H.E. Mr. Vincent Gu?rend:

On the Deputy's first point about the Conference on the Future of Europe, the conference has published a report. Now the ball is back in the court of the various European institutions to see how to bring this forward. As for the substance, it is true, as the Deputy mentioned, that the French President, in his speech on 9 May, endorsed pretty strongly many of the proposals, including probably the most innovative, which would see the European Parliament having a right of initiative. He has also said very strongly, however, in his national capacity that he believes we should generalise qualified majority voting, including in areas where there is still unanimity voting, including on foreign policy, which until now has not at all been the French line. Yes, he has made pretty remarkable moves compared with the traditional French position on this within the context of an EU which he believes needs to adapt to the challenges of the day and which is delivering, as I said and as we have seen, but also facing too many obstacles, including generally with some member states. Frankly speaking, the difficulties we have with Poland and Hungary in particular not only on some human rights issues but also on some policy issues - energy and other things - are a real obstacle to swift decision-making. Yes, the French President has been pretty clear on this. He now wants this agenda to be moved forward by the EU institutions.

When it comes to Ukraine, the French strategy with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union, certainly since the 2000s, has not changed. It is a strategy based on engagement and shared interests in the sense that we have an interest in seeing Russia being as close as possible to Europe. There is also, however, a lot of realism. We have been constantly criticising, condemning and sanctioning Russia since 2008, after the aggression involving Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, etc. Now, since January, in a way the three objectives are similar. We want to stop this war and want the conflict to stop. We want to see a negotiated solution but not on the backs of Ukrainians. It is for Ukraine to decide whatever it wants to settle with Russia or otherwise. This is not just the starting point. We will not compromise on the full territorial integrity and the full sovereignty of Ukraine.

Ultimately, we also believe that we will need, at a certain stage, a channel of communication open with Mr. Putin himself, not just his foreign minister or some other decision maker in Russia, because he is probably the only one in Russia who decides. Why should we now break this communication, which is already so challenging, only to resume it with even more difficulty in three months, six months or five years? We need that channel of communication open, as difficult and as frustrating as it is because we realise very much that he has been, frankly speaking, lying to us over the past six months. We believe, however, that it is important to keep that channel of communication open. Ultimately, one day, be it in five years, ten years or 15 years from now, it is our strong conviction that we will need to find, as difficult as it is, a security architecture with Russia. We have to find a way to bring Russia back to the various treaties on non-proliferation, conventional forces in Europe and non-aggression, which Russia has been either violating or quitting over recent years. We must have such a long-term perspective. We certainly do not want to compromise anything at the expense of Ukraine.

In the meantime, we have to pass strong messages. We also pushed very hard for the Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Guterres, to go to Russia. It took a long time for him to go there. He went there only in early April just because the Russians did not want him to come. We had insisted with other Security Council members that he go there. Again, as frustrating and as unfruitful as it was, it was important. That is why we also considered that it is important to keep a channel of communication open with Mr. Putin.