Michael Woods (Dublin North East, Fianna Fail)

I am pleased to have the opportunity to support the Bill. It is substantial and I congratulate the Minister, his officials and the Parliamentary Counsel on the work done in this regard. It is important legislation.

The Bill is fully in keeping with the country's proud tradition of opposition to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and of support for nuclear disarmament going back to the original proposal in 1958 at the United Nations by Mr. Frank Aiken when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. That led to the coming into existence a number of years later of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT. Ireland had the distinction of being the first signatory of the treaty in recognition of our initiative at that time. We were invited to be among the first signatories because the idea for it had come from Ireland.

Throughout the decades of the Cold War and the period since, the NPT, while not without its weaknesses, has stood as a beacon of hope for the international community in a world where the nuclear weapons threat has been a major danger to world peace. The NPT, however, accepts the possession of nuclear weapons by the five major powers which are permanent members of the UN Security Council. It is also generally accepted that there are a number of countries outside the NPT which have developed nuclear weapons. Besides these, the IAEA has stated that outside the NPT, India and Pakistan hold nuclear weapons and Israel is believed to be nuclear weapons capable. The DPRK in North Korea has just carried out an underground weapons test.

It is against this background that the issue of nuclear weapons testing comes into focus and that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated and agreed in September 1996. The treaty resulted from recognition of the need for continued efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate aim of eliminating them and bringing about clear disarmament under strict and effective international control. As a key step in this direction, it is foreseen that the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of new types of nuclear weapons would constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and proliferation, in other words, a complete and comprehensive test ban.

It was considered that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing was through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The purpose of the Bill before the House is to give effect, as far as Ireland is concerned, to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The main thrust of the basic obligations imposed upon the parties to the treaty is that they undertake not to carry out any nuclear weapons test, to prohibit any such test being carried out at any place under their jurisdiction and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test. The Bill creates as offences any actions contrary to the State's obligations under the treaty and puts in place a system of inspections designed to bring to light any such actions or suspected actions. The rights and responsibilities of members of inspection teams, observers and authorised officers are set out in detail in the Bill. In this regard, there appears to be some lack of clarity as to the distinction between persons referred to as international inspectors and those referred to as authorised officers. Perhaps the Minister will consider amending the Bill to make this distinction clearer.

The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland is designated in the Bill as the national authority for the purpose of the Act and the treaty. This is entirely appropriate. I take this opportunity to commend the institute on the excellent work it has done since its establishment in 1992 in activities as diverse as advising the Government on hazards for Ireland from the Sellafield nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and other nuclear establishments abroad, regulating effectively the ever more sophisticated applications of ionising radiation in medicine and industry, and assessing and bringing to public attention the hazards to public health arising from elevated levels of radon gas in buildings.

The institute has developed a high level of sophistication and professionalism and is one on which we all rely. It is important that this excellent work is sustained into the future to ensure the continued protection of the Irish people against the hazards of ionising radiation in the many forms in which it arises. This need is intensified by the likelihood that the UK is about to embark on a major programme of construction of new nuclear power plants.

The nuclear issue has been a major cause of contention in relations between the UK and Ireland for many years, centring principally on discharges of radioactive waste from Sellafield into the Irish Sea. This has been a matter of great concern to all of us on the east coast, particularly those who live close to the sea. We are not happy about the situation, notwithstanding the fact that there is constant regulation, management, control and testing by the RPII. The levels are regarded as being of very low incidence and they are checked regularly. Notwithstanding that, it is an uneasy situation.

We are concerned about the health of our children in particular and of our people generally and the risk of serious consequences for this country from a major accident or terrorist attack at the Sellafield plant. There are two issues in this regard, one is the major one of such an attack and the other is the continuous discharges of radioactive waste into the Irish Sea, even though they are at a low level. What will happen when the number of nuclear plants in the United Kingdom is increased, especially if reprocessing is to be done at Sellafield or in that area?

In 2001 the Government, having taken detailed legal advice, instituted legal proceedings against the UK in regard to a number of issues surrounding Sellafield. While these proceedings have not yet reached their final conclusion, interim judgments have required the UK to make information about its nuclear activities available to the Irish Government to a degree far beyond anything that had occurred previously. While we would like to achieve much more from these legal proceedings, this has been a beneficial outcome of them. I understand it has enabled Irish officials and RPII experts to make very informed representations to the UK authorities on issues of nuclear technology and preparedness for emergencies. This has also been accompanied by an improved spirit of co-operation on the UK side.

Another key issue relating to Sellafield arises from the proposed new expansion of nuclear power in the UK. There is a danger that the expansion programme would give a new lease of life to nuclear fuel reprocessing at Sellafield and so delay perhaps by several decades the day when Sellafield would finally begin to be phased out and decommissioned. This would be a most undesirable turn of events from an Irish point of view and would almost certainly result in the discharge of more contaminated effluent into the Irish Sea.

The Minister has rightly made strong representations to the British Government that it should not proceed with plans to build new nuclear power plants. We must, however, recognise that the United Kingdom may still decide to do so. If it does, it will have to decide how to deal with the spent nuclear fuel from the new plants. The fuel can be sent for reprocessing at Sellafield or kept in so-called "dry storage", pending ultimate disposal. This, I understand, is quite a finely balanced choice from the users' point of view. From an Irish point of view, however, it makes an immense difference. Therefore, I strongly urge the Minister to expand his representations to the United Kingdom to the effect that should it decide to go ahead with the construction of new nuclear power plants, it should opt for the dry storage approach rather than the reprocessing route for the management of the spent fuel from such plants. That, ultimately, is the crucial issue for those of us living close to the Irish Sea. Such a representation would have a real chance of success and could mark a substantial step towards the eventual closure of Sellafield.

Sellafield and the nuclear industry apart, it is important to maintain the protection of the public against other hazards associated with ionising radiation. Such radiation plays a vital role in medical and some industrial settings. In certain cases, it is at such intensities that error or mishap could result in serious danger to patients, staff or members of the public. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland is the regulatory body with responsibility for ensuring that the highest safety standards are observed during all usage of radiation. It can take credit for the fact that Ireland's safety record in this area is extremely good. However, there can never be room for complacency in matters of safety and the RPII must always have sufficient resources to ensure that this safety record is maintained.

Another hazard is the risk of lung cancer resulting from exposure to elevated levels of radon gas in buildings. This gas emanates from the natural radioactive decay of trace quantities of uranium in the underlying rock strata and in some cases can reach dangerous concentrations in individual buildings. This was tragically illustrated a number of years ago by a case in Kerry of a couple in their forties, non-smokers, who both died of lung cancer. Their house was found to have a concentration of radon almost 250 times the recommended maximum level. It is estimated that up to 200 lung cancer deaths in Ireland each year are attributable to radon.

Much has been done to address the radon hazard. The RPII conducted a nationwide survey which quantified the problem and highlighted the areas of the country at highest risk. Since 1997, the Government has had all primary and secondary schools tested for radon, with remedial measures carried out where necessary. Building regulations introduced in 1998 require that all new houses built since then have radon preventive measures incorporated during construction. Awareness of the problem is growing but must increase further so that householders have their houses tested for radon and, where necessary, implement remedial measures. The RPII has estimated that approximately 90,000 dwellings in the country have high radon levels. It is very important that such dwellings are identified and made safe. It is also important that householders open windows regularly to let the air circulate. It is crucial that the radon tests are extended to all houses that are at risk.

In the context of our discussions on these issues, I draw Members' attention to the fact that yesterday I, with other members of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, including Deputies Michael D. Higgins, Carey, Mulcahy and Allen, met Mr. Shyam Saran, the Special Envoy of the Indian Prime Minister on nuclear issues. Mr. Saran was in Ireland to brief the Government on India's policies in the nuclear area. Members of the joint committee had a most informative meeting with him, in which he outlined to us India's position on a range of nuclear related issues. The Minister for Foreign Affairs will meet the joint committee next week. This is an issue which the committee takes very seriously.

In particular, Mr. Saran set out the background to, and a detailed account of, the proposed strategic partnership between India and the United States of America in the area of civil nuclear co-operation, which was agreed during President Bush's visit to India in July 2005. Mr. Saran told us that the Indian Government sees this partnership largely in the context of its growing energy needs, as the country's economy expands rapidly. If the proposed partnership goes ahead — it has not yet been approved by the US Senate — India would allow 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to be opened for inspection under safeguard agreements with the IAEA. However, this would leave eight of India's nuclear installations outside the purview of the IAEA.

Although India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has always taken a responsible attitude to its nuclear capabilities. Ireland, on the other hand, is a strong defender of the NPT and the safeguard regimes of the IAEA and, therefore, has a different perspective from that of India in this area. I and other members of the committee were able to outline Ireland's views and concerns in this regard to Mr. Saran. The meeting was very useful as we were given a comprehensive and informative statement of India's position.

I congratulate the Minister on this major and highly valuable legislation, which I am sure will have the full support of the House.

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