Mr. Tim O'Connor:

I thank the Cathaoirleach and the committee members. I am honoured to have been asked to address the committee. It is an important project the committee is undertaking and we are grateful for it.

I submitted a copy of my statement to the committee ahead of time.

I will go through its main points. I am a retired civil servant. I should say that I am from Killeedy, near Newcastle West, in west Limerick. I went to school in St. Munchin's in Limerick, then onto Maynooth, where I was a seminarian for a few years before leaving. I taught for a number of years and then joined the Civil Service in 1974. I was a civil servant from 1974 to 2010. I spent most of that time working in the Department of Foreign Affairs. In 1986, I started working directly on Northern Ireland when I was assigned to the Northern Ireland division for the first time. That was 36 years ago. In some kind of way, I have been privileged to continue working on it since then. As a public servant, there is no bigger issue to be involved with than the peace process in one's own country.

As the Chairman will understand, I should make clear that I am speaking in a personal capacity today. The views that I express are very much my own. I am not speaking in any official capacity. I should also declare that even though I am retired, I was called back into field around five years ago, when the Government appointed me to be the Irish Government nominee on the four-member Independent Reporting Commission, IRC, on paramilitarism. It is a role that I still hold, so I have partial official capacity, but I am here today in a personal capacity.

I am happy to talk through my submission to the committee. There is lots to talk about. The subject the committee is undertaking is a profoundly important one and a rich one. To cut to the chase in respect of the Good Friday Agreement, my direct involvement restarted in the autumn of 1997, when the, now sadly, late Dermot Gallagher brought me back into the Northern Ireland division. I do not know how many of the members here knew Dermot Gallagher but he was a tremendous public servant. He died prematurely in 2017. In 1997 and 1998, he was the second Secretary General in the Department of Foreign Affairs, overseeing Northern Ireland. He was my boss and my mentor. I want to take a moment to state how profound his contribution was to all of this.

On the picture I was trying to paint of where we were in the autumn of 1997, some major developments had happened in the course of the previous few months. Chronologically, Tony Blair was appointed Prime Minister in London in May 1997, in June 1997 a new Government was formed in Dublin, with former Deputy Bertie Ahern being appointed Taoiseach, and in July 1997, the IRA ceasefire was restored. Talks had been taking place in Belfast since the previous summer but Sinn Féin was not part of them because of the breakdown of the ceasefire. With the restoration of the ceasefire and two new Governments in place, there was a sense of a new momentum. In September 1997 what proved to the final stages of the talks process got under way, chaired by US Senator George Mitchell, with all the parties involved.

Next, I wish to highlight the centrality of the role of the two Governments in the process. The key point is that the two Governments, led by the principals, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, worked together. In my submission, I have listed the various key people involved in the process. The process was driven at the level of the two Governments, with the principals being supported by their Ministers and officials, with both sides working together. If I am feeding into the work of the committee, I would say that the lesson and the key point is the centrality of the two Governments working together. This was physically manifested, during the negotiations, when the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach would arrive and would immediately go to the same room and sit beside each other. I often used the analogy that they were like brothers. For me, as a civil servant watching it, it was fascinating. If we were doing a workshop on negotiation, that would be a key requirement. Of course, on both sides, as civil servants of the British and Irish Governments, we took our cue from that and worked very closely together.

On the strategic approach of the two Governments, everybody knew in the autumn of 1997 that we were in a serious process. I must be clear that there was no great consensus that we were on the march to an agreement. Many of the members probably know the old joke about the new journalist joining the Northern Ireland press pool. The old hands, with the cigarettes, would say to the new journalist: "My friend, be pessimistic and you will not be far wrong." Pessimism ruled, among ourselves as well, but we could not afford to have that dictate things. I will put it like this: there was no history of agreement. The Sunningdale agreement had collapsed after a few months. In fairness, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was a very important agreement but it engendered enormous opposition from unionism. We had never had a situation where all the parties were around the table with a chance of agreement. The stakes were very high and the likelihood of success was small. However, there was a view that we had a once-in-a-generation chance. The old hands remembered back to when everybody was around the table in the Sunningdale negotiations, but that had been 24 years prior to 1997. That is how long it took to get back around the table. The stakes were high and we felt that we had to deliver.

I like the word "architecture" that is being used by the committee. The architecture of the Good Friday Agreement was a bit different. At one level, it was building on previous work, which was an important piece of the architecture. We were not starting from a blank sheet. We were building on what had been developed in Sunningdale and in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Some of the concepts were there. We were also doing some things that were different. One thing that was different was the level of inclusion. Every major dimension of society was reflected in the approach. It is true that the DUP did not attend negotiations, and that was a gap, but unionism was strongly represented. Of course, the parties representing the constituencies of the combatants, as it were, were around the table in a way that had never happened before. The process was inclusive. The agenda that was on the table, which was being driven by George Mitchell and the two Governments, was comprehensive. I will return to the point shortly when we are discussing themes. The idea was that most people were around the table and most issues were on the table. That was a key part of the architecture of the agreement.

I note that Ms Claire Hanna MP is in attendance. I must give credit to the SDLP input from John Hume on the idea of a joint referendum, North and South, which was a critical piece. It was very novel and powerful. It meant that there would be a validation of the work, at the end of the negotiations, by the people North and South. It was a profound idea. Of course, John Hume's contribution to the architecture was priceless. I had the privilege of just being around him and seeing him operate and think, as well as keeping out of his way. If we are talking about architecture, he was undoubtedly a key designer in terms of the concepts that he developed over many years. I have also taken the liberty to include a note in my submission about Seamus Mallon. I had the privilege, as a civil servant, to work very closely with Seamus Mallon and John Hume, but with Seamus in particular, because I happened to be the person from the Department of Foreign Affairs who was liaising with him over many years. Even after we both retired and were no longer soldiers, as it were, we stayed in close contact. I had the privilege of being with him for the writing of his book and sadly, of attending his funeral in January 2020, and indeed, of giving the eulogy at the service. Members can imagine what that relationship was like. I had the privilege of just being around and seeing the contributions made in the process.

My point is it took a village. People ask me who was the most important person in the Good Friday Agreement process and I gently say that is the wrong question, because this took a village. If we are trying to find one person responsible for it, we are on the wrong track. It took a range of people and at any given time, there were moments where certain people were fundamental and critical to getting through it. Without that, we would have had no agreement.

I have listed people all the way through. They include George Mitchell, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, clearly, as well as their Ministers. There was David Trimble, John Hume, Seamus Mallon, Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, John Alderdice, Monica McWilliams, David Ervine, David McAdams and Gary McMichael. I saw these people at different moments and there were others as well. It would be like reciting a decade of the rosary to go through their names. There were people behind the scenes, and I am not talking about myself. There is a bunch of people. The point is there was much input. What was shared was that this was a big opportunity and we could not let it pass. That was the sense.

I also suggest in my note that there was an outer circle of support beyond the village. The Cathaoirleach's brother, Niall, comes into this and Irish America played a major part in the build-up to all of this and creating the conditions. I mention Senator Ted Kennedy, Ms Jean Kennedy Smith and Congressman Bruce Morrison, Niall O'Dowd and Bill Flynn, among others. The danger when we start mentioning names is that people will say they were not named and I appreciate that is a problem. The role of the community of Irish America, as well as those in Congress, was important. There is a congressional delegation here now led by Congressman Richard Neal and although he may have been too young then, he has played a subsequent role. There was also the White House and having Bill Clinton there was critical. He gave us George Mitchell. The point is it would be wrong in describing the architecture not to mention this outer circle.

I should also mention the EU. John Hume was huge in promoting the idea that the EU is the greatest example of conflict resolution in human history, which is right. We drew on the EU model both as an inspiration for conflict resolution and as a model for its institutions, with the PEACE programme and the financial support we got from member states and the Commission. The EU was a very big part of the outer circle of support around us.

I am very happy to speak to the key issues, although I do not wish to overindulge. This is what I mean when I speak of the comprehensive nature of issues. We shied away from nothing when we had key issues on the table. They included constitutional questions and the three sets of relationships. It was something that was developed by John Hume, namely, the concept that the heart, there were three sets of relationships that needed to be resolved and reflected institutionally. There was a key range of issues arising from the conflict, including reform of policing and justice, rights issues and equality safeguards and validation and review. We built in the idea that there should be an opportunity for review of the agreement if difficulties arose. I have just mentioned validation.

There were a number of architectural issues we could not crack and on which we could not get agreement around the table. Two of these in particular were the detail on North-South co-operation and policing. They were so radioactive and difficult at the time, it bested us. The strategy agreed was that we would devise principles around both. There would be principles around North-South co-operation with the detail being done in a further process down the road with a six-month backstop, if I can use that word. It was to happen by 31 October so the process would not be open-ended. People would agree to something without knowing the detail in an open-ended process otherwise. As we could not get agreement on the detail of policing, it was agreed that a commission would be established, which subsequently became the Patten commission. The agreement has terms of reference for that commission.

In architecture terms, it is interesting that sometimes if you cannot crack a very difficult issue, there is the possibility of doing what we did. We got agreement on the principles involved but, in a way, we made a bet that having agreed the principles, people would not break on the detail. That is a big risk in signing off but it is what we did.

I mention in my conclusion the technical fact that there were two agreements on Good Friday. There was the multi-party agreement, of which I have a dog-eared copy, that involved multi-party negotiations. It was between the parties and the Governments. At the back is a second agreement called "Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland". Incidentally, this was the first time this language was used as well and we agreed on how we would refer to each other. Previously it was the "British Government" and the "Republic of Ireland". We could not find agreement on words but we agreed to do it like that. The agreement signed by Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair essentially comprised the commitments made by the two Governments in the overall agreement, particularly around constitutional issues.

I thank the Cathaoirleach for indulging me. The main goal of the Good Friday Agreement was to stop the violence and at least give peace a chance. We wanted to build peace and promote reconciliation. Any fair-minded verdict would be that it has succeeded so far in stopping the violence. It has given an honourable and inclusive pathway forward for everybody. I live in the real world, however, and I know the difficulties that clearly remain. I call this a work in progress.

I use an analogy of human health with conflict. If conflict is a disease, the agreement or deal is a surgical intervention. There is surgery to deal with the disease. As we all know in major surgery, it is not just done with the next day and there is a long process of rehabilitation and recuperation. There can be setbacks and the committee might know where I am going with the analogy. Sometimes after five, ten or 15 years, surgeons may have to intervene again. This is what a real and living peace process looks like in all its messy complexity.

Our generation was lucky to finally find the means and ways to get agreement and I am very happy to speak about the mechanics of the process, including the days and weeks around it, including Good Friday itself. We came very close to not having agreement. The difference between having an agreement and not having one is night and day. I feel very lucky that we were there, having been able to observe it at close quarters and play whatever part I could. The committee's work is very important and it bothers me a little that we forget what we did. Just like with human health, if we ignore what we should be doing with recovery and well-being, we will pay a price.