Mr. Mark Durkan:

I thank the Deputy for those points and questions. As I said in my statement, I think there is a really strong case for proper deliberative moves to curate Article 3 of the Constitution. Article 3.1 states "It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island." I think the Irish Government could, for instance, move to revive the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation or something like it. It may not need to meet in as big a format or on a public, weekly basis, but there certainly should be deliberative, well-framed, inter-party discussions. I believe that something like that would be a helpful preliminary to the establishment of a citizens' assembly or anything else. I think a citizens' assembly, when it is convened, will want to know if there is at least some established wavelength of thinking across political parties and the various parties likely to form governments here, in the North or whatever. Like the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, I think such an exercise can be open to all parties, North and South. Not all parties may attend, but the terms of reference should not of themselves prevent any party attending because, after all, the language of the terms of Article 3 was accepted and agreed in the talks by unionist negotiators. Part of the balance for accepting the institutions in strand 2 was that there was also acceptance of the terms of the constitutional change in Articles 2 and 3. I know some unionists who will say that, as far as they are concerned, the people of Ireland can be united even under existing arrangements. I have some unionists friends who say the people of Ireland united to vote for the agreement North and South so it does not have to mean a unitary state for the people to be united. People can have different views as to what they hope Article 3 would lead to in respect of uniting the people.

Article 3 was also carefully worded in expressing the firm will of the Irish nation. It was deliberately framed not to create a direct obligation on the State to be seen to be prosecuting or pushing for unity. That was to balance the provisions that were there on the UK Government side about accepting that it is the right of the Irish people to self-determination without external impediment. Just in the same way the British Government was saying it would have no agenda standing in the way of unity, the balance was that the Irish Government could not be seen to be saying that the State and every Irish Government had to be pushing for unity because, if that nuance was not there, unionists would say Article 3 was not really changing in the Good Friday Agreement.

Therefore, for all sorts of reasons there are live discussions about constitutional change, the prospect for constitutional change, what the necessary processes would be and just what are all the logical and logistical issues we would have to go through to even bring about a healthy, respectful debate. The fact is that, in respect of the provisions in the agreement, and while there is some necessary collective ambiguity, or there was collective ambiguity at the time, around some of the precise terms on providing for a possible poll on the constitutional status of the North, that was not inserted into the agreement as a dead letter. I wonder at times when I hear some people say that yes, the provision is there, but no, we should not do it because it would somehow subvert reconciliation or jeopardise the agreement if those things are even talked about. It is framed such that there are two equally legitimate aspirations, so people cannot be told that one of those aspirations dare not speak its name or that they dare not try to frame an agenda or express that aspiration in any positive way. In the long journey to the Good Friday Agreement, it took all sorts of deliberative stages for people to get our heads around language and concepts and to be able to arrive at language that could be more shared and more commonly understood. It will be the same when it comes to the questions of constitutional status. I do not think we should spend our time at the moment being fixated on asking the current British Government what the criteria would be for calling a poll. I am glad we are not stuck with the Brandon Lewis test or the Brandon Lewis doctrine as to what the criteria would be because they would probably be criteria that Deputy Conway-Walsh and I would object to and have issue with. I do not think, therefore, that we should be asking the British Government to lay down ex cathedragrounds on which a poll might be called.

We also have to be wise to the fact that the terms in the agreement that oblige a Secretary of State to call a poll may not be the only conditions on which a poll could be called. A proof of that is that the first political leader to call for a constitutional status poll after the Good Friday Agreement was actually David Trimble. In the spring of 2002 he advocated having a poll to coincide with the then scheduled Assembly elections for May 2003. At that time he made the point that the obligation on the Secretary of State is conditional and circumstantial but it is not a general restriction that would prevent a poll being called and agreed on other grounds and other bases.

Similarly, I recall a speech given by Peter Robinson in Queen's University Belfast a few years ago in which he stated that unionists should possibly agree to a poll, that it should not be on the same basis as in the agreement but on a different basis and that, therefore, the seven-year itch would not be triggered, as it were, and it would be generational. We already have evidence of people thinking beyond the choice that a British Secretary of State is obliged to take under the terms of the agreement. It is healthy that the rest of us are thinking about those possibilities. How can we create the prospect of having a debate where those who want to remain in the United Kingdom and those who want a united Ireland can put forward their proposals positively along with a clear prospectus for that? We know from the whole Brexit nonsense that one does not want campaigns that are not evidence based, nor a situation where people vote for outcomes for which there is not a clear prospectus and people are free to write and argue their own version of things after that, with all the destructive effects. There is a duty for us to try to frame that debate. That is why I deliberately referred to curating Article 3.

In taking steps to ensure due diligence in deliberations, we should start with parties, extend it to citizens' assemblies and commission expert input. I say citizens' assemblies because I do not expect it will be a one-off exercise. A series of assemblies will be needed to focus on different issues. Parties would then have to regroup and retune based on what comes back from those expert groups and citizens' assemblies. It is a longer process and it needs to start now. There is no virtue in not preparing or planning.

Some people have said we cannot talk about these things until reconciliation has taken place. What is going to be the test for sufficient reconciliation before we can have this debate? In addition, we should not suggest that those who want constitutional change are not as committed to reconciliation as those who do not want constitutional change, or that they do not see constitutional change as being the space in which reconciliation can be best fostered.