Professor Barry McMullin:

This is a risk management challenge, and there are various risks. It requires some detailed assessment of the different kinds of risks, and different measures mitigate different risks. As for the overall European supply and our reliance on that via the interconnectors to the UK, which will become progressively more important as the Corrib gas field is depleted, that is a very reasonable question and the answer to it depends critically, as was indicated in the earlier evidence to the committee, on how effective the European-wide measures are at decarbonisation. The more successful we are in reducing our consumption of natural gas in a managed way over the next 15 or 20 years, the more capacity we will have on both the existing and planned infrastructure.

The real risk is from a failure in climate action. If the climate action falls substantially short, our insecurity of supply of natural gas will be much more severe, but that is a scenario in which I would argue that the other risks, that is, the risks of climate impact, are progressively worsening, potentially to an irreversible point. In fact, they dwarf the other risks. It would be terrible if we had a insecurity of supply event in the middle of winter. That would have serious local consequences for us over a period of, potentially, several weeks, which would be terrible. In the bigger picture context, however, the potential consequences of inadequate or slow climate action are much worse.

My personal view is that in balancing those risks, there are actions within our power both in Ireland and collectively in Europe. Obviously, Ireland is a full member state of the EU, so we have a role to play in facilitating and encouraging greater action. The biggest part we can play in driving that forward is by the deployment, as rapidly as possible, of our own renewable energy infrastructure, and by additional interconnection to Europe, particularly in respect of electricity at the current time. In that way, we can demonstrate our commitment and support the wider European project.

That way, we demonstrate our commitment and support the wider European project. All the parties in Ireland have made that commitment at European level and there is very strong commitment in the Commission and the European Parliament. If we take those commitments on board, further investment in LNG anywhere in Europe beyond what is already in train would be a distraction and could potentially impair that.

The market question is a different one from the wider European question. That is a legitimate concern. If you have infrastructure that is commercially operated for profits and the profit is dependent on how much gas passes through it, you have then introduced into the Irish system an actor whose interests and the interests of the people they employ, as well as the interests of the State based on the taxes it derives from that entity, are all aligned with increasing gas consumption or, at least, maintaining it rather than reducing it. This plays out in a complicated, coupled system. This deep into our climate emergency, knowing already how difficult our climate action goals are, to introduce factors and actors into the system that would actually operate in the opposite direction would be very difficult.

The other category of risk that we have to talk about is disruption to the interconnections to the UK. This is coming into sharper focus, particularly with the depletion of the Corrib field. We then have to ask what the risks are. Are we talking about technical risks and failure of the infrastructure or geopolitical risk and attacks on the infrastructure? If I mention the second risk first, that risk is low. It is tiny. However, given the consequences, we still have to consider it. In terms of geopolitical risk, any geopolitical actor that has both the means and interest in attacking the gas connection infrastructure between Ireland and the UK, by definition, has the means and interest to attack LNG import infrastructure. Therefore, LNG import infrastructure does not actually mitigate that geopolitical risk.

Now we are back to the technical risk, which has not changed. The Ukraine war has not changed that technical risk; it is what it was. The approach to it at European level has changed because of Brexit. In a formal sense, we do not meet the EU infrastructure standard, but previously it was met on a regional basis with Great Britain. The objective assessment of that technical risk has not changed. The pipelines are dualled. A single one failing would be problematic and we would have to activate our mitigation measures. We have a plan for that, unless there is some factor that says that technical assessment has changed. However, the Corrib depletion has changed it somewhat. In a sense, even before Corrib came on stream, we were already in that situation.

If the judgment were that the risk needs to be mitigated for, say, a period of ten years, the LNG facility would have to be State-owned and operated. As Deputy Leddin stated, it is energetically expensive to maintain LNG in the liquified state. There basically needs to be a certain level of flow through the infrastructure as it liquifies. If that was, for example, a floating storage unit that was State-owned and operated and chartered for a fixed period of time and we had an exit strategy for it, that is certainly an arguable position. I am here representing myself and not any other organisation but I was party to the submission to the consultation on behalf of Engineers Ireland. It stated explicitly that there is an arguable case for that sort of LNG facility on a fixed-term basis but strong measures to guard against it leading to an expansion in gas demand need to be taken.

The other potential way of mitigating it is through the development of gas storage in the gaseous form in Ireland. We had a gas storage facility in the depleted Kinsale Head gasfield which operated for an extended number of years but was decommissioned. It operated on a commercial basis and the commercial operation was no longer providing returns to the operator, so it was decommissioned. With the benefit of hindsight, maybe there should have been an intervention to preserve that.

The ESB has engaged in very significant preliminary investigation into the possibility of re-establishing that storage facility. We had a presentation at Engineers Ireland in recent months on that exact topic. While further work is necessary, there is the technical possibility that could be done. The great thing about that is that technical possibility does migrate to the potential for future storage of hydrogen, whereas, as we heard from an earlier witness, LNG technology does not transfer to handle hydrogen. The characteristics of hydrogen and liquefied natural gas are fundamentally different. The characteristics of gaseous hydrogen and gaseous natural gas are significantly different, but not so different that a gas storage facility cannot be repurposed.

If the judgement is made that it is necessary and appropriate in terms of risk mitigation of the pipeline interconnections to look at some additional mitigation for that, while there is an arguable case for LNG, the strategic case is much stronger to look at a gaseous storage facility, whether that be in the Kinsale Head field or some other geological place that has the possibility of repurposing for hydrogen. It makes much more sense strategically, and that should be prioritised, if at all possible.

That answer was probably longer than Deputy Whitmore had bargained for.