Professor Katy Hayward:

I thank the committee for facilitating my participation remotely. It enabled me to continue teaching this morning.

In my remarks I want to touch on five lessons we could draw on given that it is now two years into the operation, in theory, of the protocol. I have identified five problems and five lessons from those, by way of reflection. The first problem has been the failure from the start of the UK and EU to publicly outline and agree on the implications of the protocol. This caused a vacuum of information and, therefore, discussion around the protocol has featured conflicting discourses making it inherently contested. Ironically, this is only beginning to be addressed now with the two agreeing, to some degree, on what the problems are. The lesson from this is that progress is limited by what the UK and the EU can agree on. If we are to have better EU-UK relations for Northern Ireland, it would be transformative if they could agree on the real benefits of the arrangements they agree for Northern Ireland in the future.

The second is that public discourse on the subject of the protocol has been informed by two contrasting narratives. We know from our polling in Northern Ireland, led by Professor David Phinnemore, that people consider the political parties they support to be the most reliable sources of information on the protocol. This helps us understand why it is that the debate is so polarised here, and why factual information is both rare and subject to political spin. The lesson from this is that the proper test for UK-EU relations is whether they are willing and able to jointly present factual information on the protocol as it evolves. We know from the same polling that this is what the majority of people would like to see.

Third, the problems with the protocol, as originally conceived and drawn up, were predicted and, to some degree, avoidable. The failure to use the implementation period of 2020 for the protocol exacerbated its disruptive effects. The failure by both the UK and the EU to secure longer grace periods as needs be meant that as soon as the protocol came into force businesses knew they were facing a ticking clock towards the impossible. The expectation thus had to be either that the law would be ignored or broken. The lesson from this is that any new or additional UK-EU agreement needs to include reasonable implementation periods and supports to enable adjustment.

Fourth, the willingness to take evidence from Northern Ireland stakeholders to identify and address issues arising in relation to the protocol, for both business and civic society, has become greater as time has continued. This has made a difference in the recognition of the problems and the complexity. A lesson from this is that direct channels for information from stakeholders in Northern Ireland need to be secured and formalised for the future operating of the protocol to avoid predictable problems.

Finally, the implementation of the protocol must be seen in the context of wider trends within the UK. It is moving to replace provisions of the protocol and retain EU law with secondary legislation made by statutory instrument, without consultation, debate, scrutiny or parliamentary vote, especially not within the Northern Ireland Assembly. The lesson from this is that close observation of what is happening in Westminster will be more difficult but also more important for understanding the challenges and consequences of implementing the protocol and trade and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, TCA, in the future for both Ireland and for Northern Ireland.