Mr. John Finucane:

I thank Sir John for his comprehensive opening statement. I echo the sentiments of the Chair in saying he is very welcome to the meeting. I thank him for taking part in what is a series of engagements we are having to review the Good Friday Agreement in the year of its 25th anniversary. I pay tribute to him and thank him for the role he played with former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds in agreeing the Downing Street Declaration and the framework documents, because, as we know and as Sir John articulated very well, they contributed to the Good Friday Agreement some years later.

Today I am at Westminster. I am not long inside after attending a protest, a demonstration, along with Bloody Sunday families and others in the context of the legacy legislation that is working its way through Parliament at present. I am cognisant of Sir John's comments to Senator Currie in the last section but would like to take some time to ask him about his time in the British Cabinet when he was Prime Minister for a substantial period between 1987 and 1997. That is a time when British intelligence would have been using a very high-profile agent called Brian Nelson. He had been recruited in West Germany and brought to Belfast to take control of operations on behalf of the UDA. The period in question also saw the very high-profile killing of Pat Finucane, the human rights lawyer, my father, among many other incidents. At the time, a large consignment of arms was imported from South Africa under the watch and direction of British intelligence. The weapons were used to significantly escalate and triple the killing capacity of loyalist paramilitaries.

Over recent years, this committee has spent some time dealing with legacy. Let me refer to what we now know from investigations and reports by Lord Stevens, as he is now, and also former Canadian Supreme Court jurist Peter Cory and Sir Desmond de Silva - the latter two are now deceased - regarding the scale of collusion between British intelligence organisations and loyalists from the earliest days of the conflict.

In their reports, Judge Cory and Sir Desmond de Silva both referenced Cabinet papers and minutes of meetings between Ministers and senior Government officials. All reports confirmed that collusion existed between the British Government's intelligence agencies and loyalist paramilitaries. In 2012, David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, apologised privately to my family, and did so publicly in the House of Commons. Irish society is still dealing with the effects of collusion and the effects of our past. I respectfully highlight the fact that collusion was endemic on Sir John's watch, as we can see from the reports that have taken place. It is in that context that I have some questions. Was Sir John briefed on that strategy? If he was not, does he find it strange that he was not? In the case of my father, and in many other cases, fairly credible and well-supported allegations were circulating domestically and internationally that collusion was involved. Did Sir John ever make any inquiries as to whether there was substance to those allegations? David Cameron said that when a state's own actors and agents are in the dark, there is an extra onus on the state to ensure accountability and transparency. Knowing what we know now, does Sir John think he would have done anything differently?