Mr. David Donoghue:

I thank the Chairman for that. I will make another few points. The framework document, which was negotiated largely under the Fianna Fáil-Labour Party Government in the mid-1990s and was published under the new Government in early 1995, in effect, was a template that we, on the Irish Government side, saw for the future agreement. That did not mean we had in mind that every single comma and adjective would be included in the agreement but it set out, nevertheless, a range of understandings on the constitutional side and on the institutional side, which we felt would have to be part of a future agreement if changes to if changes to Articles 2 and 3 were to be expected as a consequence. Of course, all along the unionists wanted to see Articles 2 and 3 changed. We recognised that but we, in turn, knew there would be no possible majority in a referendum situation in this jurisdiction and in the North unless there were politically significant North-South bodies, including executive powers. We could not just have casual or insignificant structures. We had to have something that really made an impact, which had both a practical value and also was politically robust. We knew what sort of North-South bodies we needed as the quid pro quofor constitutional change and all of that was in the framework document. The British Government, generally speaking, was of the same mind. From time to time, it was a little more reticent in attaching itself publicly to the framework document, but it knew it was basically the blueprint for what would come out of the negotiations. When Easter week eventually arrived, and it come down to a final hectic, sometimes confused, few days, we were not sitting around a table, as we would be here. It did not involve formal negotiations, as one might imagine. There were eight parties there. There were two Governments.

It was presided over by George Mitchell and his two colleagues. One might imagine that with that number of players and people one would have to have a more formal set-up, but the truth is that the deals were being done in small bilateral or trilateral settings. That is often the way it has to be. We deliberately engineered a kind of pressure cooker situation in Castle Buildings in the final few days, from about the Tuesday onwards, because it was clear that while we had the two Heads of Government there, they would not be there forever. Easter was also a deadline. George Mitchell had made clear it was a deadline for him personally so in a sense, it was now or never. We could, in theory, have gone on beyond Easter but the political dynamics were such that we knew we would have to finish for Easter. We did not quite finish within the deadline George Mitchell had in mind, which was Holy Thursday at midnight. We went into the Friday but overall, we managed to stick to the programme.

One reason that formal negotiations around a table would not have worked is that people were inclined to grandstand - no big surprise there - especially if they felt there was a media angle. People were inclined to read out party positions or governmental positions and that was not a place in which one could do deals and reach compromises so we had to go for the more informal setting.

I will leave it at that. I do not want to take up all of the time and will make way for Mr. Montgomery. To start the ball rolling, I just thought I would make those points.