Cian O'Callaghan (Dublin Bay North, Social Democrats) | Oireachtas source

The theme of an expanded role for the Office of the Planning Regulator runs through several sections of the Bill. That office is no longer just a regulator, but becomes an enforcer for the Minister. Under the Bill, there is centralisation of power in the Minister and the OPR is the enforcer. For example, the Minister makes or amends national planning statements and then the OPR has the role of ensuring consistency with them.

The issue with the regional assemblies potentially undermines their democratic role; their role would be simply rubber-stamping what has been dictated by the Minister. As this is written, the regional assembly has to follow the instruction and then the OPR has a role in enforcing what comes from the Minister.

That is my read of it; I do not necessarily expect the Minister of State to agree. My question is whether this has been examined in terms of the risks of centralising power and in terms of the expanded role for the OPR. Has analysis been done on the dangers when the roles of regulators are expanded? The question arises as to who is regulating the regulator. The OPR is no longer a regulator of the planning system, but one of the main actors in it, along with the Minister. How is the OPR regulated? What are the risks of the expanded role of the OPR under section 34, which also applies to other sections? Has that been analysed? If so, how? What is the evidence base and the process for analysing these significant changes?