Éamon Ó Cuív (Galway West, Fianna Fail)

I hope I will be able to persuade Members that what I am proposing is stronger than the amendment. When one is thinking of law one has to read the words carefully. I agree with Deputy McGinley that there are roles for independent boards carrying out certain functions. We all agree with that as a matter of principle. The question we have to decide is where it is more appropriate for a board and where it is more appropriate for Departments to carry out certain functions. For example, in the case of An Bord Pleanála, I agree it should be done by an independent board. That function was much better taken out of the hands of politicians and I have no argument with that.

There are other functions that we have taken out of the hands of politicians and put in the hands of boards where we made a mistake. It is not a simple matter. It is not a case of all or nothing in these cases. If we were debating this issue a year ago Deputy McGinley might have had a slightly different view of An Bord Pleanála. We all heard much criticism of the fact that a certain NGO had a disproportionate power to nominate people representing a particular point of view and that the contrary point of view in regard to rural development was not represented in the bodies that nominate to An Bord Pleanála. There was a perception that there was an overweening tendency in one direction because of the nominating powers of a certain body on that board as opposed to the contrary view which might be slightly more tolerant and have a different perspective on rural communities, rural life, parishes and the way in which rural society works. There is an interesting debate about nominating bodies.

Let us compare what is being proposed by the amendment and what is contained in the section. I did not amend this section on Committee Stage in the Seanad following representations and arguments made by the Opposition. The knowledge, experience, skills, personalities, integrity and ability of members rather than who suggested their names is of paramount importance. All members of the board must have those qualities. The previous board required that only three members fall into that category. The issue of financial expertise was suggested when the board was being set up. One could see the money issue as relatively minor but the board does not have any function in handling money directly. In other words, it does not have to look after the investments and so on. It is a disbursement board with a social ethos. That is not to say a person with a financial expertise should not be a member of the board but I am not sure if they have to be specifically mentioned on the board. The disbursement of this money and the plan is much more about social focus than any marvellous financial wizardry. If it was an investment board that was investing and putting money aside and had to look after the investments, which in this case is done by the finance agency, I would say a person with expertise on how to get the maximum return on one's investment was needed. That is not what is at issue here, this is about a plan and disbursements. Therefore, that is a provision that has run its course given that the board is up and running.

The issue of principal officer representation on the board is interesting. I said on Committee Stage that I do not have a black or white view and I do not know if there is a black or white view in the public service about it. It is not a question of I having a different view from the public service. Doctors differ and patients die. In this case there is a different view. On the issue of State boards there are two theories, the first is that they exist, not like private companies to do as they wish but to implement Government policy. The second theory is more prevalent nowadays that the directors of the board or a nominee of the board do not have any regard for Government policy and are free agents. I am still of the former view, that is, that there is an obligation on the appointees to State boards to have cognisance of Government policy because at the end of the day anything else would not lead to coherence.

One of the arguments in favour of having a nominee of the Minister on a State board in the form of a public servant of the rank of principal or above is that is one way of trying to ensure Government policy is reflected in decisions of the board. The argument against is that frequently a board has to refer a matter to the Minister who has to get advice. Normally that advice comes from the section in the Department dealing with the particular board. For example, if Údarás na Gaeltachta, the Western Development Commission and so on, want a change in a ministerial power they would write to the Minister who would seek advice from his civil servants. Normally the civil servant who would prepare the advice would be the principal officer, the assistant secretary and the Secretary General but it is largely driven by the principal officer in the section dealing it. This is an interesting debate and I do not have a black or white view on it. If the principal officer who advises the Minister is also a member of the board who put the proposal to the Minister, he or she winds up in a slightly invidious position because he or she is advising the Minister on an issue on which he or she helped to make the decision. If the civil servant had opposed that issue at the board and it comes to the Minister and he or she advises the Minister who goes against it, the allegation would be made that the civil servant used the power to betray the Minister. There is an argument for saying the public servant is better dealing with the boards on behalf of the Minister in direct dealings with the board and the public servant acting on the Minister's behalf outside of the board. I do not have a fixed view on this matter but I am not convinced it is always the case that the best arrangement is to have the public servant on the board. I am not convinced absolutely in one direction or the other. It is an open question.

With Údarás na Gaeltachta, a board that works under the remit of my Department, we have developed a sophisticated interaction between the board and the executive of Údarás and my Department which is positive. This is achieved by regular discussion and a series of meetings but not by having a member on the board. To a certain extent it is better as it leaves the board freer and it allows the us to act as per the Department's and the Minister's interests. I do not wish to tie my successor on this issue. I am not saying firmly whether during my term of office I will put a principal officer on the board. It is a matter on which I have two views and I am not 100% certain. It is a case of making a decision as matters evolve and in the circumstances of the time and I do not want to enshrine it in legislation. In certain cases, I have opted not to put civil servants on State boards even though my predecessors did. I can see the contrary argument and I do not wish to tie my successor's hand on that issue.

On the issue of community and voluntary representation the amendment proposes that the board shall include four persons who, in the Minister's opinion, have knowledge of, or experience in relation to, the purposes for which disbursements may be made.

The Bill refers to not fewer than four of the ten ordinary members and I have stated previously that all the members must have knowledge and experience. The Bill as it stands states that not fewer than four of the ten ordinary members appointed in this regard shall be persons whom in the Minister's opinion have knowledge in fields relating to the purposes for which the disbursements may be made under section 41, in other words, social and economic deprivation, educational disadvantage and disability. I propose that the members are appointed following consideration by the Minister of any submissions received in response to a published notice indicating that appointments will be made to the board and inviting recommendations relating to those appointments.

Deputy McGinley's amendment proposes that they have the knowledge and experience but I have gone further. I have proposed something slightly more comprehensive than Deputy McGinley.

I refer to Deputy McGinley's amendment :

(c) 4 persons who—

(ii) are appointed by the Minister after consultation with the organisations that the Minister considers to be representative of the purposes so specified,

I ask Deputy McGinley to reflect on his proposal. The Deputy is saying that I nominate the bodies so that I as Minister or whoever succeeds me as Minister nominates the bodies who can send in the names. The Deputy' s amendment does not propose the Minister must take their advice on the names. I simply have to consult and I consult with bodies of my choosing. My proposal is wider. I propose putting an advertisement in the newspapers and any body who believes it is relevant can send in names. If the Deputy's amendment is accepted, the Minister is not tied to accepting the names and I accept this is also true in the case of my proposal. However, the Deputy's case does not tighten up on that. In the case the Deputy proposes, the Minister is given more power as the only bodies who can nominate names are the bodies the Minister chooses, whereas in my proposal anybody relevant to the sector can nominate a name. I am much more liberal in this regard and I am giving much less power to the Minister in terms of this consultation process.

In both cases the reality is that the Minister, allowing that very competent names are proposed, would be a fool if he totally ignored the names. We discussed freedom of information provisions yesterday. These would obviously come to the Minister and the Department and it would be easy to check on who was nominated.

I have a bit of a fetish about the next issue. I had this experience when I was in the Department of Agriculture and Food. I am not keen on bodies nominating people to boards, my problem being they become somewhat the prisoner of the body who nominates them. It is a very technical point. I am slightly keener on the idea that bodies can propose names of people to be appointed. Technically speaking the Minister makes the appointment so that if a body has nominated or suggested a name and then applies pressure for the nominee to take a narrow view of things, the nominee can say he or she is acting in the public good, will act independently and will not answer to the nominating body because his or her appointment was made by the Minister. This will give the nominee a totally free hand to act in the interests of the board and not merely representing a particular organisation or sector. This is an esoteric point but it gives board members who might have been suggested by a body that little bit of extra freedom when they are acting on the board.

In summary, I suggest Deputy McGinley reflects on what I have said. In neither case is one bound by the names nominated. In the case of the amendment to this section which is the key section and is important to all of us, the Minister will be given the right to nominate those who can nominate names whereas in my proposal, any body of the view that it is relevant to the sector, be it big or small or local or whatever, would be allowed nominate names for appointment to the board. The Minister would therefore have less control under my suggestion than under the Deputy's proposal. The Deputy may not have intended this but his amendment would give the Minister more power and allow more room for allegations that the Minister picked the bodies that he thought were friendly towards him rather than my suggestion of public advertisement. The Minister must then trawl through the names suggested. In neither case is the Minister constrained by the names suggested but one would be very foolish to ignore the names and would do so at one's peril.

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