Mr. Lloyd Riley:

I thank the Deputy for his questions. The position of Dignity in Dying is that provision should be available for terminally ill adults who are mentally competent. The six-month timeframe comes into it primarily based on legislation that has been tabled in Westminster, which would apply in England and Wales. The six-month timeframe for terminal illness is established in law as issuing benefits to terminally ill people. Doctors are used to making an estimate of a prognosis. It is also taken from the Oregon model of legislation that has been enacted throughout the US. In Australia, some states have gone with six months, some 12 months and others have adopted a mix of the two. I am not necessarily saying the timeframe in legislation must be six months. We campaign in different jurisdictions across the UK. Scotland, for example, has a slightly different definition of "terminal illness".

Regarding treatment, we should never force anyone to undergo treatment. That would just be wrong. If someone is given a cancer diagnosis, does not want further treatment and has a prognosis of six months until death, if that accords with the timeframe in legislation, then, yes, that person would be eligible for an assisted death.

Regarding the redefining and broadening of categories, it is helpful to look at two sets of legislation. In my opening statement, I mentioned nearly 30 jurisdictions in which legislation has been enacted. They can be broadly separated into two groups. Countries that have gone down the route of a criterion of terminal illness include states in the US and Australia and they make up a slight majority of the legislation that has been written into statute books. None of those laws have changed beyond their initial criteria. That might be disputed. If someone can provide the name of the jurisdiction that disproves the claim I have made, I would be interested to hear it. Another group of countries, including The Netherlands and Canada, have gone beyond the terminal illness criterion. By definition, their categories of eligibility are more open to interpretation. That is where we see potential for what might be called a broadening or refining of the initial scope of the legislation. Those are the two broad groups of existing legislative provision.