Mr. Declan Power:

My perspective on this issue covers a variety of areas but particularly that of how it affects the State with regard to its independence and course of action, which is very important at a policy level, at a political level and, crucially, given my background in the Defence Forces and other organisations, at an operational level. One of the things that concerns me most about how the triple lock has evolved is how it affects our agility to engage in applying our own foreign policy in real and meaningful ways. We have seen, and we will probably be discussing in the course of today's discussion, various missions and various initiatives from which we have been precluded from being engaged, even though they were in line with the assent of the Government and public representatives and in line with our national foreign policy, and other initiatives which were stymied on an international platform because of threats of vetoes. This is something we really have to take into account.

In terms of the origins of this, it is important for us to acknowledge the triple lock did not start with the Lisbon treaty although, perhaps, the nomenclature did so then. This goes back to Dáil debates in 1946, when we started to consider the United Nations. At that point people were concerned as to how this would affect our independence, our course of action and our military neutrality. There was general assent at the time, and Éamon de Valera himself was in agreement, that this was for the greater good.

Fast forward a little bit to section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960, which was in the lead-up to the Congo mission. This was, to use a modern-day term, particularly with regard to a fear of mission creep in UN missions. What became the triple lock was created so that we would have safeguards. The interpretation of what the Security Council and its permanent members could do was seen very differently back at that point. The UN was the only game in town when it came to international conflict resolution. The fear was that the UN Security Council would get involved in a direct conflict which was not in line with our needs or wants, or that it would extend a mission to which we had already signed up. The triple lock, as it was developed at that point, would prevent this or at least would give us elbow room to consider it. This is ironic when we think about it; I do not know how familiar many members are with the Congo operation but it is classic example of where the nature and character of the operation changed. It was meant to be a police action but then we had the mission into Katanga when the southernmost province ceded. There were combat operations from low intensity to varying levels of reasonably high intensity. This led to the deaths of Irish troops at Niemba, and committee members are probably familiar with the siege of Jadotville. There were numerous other engagements also. It reminds us that no matter what we have in place, if we are involved in the business of peacekeeping and peace enforcement it can get messy, it is dangerous and things can change rather rapidly.

In the time back then, there were things that did not exist which do exist now. What we have now is a variety of instruments whereby regional organisations can engage in conflict management, peacekeeping and peace support. With the publication of the Brahimi report in 2000, Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, spoke about the need for more partnership with regional organisations. This means the likes of the European Union, which led a very successful mission to Chad. It had a start, middle and end. I am intimately familiar with it because I was across the border in Darfur with the UN. Many UN personnel asked me why we could not have a mission like that there because it was better organised and it probably saved more lives. This was because it had very streamlined mission objectives. There is also the African Union, and there is NATO which is considered a regional security partner of the United Nations.

Where we are today I see as an opportunity to explore where we want to be. I am a big supporter of the UN - anybody who has worn an Irish Defence Forces uniform is - but I am also a big believer in not putting all of Europe's strategic eggs in one basket.