Professor Richard Huxtable:

I welcome this question. On the one hand, we do want consistency, not least in our law and the messages the law sends but I will make three remarks to problematise that proposition.

I have three remarks to problematise that proposition. First, we can ask of those examples I gave earlier whether they truly are equivalent to assisted dying. Mr. Kelly mentioned the so-called distinction between acts and omissions. Some would say on that basis that refusing life support is very different from actively assisting someone to die. Equally, with regard to animals being euthanised where they are suffering, some would of course say that humans and animals are very different moral creatures. Second, we might say that an argument regarding consistency only takes you to a crossroads. It only points out that, on one hand, you believe this and, on the other, you believe that. It does not tell you which road to take. Simply because we allow people to refuse life-sustaining treatment or withdraw or withhold it from those who are lacking capacity does not necessarily mean we should be committed to the next step. Robert Burt, writing in the Hastings Center's report, stated that perhaps there is an inconsistency but then specifically states, “Preserving these ‘illogical’ lines ... is in the service of promoting conscious awareness of moral discomfort”. Perhaps there is value sometimes in retaining an inconsistent position.