Dáil debates

Thursday, 19 October 2006

Nuclear Test Ban Bill 2006: Second Stage (Resumed)

 

2:00 pm

Photo of Pat CareyPat Carey (Dublin North West, Fianna Fail)

From that point of view we can have the luxury of condemning those who promote nuclear power and avoid taking the hard decisions.

It took 50 years to agree the nuclear test ban treaty which is a simple treaty with profound value for the struggle against proliferation. By prohibiting any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, the treaty would simultaneously help constrain the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, curb proliferation, advance disarmament and delegitimise nuclear weapons. The comprehensive test ban treaty has been signed by 176 states and 135 states have ratified it. The Bill before the House will give effect to the treaty under Irish law, completing our ratification. While the international community easily ratifies treaties, it often then does nothing to enforce them. No country has a monopoly on morality regarding any of those treaties.

Of the 44 states identified in the treaty's annex II, whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force, 34 have done so. Nevertheless, ten years after its opening for signature, the treaty is still in a vulnerable position. Ten key states, including India, Pakistan and the United States, must sign and ratify it to enable the accord to take full legal effect. As each year passes without the treaty entering into force, the odds increase that one state or another will resume ongoing nuclear testing. This debate is an important opportunity to reaffirm our support for the full implementation of the treaty and address the challenges facing it.

It is important to consider the purpose of the comprehensive test ban treaty, the challenges to its entry into force and the consequences for national and international security if nuclear testing were to be resumed. A nuclear test ban contributes to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, as well as supporting disarmament. It prevents further damage to the environment from the intense heat and radiation of successive nuclear blasts. I recently read that there were still adverse radiation effects on the environment after some underground tests carried out by the United States. The comprehensive test ban treaty's contribution to curbing the development of new types of nuclear warheads also helps to reduce dangerous nuclear arms competition between the existing nuclear capable states.

While treaty signature and ratification by the 44 key states may not close off their nuclear capabilities, it would rule out further development and operational deployment of new weapons that would help dampen destabilising arms races in many regions. One concern over Israel having an arsenal of nuclear weapons is that if there were ever a temptation to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East, it would be difficult for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria not to be tempted to follow the same route. The international community, therefore, must be resolute in enforcing the test ban treaty.

The comprehensive test ban treaty's far-reaching nuclear test monitoring provisions, including an international monitoring network and short notice on-site inspections, would ensure other countries are not conducting nuclear test explosions. The full-scale implementation of this system depends on entry into force of the treaty. It is possible that financial support for the establishment of the treaty's monitoring and verification system will wane if entry into force is indefinitely delayed. In return for economic support, some countries, such as India and Iran, may be more transparent in allowing inspections. Mr. Mohamed El Baradei and Mr. Hans Blix have pointed out the fine line between willingness and resistance to co-operate with nuclear inspections. Politics being the art of the possible, I suggest more diplomacy be deployed.

Entry into force of the comprehensive test ban treaty would also prevent additional environmental and health damage from nuclear test explosions and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Between 1945 and 2000, seven countries conducted 2,046 nuclear test explosions, an average of one test every ten days. That is a chilling reminder. To borrow a phrase, "they haven't gone away, you know". By 2000, the 528 atmospheric tests delivered radioactive materials that will have produced approximately 430,000 additional cancer fatalities, according to a 1990 report by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The US National Cancer Institute has estimated that the 90 dirtiest US nuclear tests will cause 10,000 to 75,000 additional thyroid cancers.

While underground nuclear blasts pose a much smaller radioactive hazard than atmospheric tests, there has been widespread venting from underground explosions. The US has acknowledged that 114 of its 723 underground tests have released radioactive material into the atmosphere.

The atomic bombings of 6 and 9 August 1945 illustrate the magnitude of harm caused by nuclear explosions. Of Hiroshima's population of 340,000 people, 130,000 were dead by November 1945 and by 1950 an additional 70,000 had perished, mainly from radiation-related illnesses. In Nagasaki, 70,000 people were killed outright or died within the first four months and another 70,000 died by 1950.

The test ban treaty does not stand or fall by itself. Rather, it is a vital part of a network of treaties, agreements and norms that underpin international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and codify multilateral arms control and disarmament. Repudiating or weakening one or more elements erodes the overall framework.

The comprehensive test ban treaty is an essential step toward restoring confidence in the beleaguered nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime, the cornerstone for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The preamble of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty refers to the determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The nuclear-weapon states' commitment to achieve the comprehensive test ban treaty was a crucial part of the bargain that won the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1995. Ireland continues to regard these as the benchmarks for nuclear disarmament. It is important to recall the influential role played by Ireland in the early days of the debate on nuclear non-proliferation. The then Minister for External Affairs, the late Mr. Frank Aiken, played a critical role in formulating the non-proliferation treaty.

While widespread repudiation of the NPT is not likely in the immediate future, the regime is vulnerable. Rejection of the comprehensive test ban treaty by some states may provide an excuse for a government that wished to renounce or thwart its NPT obligations. For example, inaction on the comprehensive test ban treaty by the United States has already complicated efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards on civilian nuclear programmes.

There are two alternative consequences of the comprehensive test ban treaty not entering into force. First, there could be no test ban treaty but a continued commitment to moratoria. Alternatively, there could be a resumption of nuclear testing by one or more countries. The former may look convenient, but there could be problems over compliance which would be difficult to resolve in the absence of an enforceable regime. The longer the non-enforcement of the treaty continues, the more likely states, legitimate or rogue, will look for ways around the regime. The fear is that over time, a commitment to the non-testing norm would be likely to erode and accusations of non-compliance could increase international tensions.

While it may be possible to sustain the unilateral moratoria undertaken by the nuclear testing states for several years, uncertainties and the risk of a resumption of testing will only grow over time. For example, the condemnation of nuclear testing remained firm despite the south Asian nuclear tests of 1998. This month's actions by North Korea, however, will not be met with the same response. A resumption of nuclear testing by this one state could well lead to a cascade of nuclear capable states acquiring more nuclear weapons, conducting their own nuclear tests or additional states acquiring nuclear capability.

We must not lose heart. Progress on difficult nuclear issues is possible. We must continue to work with determination for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

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