Mr. Miroslav Laj?k:

Dia dhaoibh. I thank the committee for inviting me to address it today. I wish I could have been with the committee in person but, unfortunately, the serious crises we are encountering in north Kosovo mean I cannot leave Brussels. However, I appreciate the opportunity to speak and appreciate the committee's attention to the western Balkans. I will focus my introductory remarks on three important aspects: first, 2022 as an exceptional year for enlargement and how we get there; second, rethinking enlargement; and third, the challenges in the region.

I have 25 years of personal experience with the western Balkans in many different national and international capacities. Since April 2020, I have been responsible for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and other regional issues so the views I will present are mostly based on my personal experience.

We had a moment of hope in Thessaloniki in 2003 when we promised that the future of the western Balkans is in the EU but, unfortunately, in the 20 years since, only one western Balkan country, Croatia, has joined the EU. That was in 2013, ten years ago. This is not the speed or level of progress that our leaders envisaged 20 years ago. What is worse is the opening speech of the then President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, in 2014 who said there would be no enlargement during the mandate of his Commission. That sent a very negative signal to the region and discouraged the pro-European forces there. The region started losing hope that it would one day join the EU and the EU’s credibility has eroded to the extent that we are no longer seen as a role model or example and we were criticised for mentoring and lecturing the region while not being honest and moving the goal posts. I would say the lowest point came in 2019-2020 but that was also the beginning of an awakening on the side of the EU and understanding that we are not doing well and we are losing the region and opening the space for other players who are not EU friends.

What changed the situation dramatically is Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. Ironically, with all the tragedies and the negative effects on the global architecture, the war did have a positive impact on EU enlargement policy because, first, it put an end to the illusion that Europe can be truly united, prosperous and at peace with the western Balkans still being left outside. In a way, the war has brought EU enlargement back to life and enlargement was made political again. For years, we had reduced enlargement into a bureaucratic, technical exercise, ticking boxes and speaking about chapters and clusters and not about values or joint positions on crucial international issues. The war in Ukraine made the bold decisions on the side of the European Union suddenly possible. Therefore, last year the EU delivered a number of important decisions which seemed unthinkable before, namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with Moldova and Ukraine, were granted candidate status, long overdue accession negotiations were launched with Albania and North Macedonia and Kosovo finally got the green light for visa liberalisation.

These are big things but let me be honest. They are not the result of the huge progress on the side of the region but rather these are overdue decisions on our side, and they are also seen and understood as such by the region.

The mood in the EU nowadays is different. Future membership and enlargement are no longer taboos. More and more member states realise that only EU membership can achieve what we aspire for in Europe.

This brings me to my second point, which is the need to rethink our approach to enlargement. We know that is a long process; it is a marathon rather than a sprint. What is most important is enlargement is a political process that is based on technical criteria. As I said, we prioritised the technical aspects of the process over years, neglecting the political aspects, which was a mistake. Now, the issue of joining our sanctions on Russia, aligning with our sanctions and our foreign policy and defence policy statements have become a prominent issue. However, that is how it should be because this is about shared values.

The process of enlargement does not work well. There are at least two examples that prove that. First, there is a clear disconnect between the progress on the technical aspects and progress in the accession process. We have analysis showing that the progress in implementing the technical criteria is not reflected in the speed of the progress of individual countries. Countries that are part of the accession negotiations for years are not meeting certain criteria that countries that have not yet started accession are already meeting. Normally, it is should be that when a country meets the technical criteria, it is given the green light to progress. This is not happening.

The second is the issue of the length of the accession process. My own country, Slovakia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, completed the accession negotiations in 34 months. Estonia, Poland and Slovenia completed their process in 56 months. Now Serbia is negotiating for 112 months and closed two chapters. Montenegro is negotiating for 130 months and closed three chapters. It is very clear that this process is going nowhere and that gives very little hope to the countries that the membership prospective is tangible and credible.

Therefore, we need to rethink our approach to enlargement, on which I would like to make three key points. First, we need to recommit to the enlargement and the message from Thessanoliki in 2003. Second, we need to overcome the fear of enlargement. It something I do not really understand because we invented the enlargement process, we are setting the rules, we are fully in control and the process is reversible. We should depoliticise the early stages when inviting parties to be part of the process and be political when we assess the progress and when we decide on closing the chapter. Third, we also need to have an honest discussion about practical interim solutions. One issue that is being discussed a lot in Brussels but outside of the European institutions is the gradual integration or staged accession. Basically, the philosophy is that we should end the binary system of limited pre-accession assistance and then massive post-accession funds after the country has joined. We should allow the countries to progress towards accession in stages according to the reforms achieved, with each stage giving access to increased funds. In addition, we should establish a consolidation phase at the end of the negotiation, before full membership - something like being in the room but with out the veto right, so that we know that the countries are fully ready. These are not official ideas but it is clear that we address the methodology of the process of enlargement.

It is also clear that the momentum that was created a year ago will not last forever. It is unfortunate that the positive developments on our side are not reflecting on the side of the western Balkans. The region still does not believe that we are honest when we speak about the European future and, as such, they do not seem to have the necessary motivation to undertake the actions that they are required to. We see very little progress on the reforms. There is very little progress on resolving bilateral disputes. We see increased political instability. We see a weakening of pro-European forces in these countries. Issues of the past are resurfacing and taking too much time of the current politicians. The future EU perspective is not the beacon that would guide their actions and steps the way it was in the case of countries in central Europe, for example.

This brings me to my last point, which is the challenges we are facing. We look at the region as such but, of course, there are six countries in the region and they are still grappling with unresolved challenges that have the potential to contribute instability and friction. In this context, I would like to draw members’ attention to some particular issue. I refer to North Macedonia. North Macedonia and Albania were invited to start accession negotiations last year. They are in the screening process. However, for North Macedonia to start the real accession process, it still needs to adopt constitutional changes related to the Bulgarian language. The country is struggling to collect the necessary number of votes. I believe we need to help the country the best we can to get over the last hurdle. Otherwise, we will face the risk of decoupling Albania and North Macedonia and leaving North Macedonia behind. That would be a bad mistake because North Macedonia has been very committed and has met every request coming from the European Union. It does not deserve to be left behind.

My second point, which I see as the most strategic challenge we are facing in the Balkans, is the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. This affects the entire region. In February and March of this year, we achieved landmark agreements on the path towards normalisation, which represents a solid platform to make rapid progress towards normalisation. However, unfortunately, since the end of May, we again in the midst of a crisis and this crisis is distracting us from our efforts. Instead of focusing on normalisation, we are again fully busy with crisis management. European Union’s 27 member states presented a proposal consisting of three points: de-escalation; new elections in the north with the participation of Kosovo Serbs; and a return to the dialogue and normalisation. I ask members for their support for this plan also.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is deeply dysfunctional. There have been some promising developments in the federation, but still, the underlying issues are very much present and prevent the country from progressing. We need to address the issue of the dysfunctionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Finally, do not lose sight of Montenegro. The country has been seen as most successful and has been a frontrunner on enlargement but, for the past three years, has dealt more with internal issues and issues of the past, such as ethnicity, religion or culture, rather than progressing on the EU path. Now, it is forming a new government after the elections. It has a chance to catch up and reconfirm its role of being a front-runner. However, it needs to put together a pro-European government and we need to be very clear on that.

We need act quickly, politically and now. If we want to see the EU as a global player, particularly after the war in Ukraine, when the new world order will be discussed, we want the Union to be at the table. It will not happen if we are still busy with the western Balkans, the same way we have been busy five or ten years ago - or now. Therefore, the only way is to offer a European future to the next generations in the western Balkans. I do not see a credible alternative. For this, we need full commitment, out-of-the-box thinking and we need to be credible again. I thank members for their attention.