Robert Troy (Longford-Westmeath, Fianna Fail) | Oireachtas source

I move amendment No. 168:

In page 113, to delete lines 7 to 13 and substitute the following: “(k) in section 14—

(i) by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (1):

“(1) Evidence obtained as a result of surveillance carried out under an authorisation or under an approval granted in accordance with section 7 or 8—

(a ) may be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings, and

(b) shall not be admitted as evidence in proceedings other than criminal proceedings, or used for the purpose of investigating any matter other than a criminal matter.”,

and

(ii) by the substitution of “member of the Defence Forces, officer of the Revenue Commissioners or authorised officer of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission” for—

(I) “member of the Defence Forces or officer of the Revenue Commissioners” in subsection (4)(a), and

(II) “member of the Defence Forces or an officer of the Revenue Commissioners” in subsection (5),”.

This amendment is to provide clarification that any evidence gathered by the CCPC using these new surveillance powers can only be used in the pursuance of criminal cases and will not be used to pursue a civil case. Deputies will recall that during pre-legislative scrutiny of the general scheme of the Bill it was made clear that the granting of surveillance powers to the CCPC was for the purposes of investigation of the most serious cartel cases only.

Deputies may recall that the general scheme of the Bill contained a head to add interception powers to the toolbox of the CCPC. On reflection, I would like to defer that particular proposal pending further consultation with my colleague, the Minister for Justice. I am informed that the Department of Justice has undertaken a comprehensive review of the State's legislative framework for interception powers. That framework, as provided for in the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act 1993, is quite dated and in need of complete overhaul. The review will, however, be a comprehensive review of the powers necessary to ensure that the bodies are properly equipped in dealing with ever-expanding forms of communication and that there are in place the necessary safeguards and oversight mechanisms to ensure we have a modern interception framework regime in the State.

I can see merit, particularly in light of this review, in the view that the State and the public would be better served with a single statutory framework dealing with these powers rather than a diffusion of such powers through sector-specific legislation with different approaches to oversight. That is not to say that these powers will not be available to the CCPC. I am assured that they will be introduced as part of that comprehensive exercise.