Ms Liz O'Donnell:

Good afternoon, Senators and Deputies. I am delighted to be here, Chairman, and I am grateful to have an opportunity after all these years to put on the record my personal reflections as a participant representing the Government at the talks leading to the Good Friday Agreement almost 25 years ago.

The background to my being on the Irish team is that in June 1997, I was appointed Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for overseas development assistance and human rights. My position also involved a role in Anglo-Irish relations. At that time I was a Deputy representing Dublin South for the Progressive Democrats and I had done so since 1992. That was my first ministerial appointment and my party was in a partnership Government with Fianna Fáil. David Andrews was the senior Minister in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and I was a Minister of State.

It was felt that because it was a coalition Government that our party should have an active role in the peace process and any negotiations in that regard. For the record, the Progressive Democrats - since the party is now gone - was formed in 1985 by Des O’Malley and Mary Harney. The party’s credo was one of radical tax reform and prudent management of the public finances. It also had a moderate approach to the Northern Ireland issue. Mary Harney had been expelled from Fianna Fáil for voting for the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiated by Garret FitzGerald in November 1985.

Des O'Malley, our leader, was more concerned with true republican values than with nationalistic myths. In his first address as leader Des O’Malley said:

I believe there is a great consensus in Ireland which favours a peaceful approach to the problem in Northern Ireland; which favours fundamental tax reform; which favours a clear distinction between Church and State. Irish politics must be transformed. Experience tells me that no such transformation will come from within the existing parties. It must come from outside. There must be a new beginning.

Given Des O'Malley has now passed, I felt it important to put that initial credo on the record of the House. That moderate approach on the Northern Ireland issue informed my participation in the talks. Yes, I was there as part of the Government's negotiating team, but I was also representing my party, the Progressive Democrats.

When I entered the process in July 1997, the Government inherited a moribund situation. Despite the careful stewardship of the outgoing rainbow Government headed by John Bruton, an IRA bomb at Canary Wharf and the end of the ceasefire had seen to that. Negotiations had ceased with depression on all sides. However, all that changed when the IRA reinstated its ceasefire on 20 July 1997. The peace process was back on the rails. Talks were to kick off in Belfast in September. I remember Mary Harney calling me around that time in my Iveagh House office and announcing in her usual frank manner, "By the way, you are handling the North". As you can imagine, as a relatively new Deputy with an inauspicious political pedigree, I instinctively felt ill-equipped and overwhelmed but I quickly adapted to the challenge presented.

I spent the summer period in Donegal briefing myself on the existing documents relating to the peace process and ingesting its glossary of terms. The joint framework document, the heads of agreement, the rules of procedure, and the position papers already tabled needed to be absorbed and understood. Language was so important. In a political context so devoid of trust and laden with paranoia, loose words could literally cost lives. I was adamant I was not going to be the one to drop the ball at any stage.

The peace process was a Government-driven political project. It is important to acknowledge that it was blessed with all-party support in the House. It sought to find a comprehensive settlement to the Northern Irish question, one that would identify and deal with the causes of the conflict on the island. Very little happened by chance; it was a highly micro-managed exercise in conflict resolution. Mo Mowlam, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, often bemoaned the fact that it was not more of a “people’s project”. However, it was an inclusive project - eight parties, big and small, specially elected in 1996 to participate on an equal basis. I believe the inclusion of the smaller parties was hugely important to the outcome. I refer particularly to the participation on an equal basis of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, NIWC, headed up by Monica McWilliams, Bronagh Hinds and their colleagues. They brought something new to the process. They were cross-community, and were not from a particular tribe. They came from civil society. Some were academics, social workers, lawyers and community activists. They advocated a different agenda of equality, reconciliation and human rights but because they did not come from the toxic name-calling which had passed for politics in Northern Ireland, they offered something fresh. They helped, on many occasions, to overcome procedural logjams. They were also helpful conduits for Governments in judging sentiment in the community, and in the loyalist paramilitary groups in particular.

Similarly, the two small loyalist parties were essential to the process of reaching agreement and ending the conflict. I deeply regret that the smaller loyalist parties did not prosper electorally post-Agreement. There was a proposal to make space for the loyalist parties and the NIWC in post-Agreement elections, but this was rejected by the major parties. That was a source of regret to the Government.

As soon as Sinn Féin entered the talks, we lost the Democratic Unionist Party, DUP, which was always a very serious concern. It meant that David Trimble and his colleagues were isolated and subjected to vicious abuse from the DUP from outside the talks. As a result, David Trimble became extremely cautious about making any concession as he would be vilified by the DUP, and indeed he suffered in every subsequent election. Both Governments knew well how difficult a situation David Trimble was in.

The Irish Government knew that if it lost David Trimble, there was no process to speak of. We spent a lot of time, energy and ingenuity in efforts to "save David" from himself and from discontent and disunity within his own party, as well as the anger of the rejectionist DUP outside the talks.

The two Governments were close and mostly ad idem- in other words, they were of one mind.

That intensive co-operation between the offices of both Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, was of huge significance. They had recently been elected with strong mandates and a new resolve to make the process work and end the conflict. Both Governments had the peace process as their priority. It was the number one priority for them. The best civil servants and diplomats on both sides were despatched to this singular task.

It was a high-risk project for both Governments. Fundamental principles were at stake. For the sake of peace and an ultimate settlement of the vexed quarrel between the UK and Ireland, and between the parties in Northern Ireland, should sovereign governments negotiate with armed paramilitary groups and their representatives? The state of mind of the republican movement, in particular, was crucial. We had it from trusted intermediaries that the IRA was up for a settlement if we could reach a comprehensive political settlement. The phrase "constructive ambiguity" has become synonymous with the Irish peace process. Ambiguity was necessary. We could not be blown off course by the most recent setback or atrocity. At various times, many of us in the constitutional parties had to suspend our critical faculties, about the bona fides of armed groups and their representatives, to keep the show on the road. We had to keep our gaze on the ultimate prize of peace despite ceasefire breaches and other ambiguities and suspicions.

Eight years after the Good Friday Agreement, I was asked by the British Council to reflect on the agreement in an essay in its publication, Britain and Ireland: Lives Entwined. To be honest, I have drawn upon those published memories to inform my contribution today. Twenty-five years on, however, my memories are still vivid of that day - 10 April 1998 - when we finally reached agreement. That day marked the end of a tedious process of meetings, drafting and drama over nine months. There was awful tension and a sense of standoff. Those of us who were close to it all - in the rooms - were not overly optimistic that we would reach agreement on that day. So many threads were left loose. Our masterful chairman, Senator Mitchell, had set a deadline and he meant it. He was leaving the building and going back to his wife and newborn son in America. Outside, the world media were camped and hopes were high. People tell me they were glued to the television as though it were a hostage taking. I for one was in the hopeful camp but there had been so many false dawns and the parties, although exhausted from intensive talks for weeks, knew that so much was not tied down.

That morning, as David Andrews and I made our way up from the Stormont House accommodation provided for us during the talks, we heard Tony Blair’s memorable soundbite, "I feel the hand of history upon our shoulder", on the radio. We joked darkly that it could equally be the boot of history, such was our uncertainty about what was going to happen. The Taoiseach, burdened with the task of finalising these talks on the same weekend as burying his beloved mother, was white-faced. Early in the morning, it was clear that elements of a deal were in place after weeks of intensive negotiations across the three strands but, in the time necessary to tidy up texts and prepare final versions, we heard rumours of dissent and discontent in the unionist camp. There was talk of a walk-out by unionists. Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern were back in the building. Bill Clinton was on the phone. Seven o'clock in the morning became 10 o'clock, then noon, then 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The morning’s euphoria gave way to exhaustion and, for some, head-hanging despair. I remember the then Secretary of State, the late Mo Mowlam, who was very unwell at the time, roaming the corridors bleary-eyed and barefoot consulting the small parties and trying to keep everybody motivated. We were all very fatigued and I feared we would lose control of the final text in the frenzy of last-minute amendments to documents with the British Government, etc. We almost lost David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, UUP, on the issue of North-South bodies, which were overly ambitious in number and were filleted at the last minute.

Finally, word came that Senator Mitchell had called a final plenary session. Jeffrey Donaldson had left the building, among others, including Arlene Foster, but Trimble had convinced most of his party to go ahead. Tony Blair had sent him a side-letter holding out the promise of decisive action by the British Government if there was not early progress on decommissioning.

The decommissioning of illegal weapons held by loyalists and republicans had dogged progress in the talks from the beginning and the issue was there at the end, unresolved and parked with the establishment of the decommissioning commission headed up General John de Chastelain. Unionists and, to be fair, the rest of the parties perceived the disposal of weapons as an indispensable part of the talks and settlement. Sinn Féin, however, saw it as ultimately the outcome of a settlement to its satisfaction. Therein lay the conundrum. Ultimately, the delay in the decommissioning of IRA weapons post-agreement gradually eroded the trust of the Ulster Unionist Party. Weapons were finally disposed of almost eight years later, too late for David Trimble’s party, which was destroyed electorally by the DUP in subsequent elections.

On that historic day, I remember us all rushing to the plenary session. Politicians and officials crowded into the humdrum, plenary meeting room in Castle Buildings. Even the hard-pressed catering and kitchen staff came to have a look at what was going on. People I had never seen before rambled in. It was learned later that ex-prisoners and paramilitaries of different hues turned up to witness the finale. Senator Mitchell was eloquent as always. Apart from that, there were no speeches. Each representative had to say "Yes" or "No" to the agreement. Only Deputy Gerry Adams had to reserve his position pending internal party discussions. I remember looking at the late Martin McGuinness; he was smiling broadly and very happy with the outcome.

The only document formally signed that day was that between the two Governments – the official British-Irish Agreement. People passed around papers for autographs as keepsakes. The late Martin McGuinness rushed over to me and gave me his Bloody Sunday pin, which was precious to him, from his lapel. I said a hurried goodbye and thanks to Senator Mitchell, hugged the late Seamus Mallon - it is remarkable, 25 years later, that so many of these key players have passed - and then it was over. There were tears of fatigue and hugs of relief all around. We spilled out to brief the media waiting outside in the mud and in portacabins. It was lashing rain with freezing wind. I remember seeing John Hume, who was, more than anyone else, the intellectual architect of all of this, standing in the rain, looking up to the skies while giving his press conference. There were poisonous exchanges between Ian Paisley of the DUP and the late David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist Party, PUP, the loyalist party. There were rumblings and intelligence that Paisley was organising public protests and our security arrangements had to change which meant we all had to fly back immediately to Dublin.

On arrival in Dublin Airport, some celebratory alcohol was found but, to be honest, people were so jaded we could hardly take it in. In my case, I went home to an empty house. As it was Easter, my family had gone to Donegal where I was meant to go via the North with the RUC and then be taken to my Donegal home by An Garda Síochána. I turned on the kettle and opened the fridge and there was no milk. I sat in my coat in the cold and empty house and turned on the TV. The whole media frenzy was still going on outside Stormont. It was quite unreal, as one can imagine. A friend rang my mobile, never thinking she would get through to me, and there I was alone in the cold house. The following day, after a good sleep, I joined my family in Donegal.

The media were euphoric. I for one did not share the euphoria. Those of us on all sides who were participants knew it was only the beginning of a long process of fundamental change in Northern Ireland - a remaking of how the place was to be governed. So much was left undone, including policing, the justice system, referendums on both sides of the Border, the disarming of armed groups, demilitarisation by the British Army, the continuing release of prisoners and equality legislation.

The negotiations had been carried out across the three strands. These were strand 1, relations within Northern Ireland; strand 2, North-South relations and institutions; and strand 3, east-west UK and Irish Governments. My principal role was in relation to strand 2, arrangements for North-South institutions in the event of changes to Articles 2 and 3 of our Constitution. This strand was predictably the most contentious for unionists. Any talk of North-South bodies was anathema to them and they saw its very concept as veering towards a united Ireland. It was only when the whole agreement came together in the chairman’s draft document, shortly before 10 April, that the scale of change envisaged was evident. Those of us close to it knew the agreement was going to be extremely difficult to deliver. It was only the beginning, and so it proved to be.

What are my thoughts 25 years later? They are complex. I certainly think it was the highlight of my work in politics. I feel hugely privileged to have been on the Government team, which comprised officials and diplomats of the highest calibre, most of whom went on to serve as ambassadors over the past 25 years.

I believe many of them have given evidence to this committee, such as David Donoghue, David Cooney, Ray Bassett, Rory Montgomery and so on. They were excellent diplomats and civil servants. My own private secretary, Gabriel Burke, who died last year, worked with me throughout the whole process.

In terms of implementation, the Good Friday Agreement has seen its share of ups and downs, mostly downs, considering how fitfully the institutions have functioned as planned. However, as an instrument of conflict resolution it has been an overall success. The agreement has brought about many positive transformations. Undoubtedly lives have been saved by ending the conflict. A generation has grown up in a precious peace. A recent survey demonstrated, however, that many young people born 20 years ago know very little about the Troubles and related politics in Northern Ireland. There is no doubt but that the Northern Ireland peace process is held out as a model for conflict resolution in other troubled parts of the world precisely because it has produced an enduring peace. Long may it last. Each conflict is unique in its complexity. It is true that conflicts which involve allegiance, like ours, are particularly difficult to resolve and take a long time, as ours did, going back to John Hume's early treks to the United States lobbying successive US Administrations to intervene with the British to try to resolve the conflict. The role of the United States cannot be overlooked. It was essential and remains so that support continues to this day with President Biden.

The politics of post-agreement Northern Ireland has been problematic to say the least. The delay in decommissioning of IRA weapons drained confidence in the unionist community and deeply frustrated politicians and the public on both sides and both islands. If 10 April 1998 was the best of days, the worst one for me was the day of the Omagh bombing. Just four months after the agreement the deadliest bomb of the troubles exploded in Omagh town centre. I had the grim task of representing the Government at a memorial service for its many victims. I was personally devastated because I feared that all the promise of the agreement had been set at naught. It transpired it was the act of dissident republicans but it was nonetheless a dreadful and shocking setback. I often wonder, if Omagh had happened before the agreement, whether we would have had an agreement at all?

After too many years, the IRA finally decommissioned its weapons and declared the war was over. Loyalists did likewise. The democratisation which replaced the conflict has gone from fledgling to faltering, lurching from crisis to crisis. People and parties have been at different stages of forgiveness and reconciliation. Although the agreement had a strong mandate North and South because of the referendums, the DUP remained opposed to the agreement until essentially the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006 and it was electorally in a position to take the top spot. Years of rejectionist politics deployed by the DUP served to dissipate the aspiration and dynamic and the hope for a shared and amicable system of government. The two Governments have toiled long and hard to make things work. This work continues to this day as the Governments try to unlock the logjam caused by Brexit and its accompanying protocol to avoid a border on the island.

Because I was there and had possession of all of the documents and position papers, I can vouch for the fact that of all the scenarios we considered, never once did anyone anticipate that the UK might leave the European Union. On the contrary, the agreement anticipates in many cases the benefits of free movement of peoples on both sides of the Irish Sea as co-members of the EU and envisaged a role for the North-South institutions for implementing EU legislation and directives. It never occurred to anyone that this might happen. When the British people voted to leave the EU on that day in 2016, it immediately presented a huge threat to the Good Friday Agreement. We had changed our Constitution on the basis that the Border would be porous, essentially open and perforated by North-South executive bodies. Quite apart from the technical details, which the two Governments and the EU are trying to sort out as we speak, Brexit poisoned the well and polarised politics between the two largest parties of government in Northern Ireland and between the UK and Ireland. This in turn has caused the institutions not to sit since the last elections in May of last year. Thankfully, the new British Government under Rishi Sunak had made some progress in talks with the EU and the Irish Government to resolve the impasse, which brings us up to date. I am happy to take questions if members have some.