Michael McDowell (Dublin South East, Progressive Democrats)

In his introduction to the board's annual report for 2004, which I launched on Tuesday, Mr. Holmes stated:

There has been much debate as to whether the new Body should be run by a single Ombudsman or by a commission of three people. In my view, a three-person commission lessens the likelihood of a personality based conflict arising between it and Garda management.

In considering the model in operation in Northern Ireland, it should be remembered that the PSNI is a regional constabulary covering a relatively small geographical area with a police force of 7,500 officers. On the other hand the Garda Síochána is the police force of a sovereign State with the additional responsibility for protecting the security of the State, covering a much larger territory, and which will shortly have a force strength of more than 14,000 members. I also point out to the Deputies that the equivalent Independent Police Complaints Commission operating in England and Wales has 17 members.

As a practical response to all the views which have been expressed, I have indicated that I am preparing to bring forward an amendment on Report Stage providing that one of the members of the ombudsman commission should be its chairperson. This amendment will retain all the advantages of the collective leadership of a three-person commission but will provide the commission with the agreed "visible leadership" advantages associated with an individual, for which argument has been made in recent days.

The other difference between the powers of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the proposed ombudsman commission relates to the power to search police stations. The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland may search any police station, whereas the search of some Garda stations by the ombudsman commission, as outlined in the Bill, may be subject to a direction by the Minister of the day. The difference in the Garda Bill is simply a reflection of a fundamental difference between the two police forces. The PSNI is a police force, whereas the Garda Síochána is both a police force and a security and intelligence service. That is not to say that the PSNI does not deal with intelligence matters, but simply to make the point that alongside the PSNI are quite separate security and intelligence services to which the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland has no access.

The Garda Bill deals with this difference in function by empowering the ombudsman commission to search any Garda station. By way of a potential exception, it also enables the Minister to designate, with the approval of the Government, Garda stations where information relating to the security of the State is held and which may only be searched to an extent specified in a ministerial direction, and the Bill sets out the factors to be considered by the Minister in that regard. The default position in the Bill is that every Garda station is liable to search by the ombudsman commission and it is only if the Minister of the day designates any stations or any document repositories within them on security grounds that a search is subject to ministerial direction.

In addition, the Bill provides for a judge of the High Court to be appointed to keep under review this provision and to report to the Taoiseach from time to time on its operation. As part of this, the judge may investigate any case where the Minister gives a direction and must be given access to any designated Garda station and allowed to inspect any documents there. Reports to the Taoiseach by the judge will also be laid before both Houses. Bearing in mind the distinct difference in function between the Garda Síochána and the PSNI, the provisions of the Bill on the potential restriction on the search of some Garda stations are reasonable. I know of no security force in the world which would allow perfect strangers to walk in to its premises and examine its files. I am examining further safeguards to prevent the security exemption from being abused. If it was broadly interpreted, it would mean that virtually any special branch material could fall within its rubric and that is not what I intend.

Another key provision in the Garda Bill is the establishment of a Garda Síochána inspectorate. This was not included in the Bill as published, but was included by way of an amendment which I brought forward in direct response to the first report of the Morris tribunal. The purpose of the inspectorate will be to seek to ensure that the resources of the Garda Síochána are used to achieve the highest levels of efficiency and effectiveness compared to best police standards. To that end, the inspectorate will inspect the operation and administration of the force and report to the Minister of the day with advice on best policing practice. The inspectorate will therefore not only assist the Garda Síochána itself to achieve the highest standards, but will make available to the Minister an independent and objective assessment of the performance of the force. This will be a crucial response to the concern of the Morris tribunal that too much distance has opened between the Garda Síochána and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. This is particularly important in the context of the tribunal stating in its first report that the Department has a role in ensuring oversight in respect of the recommendations of the tribunal, and that the Department must, in consultation with the Garda Commissioner, address the structural defects and deficiencies that were identified in the report to ensure it is empowered by knowledge. The reports of the inspectorate will be laid before both Houses and the chief inspector will, when requested, attend before any Oireachtas committee in connection with any such report. In addition to the new duty on gardaí to account for their action, I will be bringing forward a number of other significant amendments to the Garda Bill in response to the findings of the Morris tribunal, dealing with such issues as enhanced accountability, discipline and the provision of information to the Minister of the day. I look forward to a detailed discussion on these and other issues on Report Stage next week.

Following the first report of the Morris tribunal, the Garda Commissioner established a number of high level working groups to examine the findings and recommendations of the tribunal and to make proposals for change. The Garda Commissioner reinstated the obligation on Garda officers to keep an official journal, as the lack of such documentation was a serious cause for concern by the tribunal, and adversely affected its search for the truth.

In the first report of the Morris tribunal, there was a clear direction by Mr. Justice Morris that it would be wrong that persons dismissed from the force for disciplinary reasons, "even as a result of evil actions on their part" as the report states, should lose their pension entitlements. There is a view out there that the report of the tribunal and the sanctions put in place have been devalued because some members of the Garda Síochána who departed the force voluntarily or by dismissal have still retained their pensions. Mr. Justice Morris specifically stated that it was in the interests of the force that pensions in those circumstances should not be forfeited. It is important to state that because so much commentary recently has proceeded on the basis that this is some kind of sweetheart deal between the Minister or the Commissioner and those who are departing or being dismissed from the force. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am living up to the clear advice given by the report that not to do so would damage the force and would be wrong in principle.

There are disciplinary issues arising within the Garda Síochána. I concur with the view expressed by the tribunal that it is wholly incompatible with discipline that people who fail to account for the manner in which they carried out their duties absent themselves on sick leave, or only make statements to their superiors on legal advice, or with the advice of their representative associations. The Garda Commissioner has taken steps to ensure that such a culture is emphatically ended. One of the amendments to be tabled on Committee Stage will permit the removal of any member from the force outside of the disciplinary process, where in the opinion of the Commissioner and with the consent of the Government, it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining confidence in the force. This new power will be necessary to employ in circumstances where in the past, due process in the disciplinary procedures has led to lengthy delays and a public perception that nothing was being done on a disciplinary level.

See this speech in context