Michael D Higgins (Galway West, Labour)

I am pleased to have an opportunity to speak on this welcome proposal by the Government to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. I concur with the view expressed by my colleague, Deputy Stagg, in regard to Ireland's international policy in this general area. In the very near future we will attend a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which will discuss, among other issues, the implications of the US-India agreement of July 2005. The issue that arises is whether we will use our position on the Nuclear Suppliers Group to assert the principle of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

This treaty is perhaps best known internationally in the name of Ireland as we were one of its authors. Finland was among the first signatories. It is a most important treaty, and has been from its initiation in 1968. It was reviewed in 1995 and in the year 2000, 13 steps were agreed which were to move the treaty towards universal acceptance. The 2005 review was ineffectual and barely moved beyond the agenda. I do not wish to dwell on this matter as I want to move on to what is centrally before us, but there are issues to be decided in regard to that treaty.

At this stage, if one takes the discussion that has taken place on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which is at the heart of the matter, the question is whether we take a stand and describe this as the bedrock of the Irish approach or accept other formulations such as that of Mr.Baradei. He wrote recently in a newspaper in the United States about the need to think outside the box and accommodate, as it were, the US-India agreement. It is not possible to do both. The question is whether we will stick with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and seek universality. We have attended meetings organised by Sweden and New Zealand in seeking to bring that agenda forward but there should be a public announcement on our attitude towards the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

It is important to bear in mind the background to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Since the first nuclear test was conducted in July 1945, more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions were conducted, most recently in North Korea. Tests were initially conducted in the atmosphere, underwater and later underground, and mostly by the major powers, then the United States and the Soviet Union, but also France, China and the United Kingdom. The nuclear weapons states have not conducted any nuclear tests since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in September 1996. The most recent tests prior to that of North Korea were conducted by France and China in 1996 and India and Pakistan in 1998.

There is no doubt we are at a dangerous time in terms of freeing the world from the threat of nuclear contamination and destruction. Ireland is late in ratifying this treaty. It was opened for signature in 1996 and was signed by 71 states, including the five nuclear weapons states. As of April 2006, the number of signatories, without obligation of ratification, had grown to 176. A total of 132 ratifications have been made. The difficulty is that the treaty will only enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by 44 designated states. The conclusion that arises is that the entire planet is held to ransom by those countries that possess nuclear capacity and refused to ratify. That is a blunt fact.

The question arises as to what one can do regarding international policy. In terms of domestic policy, I welcome the Government's ratification, but significant steps should be taken in regard to the implications of international policy. Ireland should reaffirm its commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as the bedrock of its approach and it should state explicitly that it will be guided by that principle in the resumed talks of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It should state also that it is in favour of a new international convention on fissile material. In addition, it should return to the principle of universality.

Models exist in regard to verification. Like my colleague, Deputy Woods, I had the opportunity to meet spokespersons for the recent Indian proposals. Inspection of eight of the 22 nuclear installations is not on offer as they are military — the other 14 installations are civilian. Neither is the close scrutiny on offer in respect to members which have signed the protocols to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. All this is very important. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides a model as it has a verification regime and a set of obligations that could be used. That model exists and we should canvass support for it.

Confusion also exists in regard to international politics in respect of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and testing. It is hard to reconcile the position currently adopted by the United States, for example, on North Korea, where it appears to advocate a regional dialogue, and in regard to Iran. We have yet to see clear evidence of the breaches of principles of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by Iran. A further issue relates to those non-signatory countries, not just to India but to Pakistan and Israel.

It is time the lamp shone on all the countries with nuclear weapons and required of them a common obligation. I have great difficulty with Mr. Baradei's inconsistent views in regard to India, on the one hand, and Iran on the other. I note a considerable difference between his position and that of Hans Blix in the most recent report on the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. Both share agreement on something to which I do not subscribe, the use of nuclear as a source of energy, but the difference relates to whether Mr. Baradei favours the evolution of mechanisms that are not just parallel to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty but may constitute alternatives to it. In that sense, he is weakening the forward movement of restoring the authority of that treaty.

Welcome developments are apparent. I wish to speak positively. It is interesting that one government after another in Latin America has decided not to go down the road of nuclear energy which gives rise to the reality of a continent that is nuclear-free. It would be a most worthwhile objective to pursue this notion, let us say in the case of the Middle East, which is a region where the conflicts are a threat to international stability in the most general sense. For that region to become nuclear free, it would require people to have the courage to speak about Israel's capacity. I do not make the case for Iranian capacity, I simply say that if one is to address the issues of the region, one must look at the nuclear capacity in the region that is currently admitted. We must remember that Iran is a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The accusation has been made about non-disclosure. One can well ask, if it had not been for Mordechai Vanunu, whether we would know about Israel's capacity. What is the attitude of the international community in the sense of balance in regard to this issue?

I favour the idea of regional nuclear free zones. It is an appalling colonial legacy that the 2,000 tests since 1945 took place in the context of the abuse of the ecosystems of some of the poorest regions of the world. France carried out tests in areas where the capacity to object was weak and only with courageous and innovative opposition was attention directed to them.

Ireland's ratification of this Bill is significant in that it is an acknowledgement of the importance of the rule of law internationally. The difficulty lies in that Dr. El Baradei is speaking about bilateral alternatives to the rule of law when it is equally clear that the independent commission on weapons of mass destruction chaired by Dr. Hans Blix is stressing that our proposals and futures are best protected within the framework of international law. We must be unequivocal in our statements in this regard, for which reason I stress the importance of achieving clarity before going to the nuclear suppliers group's meeting. It is interesting that the group takes its decisions by consensus. A single opposing member country is capable of returning the US-India agreement to the blocks.

The Government was comfortable in its assumption that the American Bill would not get through the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It believed it could get away with not having a position, but the Bill has cleared both committees. While it requires an amendment of the 1954 American legislation, the time has come to declare our hand, as uncomfortable as that may be.

This is a cross-party matter and, with all respect for the Government, it should have no difficulty in declaring the Irish position, taking its departure point from the bedrock of the NPT, stressing the importance of the framework of international law, announcing that it has transposed into law the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and attempting to achieve universality in respect of the treaty.

My colleague, Deputy Stagg, made an important comment. If international policy is in difficulty and the discourse, to use an unfortunate word, has been contaminated, it is due to the bad faith of nuclear countries. The NPT concerned the non-proliferation and eradication of nuclear weapons rather than their acceptance. There has been an absence of good faith on the part of the nuclear powers under the Article VI provision.

Many instruments and United Nations General Assembly resolutions underline the need for a comprehensive test ban. For example, the preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty refers to the goal of "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end". A key component of the deal that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was a call for the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty in 1996. While the treaty was adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature in September 1996, it has not entered into force.

Deputy Stagg stressed the importance of both urging the United States of America to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of countries restoring the dialogue necessary to accept a general verification scheme that is impartial in its implications or obligations. While bilateralism in international policy can resolve seemingly intractable problems, it brings dangers because the matter may descend into a dialogue between the powerful and the less powerful.

The threat of force and sanctions in the Iranian case before the diplomatic possibilities were exhausted is an unwelcome development. Ireland has not been well served by those who have spoken for the European Union in the negotiations. We have ceded the discourse to them on the basis they might be counted upon to have the technical capacity to verify and assess threats.

More significant issues must be discussed, that is, the future of the region, the EU's relationship with the region and global peace. All of the options open to Mr. Ali Larijani and the representative of the Union in this respect should be evaluated carefully, such as the supply of materials, the Iranian enrichment facilities that are under international scrutiny, the time periods in which there would be full international verification and so on. Models exist and one should not fall easily to the suggestion that one is dealing with an eternally hopeless case. Who are the hopeless cases? They are the ones who have not fulfilled a jot of their NPT Article VI obligations.

If we are to start building block on block, the actions of the Government and Oireachtas are important in a practical sense domestically and a moral sense. In Dr. Blix's recent report, he quoted former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who stated in 1956: "If men can develop weapons that are so terrifying as to make the thought of global war almost a sentence for suicide, you would think that man's intelligence and his comprehension...would include also his ability to find a peaceful solution". It is unwelcome that countries are not only ignoring forward movement in treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the development of the 13 steps in the 2000 review of the NPT, but they are also renewing their nuclear weapons, including our nearest neighbour. There is the possibility of putting this poisonous development into space, which is a new horizon in terms of threat and potential destruction.

Recently, we participated in a conference with Sweden and New Zealand to give new energy to the attempt to universalise the NPT. We should have more such meetings, as they would be welcomed internationally. Initiatives external to this debate can be taken. For example, the creation of greater security in the Middle East is more than an aspiration. The desperate need to solve the Palestinian issue would be a contribution to security. Removing the need for security would remove arguments for developing nuclear capacity and putting a verification system in place would remove another. Committing to a timescale that does not include threats can open a dialogue, which is the way to proceed.

Even if one believes in none of this and seeks to achieve consistency, there cannot be a different approach to North Korea as there is to the Middle East. It is equally important in this regard that sovereign governments which sign and ratify the treaty also accept the discipline of other existing international instruments on the control and flow of materials and the input of scientists who are involved at different stages. I am speaking plainly about Pakistan, for example. This is a discussion that we need to have.

I do not want to single out what I have stated about the US-India agreement. The United States has also sponsored a separate set of signings in the form of the PSI, the proliferation security initiative, which is in effect an alternative to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In diplomacy, the Minister and his colleagues in Cabinet should avoid the language, which is frequently used about some countries which are non-signatories to the discipline of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the suggestion that in so far as they have not signed anything, they cannot be accused of being in breach of anything. The principles are too important for sophistry and diplomacy and international relations are tested by this issue.

I welcome the all-party agreement on issues and legislation such as this. Moderate language is most valuable and none of us is assisted by statements such as that of President Chirac, who suggested that France would not confine itself to conventional responses to threats, thereby automatically brandishing the nuclear capacity as a weapon or threat of intimidation and as a substitute for diplomacy, for which France once had a great record.

Let us be positive. We have made some progress in the elimination of the threat of war, but what we seek to achieve is a nuclear weapon-free world, with an end to testing as an important step in that direction. We are far from that target at present. The Government and the parties in the Opposition who are agreeing to the Bill are taking a small step. While there are 27,000 nuclear warheads, thousands of which are on hair-trigger alert, in the world, while those with nuclear capacity are replacing their weapons, and while the intelligence of scientists is being deflected into this appalling business at the same time as world hunger, world poverty and communicable diseases could be eradicated, it is a great stain on the world. This small step is to be welcomed and has my support.

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