Ms Caitr?ona Heinl:

My statement aims primarily to emphasise the constantly changing nature of hybrid threats and their import to nation states, including Ireland. While members will see in the statement that there is no agreed definition for "hybrid threats", they are understood to comprise a combination of different types of tools, some expected and known and some unexpected and clandestine, applied to achieve an undeclared strategic objective. In short, our conceptual understanding of their nature is not just an academic point. It is important that we establish a baseline common understanding to then develop appropriate national, regional and international responses.

Actors’ objectives generally include undermining public trust in democratic institutions, deepening unhealthy polarisation both nationally and internationally, challenging the core values of democratic societies, gaining geopolitical influence through undermining others and affecting the decision-making capability of political leaders. It is well established that both state and non-state actors undertake this type of activity. Campaigns can be understood as co-ordinated actions across different domains. Members will also note that actors are observed to be constantly refining their tactics, techniques and procedures. In the written statement, they will find for their perusal annexe 1 and an image I have included which show the breadth of the tools and types of domains.

Specifically with a view to understanding the cyber and FIMI - foreign information manipulation and interference - disinformation nexus in the context of hybrid threats, I refer to the EU’s 2020 cybersecurity strategy, which explains how hybrid threats can combine disinformation campaigns with cyberattacks on infrastructure, economic processes and democratic institutions. The challenge is that this has the potential for causing physical damage, obtaining personal data, stealing industrial or state secrets, sowing mistrust and weakening social cohesion. It is understood that these activities undermine international security and stability and the benefits that cyberspace brings for economic, social and political development.

Members will note that the current national cybersecurity strategy for Ireland explains clearly that many hybrid threats have had a cyber component. It goes on to explain that as an open, liberal democracy, Ireland is vulnerable to campaigns of this type in much the same way as other EU member states. Similarly, the first annual progress report on the implementation of the EU strategic compass for security and defence, released in March 2023, specifies how FIMI is increasingly used as part of broader hybrid campaigns. In this regard, while so-called disinformation is not a new issue, there is a need to distinguish what is disinformation and what is security-related. It is also understood to be a security challenge comprising the deliberate activity of actors that use the information environment and manipulation of it as a strategic tool. It seems that in the Irish context, this conception of disinformation has not been overly focused on the geostrategic or security aspects with this FIMI-hybrid threat lens in processes like the Future of Media Commission.

The second section of the written statement draws on some key pointsvis-à-visthe threat landscape. In this regard, regular strategic threat assessments are necessary to develop better national security strategy and, by extension, our national responses to hybrid threats in the context of a constantly changing geostrategic and geopolitical environment. By way of example, at regional EU level, the first ever EU threat analysis was conducted in 2020 in order to properly prepare the EU strategic compass. The compass, as many members will be aware, specifies a number of relevant trends. I will speak to a few but not the entire list, in the interest of time. I also note that the White Paper and the 2019 update as well as the report of the Commission on the Defence Forces mentioned hybrid aggression specifically and related trends. In fact, there are approximately 50 mentions of “hybrid” in the commission's report.

In short, vis-à-vis the types of trends that the compass alludes too, hybrid threats are growing, both in frequency and their impact. Both state and non-state actors are using hybrid strategies, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, direct interference in elections and political processes, economic coercion and the instrumentalisation of irregular migration flows.

Two other trends are worth drawing members’ attention to. First, in respect of the armed aggression against Ukraine, the compass specifically finds that Russia is showing readiness to use the highest level of military forces, combined with hybrid tactics, cyberattacks and FIMI, and economic and energy coercion. It is also said to use crises, including by using disinformation and mercenaries as well as hybrid tactics, compromising the stability of other countries and their democratic processes. Most notably, this is viewed as having direct implications for European security. In this regard, I also note that the compass mentions other nation states that are also described as using hybrid tactics too. On the latest trends related to the compass, the March implementation report flags the instrumentalisation of food specifically.

Next in this regard, I draw to members’ attention some notable evolving and emerging trends that require our attention in the immediate term.

Four in particular are listed. First, drawing on United States threat assessments from earlier this year, those assessments identify that efforts by other countries to promote authoritarianism and spread disinformation is helping to fuel larger competition between democratic and authoritarian forms of government, exploiting global information flows, which is said to impact nearly all countries, contributing to democratic backsliding, threats of political instability and violent societal conflict. The second trend to note, from a number of different sources, is the indicators about the expansion of malign influence globally, including in other regions such as Africa, which could impact nations at home. A third notable trend is that some democratic states, and I emphasise "democratic states", are apparently engaging in digital repressions against the backdrop of broader digital influence operation. Fourth are indicators of increasing use of emerging and disruptive technologies for future geostrategic information purposes. For example, artificial intelligence, AI as a powerful information tool, could target societies and political establishments by impacting the content, speed and volume of information delivery and perception.

That brings me to the third section of the written statement, which focuses on responses. As the committee will see, in short, national and EU conceptual approaches to hybrid threats and increasing resilience continue to develop and mature. Annex 2, which I have attached to the statement, describes in particular Finland's approach to hybrid influencing, and it does so to provide an overview of the complexity and the breadth of measures which are being put in place by another EU nation state. Some examples of good practice measures, six in total, are included, but these are not exhaustive. As mentioned, first, establishing a baseline common understanding is key, as are regular strategic threat assessments. Third, a very important measure is that of a co-ordinated cross-governmental approach, given the combined and co-ordinated nature of hybrid tactics. The committee will note, from its reading of the Commission on the Defence Forces report, that there is no overarching national counterhybrid strategy. In this case, an overarching national framework would bring different relevant instruments together in a co-ordinated manner for the breadth of combined hybrid threats. The idea here is that this would increase co-ordination where in fact there are a number of relevant measures being implemented already by Ireland. The committee will also be aware of the specific report findings within the Commission on the Defence Forces report calling for a whole-of-government approach and the need to increase co-operation.

A fourth good practice measure is that of increasing situational awareness, where there is still an acknowledged gap globally in our understanding about what is actually happening. Deeper clarity is needed about who the actors are, their tools, tactics and techniques, and the nature of the threat level. In this regard, enhanced intelligence capacities would likely also be needed. A fifth very important point is that of building out societal resilience and developing whole-of-society solutions. It is widely acknowledged that this can be very difficult to achieve, but for example, raising resilience to foreign information manipulation and interference, FIMI, is by definition a whole-of-society effort. On this note, the committee will see within the written statement that governmental strategic communication mechanisms would provide a verifiable governmental source of content outside times of crisis and during peacetime. Members will also note new developments preceding the invasion of Ukraine, whereby intelligence was declassified and communicated as a counter-disinformation method. This is an example of one of the latest evolutions of communicating more transparently on intelligence and national security matters while also protecting sources and methods but with a view to bringing about consequences for nefarious actors.

Another good practice is to communicate transparently that government does not always have all the solutions and it must work together with the whole of society, specifically with regard to cyber. A next related point is that there is a need for support of non-governmental independent research enterprises and engagement with the media to inform independent content. The idea is that this would foster a fact-based information environment and increase our ability to access information from many different trusted sources. There is naturally value in continuing to draw on, learn from and engage with EU responses and like-minded partners. Some examples of good practice in EU initiatives include the work of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which releases new methodologies regularly and assists with ongoing capability development. As the committee knows, Ireland became a member in January 2023.

There are a number of EU directives relevant to this space and enhancing resilience which are being implemented or are due to be implemented. I will conclude and look forward to the discussion. I thank the Chair.