Joe Costello (Dublin Central, Labour)

A security committee does not exist though it might at some future time. Let us not talk of possibilities that may never be realised. In terms of oversight, I would love to see a specific role for the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights. That would be helpful. However, there is no substitute for a structure or mechanism to monitor all the activities going on.

Deputy Ó Snodaigh emphasises in his amendment the need for a merit-based and transparent public recruitment process. Everybody recognises that need. The Minister must do a lot to convince us that the structure currently in operation with regard to Garda appointments above the rank of inspector is transparent and merit-based to an extent which commands public confidence. It is not, and it must be changed. The public must know that a proper structure is in place. I would like to ascertain what the Minister has in mind in that respect.

The role of the ombudsman arises in the context of transparent structures. I look forward to the operation of the new commission in terms of transparency and effectiveness, given all our reservations to date. However, it is difficult to believe anything could be less effective than the current complaints machinery.

The Minister has addressed a number of the issues in this regard but, ultimately, the Opposition is attempting to put the best and most effective structures, which will command respect, in place so we will not have to revisit the legislation in the autumn on the basis of it not working and that it was not thought out properly. I am not sure whether the ombudsman commission has the necessary powers because its ability to inspect Garda stations is a grey area. A number of stations can be inspected but others designated by the Minister will not be open to inspection.

That presents an interesting conundrum. No Garda station deals wholly with security. A number of stations are concerned with the security of the State and documents and computer files are stored in them. The Commissioner will advise the Minister regarding the designation of stations on the basis that it would not be desirable to have the commission leafing through documents in them because of security concerns. Advance notice will be given of the visit of a member of the ombudsman commission. Once a station receives such a designation, advance notice is automatically provided and, therefore, it will be impossible for the commission to conduct its business properly.

That presents a problem in terms of the powers of the commission. How many stations will be involved? Will the designation apply to part of the Garda station or aspects of the work engaged in by the station or will it apply to the entire station? What criteria will be used? What is "the security of the State"? Does it concern special branch, C3 files, matters relating to political or paramilitary activity or a combination? Limitations will be placed on the work of the commission. In which areas will it operate proactively without having to await a complaint? These issues relate to the transparency of the role of the ombudsman commission and the amendment is concerned with accountability, promotions and oversight and monitoring structures.

My other amendment relating to the Garda authority will not give rise to a charge on the Exchequer. It states, "The Minister may by regulations provide for the establishment of a body to be known as the Garda Síochána authority". That is not compulsory and an option will be provided. If it is only an option, why has the amendment been ruled out of order? The amendment under discussion presumes a Garda board will be in place, which will result in a cost to the State. There is a lack of logic about what is permissible and what is out of order. It would have been better if my more modest proposal had been used as the starting point. We could then have debated properly the other amendments, which lead from that proposal.

The Opposition considers that a Garda authority should be established. It will not tie the Minister of the day in the manner the Minister thinks, thereby leaving nobody accountable to the House. The authority can be established in such a way that the Minister would remain accountable to the Oireachtas. The other side of the coin is the Minister will have sole responsibility for the Garda, which will be unhealthy. It will be impossible for a Minister to keep an eye on everything that happens and it will also be impossible for the Department to do so because it has different functions nor would it be healthy for the Department to do so. However, nothing will be established in their place, which is the problem.

While the Minister points up the dangers to establishing an independent police authority, he has not proposed an effective body to replace it. The Minister has provided that the inspectorate and the Commissioner, through certain duties assigned to him or her, will take the place of such an authority but sufficient oversight capacity will not be provided. This will result in a mish mash down the line and the Garda not being subject to appropriate accountability or transparency. Neither will it be managed in an effective fashion on a day-to-day basis. A malaise could affect its operation in the future.

We may have to revisit the amendments to the section. The Minister's amendments address matters raised in the Morris tribunal reports. However, the reports are not the be all and end all of Garda reform. The Patten report will have a greater contribution to make to such reform while Senator Maurice Hayes made a major contribution in this regard in the past. Other incidents in the not too distant past have raised concern about the need for Garda reform. Not only has confidence in the Garda been eroded following a major scandal in Donegal, it also has been eroded by the failure to deal with gangland killings.

In those cases, people are operating with no chance of being prosecuted, convicted or imprisoned. In the past ten years, no more than two people have been convicted of gangland murders in any single year. In some years it was only one. When there are a dozen gangland murders and only one or two people are convicted for those crimes, it is not a high success rate. While it is notoriously difficult in international terms to achieve a high conviction rate in such cases, the low rate is worrying. People can virtually kill with impunity. Contract killers can be employed, and that is happening to a greater extent.

The accompanying problem of where the guns are originating is a cause of equal public concern. They are readily available.

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