Mr. Edmund Honohan:

The provisions in our regulations, under the 2014 directive, which state that the Central Bank shall supervise or regulate this, are wholly inadequate because there is no question of the Central Bank interrogating each and every sale and publishing its results. For instance, it might be found that a particular receiver has a particularly bad record or that there might be a pattern in the sales a particular receiver or a particular bank was achieving. These are concerns about the possibility that there may well be profiteering taking place: gouging of the borrower and profiteering by the investor. In my view, looking at the new directive and the new provisions for forbearance, we are facing into the same situation whereby any investigation by the Central Bank on forbearance will not produce publicly published material. The decision to employ the Central Bank is one we have taken; it is not one the EU imposed on us. The EU states, "These are the forbearance measures that should be adopted." We could have said, "This is a whole new ball game. Forget about the Central Bank. We will now structure a mechanism for resolution of debt in accordance with the provisions of the directive." That would have required primary legislation. The point about this is that it would involve transparent procedures, everybody would know what was happening and, in that way, the effet utile, as they call it in Brussels, or the effective application of EU law, is secured. I am concerned about going too far in suggesting there is any sort of pattern of underselling, but there is no doubt that an individual who is concerned about this does not appear to me at this point in time to have any access to justice.