Charles Flanagan (Laois-Offaly, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I will ask a couple of questions under three headings, some of which have been referred to, and on others perhaps Dr. Colfer and Mr. FitzGerald would like to leave us with a message: first, Russia; second, what we are doing nationally; and, third, our international role. On the issue of Russia, I note that the IIEA presentation mentions Russia at least 15 times. It is quite unusual in the context of a presentation to us that it should be so specific in its messaging. In response to the IIEA response to the questions, both of our witnesses have been remarkably, or refreshingly, frank and direct in their responses. That is not something that is always apparent in our engagement and we very much welcome it.

On Russia, the witnesses very directly and heavily identify Russia as a threat. I ask them to comment on the fact that we in this committee have been critical of the very strong engagement of Russia in Ireland, with particular reference to numbers, activity and the role of official Russian ambassadorial engagement in Ireland. The witnesses quote Russian President Vladimir Putin, who said: "[A]ny critical infrastructure in transport, energy or communication infrastructure is under threat - regardless of what part of the world it is located, by whom it is controlled, laid on the seabed or on land". This is against the background of what the witnesses have said and what we have been saying here regarding our own critical telecommunications infrastructure in Irish waters under the seabed, yet we have a significant complement of Russian officials, technicians, experts and operatives working on a daily basis in this capital city and across the country. Would the witnesses associate that with Ireland's vulnerability and would they have any message for committee members in that regard?

From a national perspective, I note that in response to the question from Deputy Cronin about lead Departments or Departments of greater influence or priority than others, Dr. Colfer said he was ambivalent as to the lead Department. Maybe I could invite him to review his ambivalence in the context of what we are doing under, for example, the National Security Analysis Centre, which in 2019, in an unprecedented move from a security point of view, brought all of the security and related agencies - the Garda and the defence, communications and energy agencies - under the Department of the Taoiseach for the first time. There was a period of public consultation in 2019 and, thereafter, legislation, which to the best of my knowledge has not yet been enacted, that would place this office or centre on a statutory footing. One could say that any element of tardiness, if, indeed, there was tardiness, may well have been due to Covid and the fact that we, as a Legislature, were not operating at full throttle over a period of years. I ask the witnesses to give us their assessment of the workings of that centre and if they see any immediate gaps in the system, particularly in regard to the connectivity or otherwise between the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces, the resourcing of that centre in the Department of the Taoiseach, and, given their experience, whether over the past four years the level of co-ordination has been sufficient.

The IIEA also identifies in one of the recommendations the need to ensure a greater level of co-ordination and co-operation between the public and private sectors. That, of course, is very important in the Irish context, having regard to the expertise and experience that is potentially available to us given the siting of many of the leading global technology companies in Dublin. Do the witnesses think we can gain from their expertise? What type of collaboration do they see as appropriate in the circumstances? This is work that we can do nationally but I question whether this is being done with the speed and intensity the IIEA paper seems to suggest we might.

On the international stage, we have been engaging quite actively in recent times in the EU strategic compass. We appear to be fulfilling what might be described as active engagement. I do not want to call it our "obligations", but our activity and involvement is not only in terms of finance but in terms of the personnel and targets that have been agreed. Do the witnesses see that as being a way forward? Do they see any connectivity or potential conflict between what the strategic compass is doing and what other international organisations such as NATO might be engaging in, particularly in the context of what Deputy Stanton said about Europe being at war?

In terms of the European jigsaw, we are actively engaged as members of the EU but our nearest neighbour is no longer a member, yet we continue to have a special security relationship and engagement with that neighbour. How do the witnesses see that jigsaw working in a timely and essential manner, having regard to the changed European landscape with war on the Continent?