Lynn Ruane (Independent) | Oireachtas source

I thank everyone for their contributions. I will ask all my questions now. I would like the delegates to note them rather answer each as it is asked.

The first question I have, for Dr. McKeown O'Donovan, is about value. She mentioned the value of a very short period of life, the life that is left. When considering the intrinsic value of life, can we somehow consider it to be different if death is imminent? Is the value of the portion of life left to live somehow different from that which has come before it? How is suffering categorised ethically? We talk a lot about ending someone's pain and we consider palliative care as an option allowing people to die peacefully, but we have to consider how suffering may go beyond actual physical pain. We must also consider whether someone is even coherent in the final days when they receive medication at a level that means they are not able to engage with family, talk or say proper goodbyes. They may be heavily medicated. How do we categorise that?

Having read Dr. Finegan's written submission, I respectfully refute the assertion that "Tellingly, pro-euthanasia contributions at Committee have generally avoided affirming euthanasia restrictions". That is unfair to the work of the committee because we have not affirmed anything; rather, we have tried to explore the boundaries and the lengths to which the conversation can go to best understand where the safeguards lie in terms of being able to fully examine an issue. It may be premature to state the committee has affirmed or not affirmed something in that sense.

Dr. Finegan mentioned the intrinsic value of life, something I keep pondering. I am wondering whether will, autonomy, agency and those other things we speak about also relate to the intrinsic value of life. How do we separate them? Is will of value in and of itself, or do we place a value on it only when we consider its consequences? I am referring to the will to live and the will to die. Do we oppose somebody's intrinsic values of autonomy and agency by separating them from the intrinsic value of life? It goes back to what I think Dr. McKeown O'Donovan said about not doing one thing because of the consequences of another. What is Dr. Finegan's position on the intrinsic value of will?

My other question is for Dr. Yuill. We were concerned when we read the comments on homelessness and unmet State needs.

However, I struggled to find a source for the observation in his opening statement that, "Canada is the most dramatic example [and we have heard many statements about Canada] where, having legalised in 2016, many seek euthanasia from problems of homelessness, poverty and inadequate medical resources." Looking at the application form, I see there is space for additional information. Is Dr. Yuill saying applicants have mentioned those things as part of the reason, or the only reason, they are seeking euthanasia? Is somebody who is homeless saying he or she would like to avail of euthanasia for that reason? There is also a part of the application form that looks for where somebody lives, whether they are incarcerated or perhaps live in a hostel. Is it their address that points out they are homeless or are they presenting with that information? I am wondering what is the source of that information. Has somebody availed of euthanasia because he or she is living in poverty and that is the only reason?

Loneliness has also been mentioned. I would want to know whether that is just one reason provided under the additional information section or is it the sole reason. Are we saying that is another matter that people consider when looking at their disability or illness if, for example, they have a cancer diagnosis? Such people might also mention that they are lonely. I want to ensure that the information we have is clear and accurate in that sense.