct of an investigation. Mr. Birmingham's inquiry was completed in six months and cost approximately €1 million. These facts speak for themselves and without any implied criticism, the contrast between the cost and the length of the Birmingham inquiry with the Barr inquiry deserves reflection in this House. One took a long time and a lot of money and they were subjects of comparable complexity.

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