Dr. Daragh Murray:

I thank the committee for the invitation to participate in this session.

In my opening remarks, I would like to address first, in general terms, the surveillance capability made possible by facial recognition and highlight the chilling effects this surveillance may give rise to. I will then flag three concerns regarding the human rights law compliance of the general scheme.

Facial recognition represents a step change in police surveillance capability. It is an oversimplification to think of facial recognition as a technology that merely allows police to examine an image and identify those present. The use of retrospective facial recognition allows police to look back in time and determine where an individual was, who they were with and what they were doing. Both live and retrospective facial recognition make possible the ability to monitor, track and profile large segments of the population, with significant private-life implications. Linked to this surveillance capability is the possibility that chilling effects will emerge. Chilling effects arise when individuals modify their behaviour because they are afraid of the consequences that might follow if that behaviour is observed. These chilling effects are most likely to be felt by those outside the mainstream or in opposition to the status quo. In concrete terms, they can undermine the right to protest and the ability to mobilise or organise for political change.

Chilling effects are most likely to be felt when police are granted broad powers, as is the case regarding the draft Bill, which allows police to use facial recognition for a wide variety of offences and a wide variety of purposes on the basis of subjective interpretation. The European Court of Human Rights has classified facial recognition as "highly intrusive", requiring a "high level" of justification to be considered "necessary in a democratic society". It is difficult to see how new section 43 satisfies this criterion.

Two additional issues, linked to the authorisation and oversight process, can be highlighted that again raise concerns regarding human rights compliance. The authorisation process runs the risk of being reduced to a tick-box exercise by failing to take into account the context of each use of facial recognition, thereby undermining the ability to evaluate necessity. Equally, a tool this powerful should appropriately be subject to independent oversight.

To summarise, the surveillance capability made possible by facial recognition is unprecedented. We should be cautious about authorising the use of this tool and should first fully understand both the benefit to policing and the potential harm, including to human rights.

Discussion surrounding police uses of facial recognition is characterised by unsubstantiated claims and this is why I have suggested a moratorium for the time being.