Ms Tara Connolly:

I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in the meeting on behalf of Global Witness. For those who are not familiar with us, Global Witness is an environmental and human rights NGO that has been investigating and exposing abuses in extractive industries for the past 25 years. Today, we will focus on climate change and the fossil gas industry. March is not yet over, but we have already seen many broken records and shattered beliefs this year. With the cost of 1 MW hour of fossil gas regularly exceeding €200 on the Dutch title transfer facility, TTF, market, the myth of cheap, abundant fossil gas is over. The climate crisis is causing unprecedented events. Simultaneous heatwaves occurred in the Arctic and Antarctic ten days ago, leaving climate scientists stunned. European peace was brutally shattered when Russian soldiers invaded Ukraine on 24 February. Policymakers no longer have the luxury of tackling one crisis at a time.

There has been renewed debate about the value or merit of an Irish LNG import terminal. Such a terminal would be costly and would probably rely on fracked gas imports or come from countries with poor human rights records, as well as having grave consequences for the global south. LNG terminals are not cheap and they will only become more expensive. Increased costs of raw materials suggest they will be at least one third more expensive than two years ago. Increased interest rates also mean higher capital costs and competition with other countries racing to build similar facilities.

Much of the debate has focused on proposed LNG terminals receiving fast-track planning permission and accessing investment subsidies, particularly due to their status as a project of common interest under EU law. However, this committee should be aware that many projects also require and receive operational aid. One such example is a Croatian terminal off the coast of the island of Krk. In addition to securing public subsidies, it covered 80% of the investment costs. The operators were guaranteed a security of supply levy, essentially an LNG levy, to be placed on gas customers' bills by the Croatian gas grid operator. The levy would cover any shortfall in revenue from the running of the terminal. Given Ireland's access to piped gas from the UK, an Irish LNG terminal would be a last resort.

We can expect very low utilisation rates of such a facility. If Ireland meets its climate targets, fossil gas use should be dropping significantly over the next decade and beyond. Liquefied natural gas, LNG, terminals have an economic lifespan of 30 to 40 years so Irish gas customers or taxpayers could still be paying an LNG levy for the LNG terminal in 2062. According to the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland's recent national heat study, the role of fossil gas by 2050 will be marginal if Ireland is to meet its climate targets.

Another cost consideration must be the high and violative price of gas. Ireland's purchasing power on the global gas market is weak. At a global level, Ireland is a small market, representing just over 1% of the EU's gas market. Any contract signed purely for the Irish market would not be on favourable financial terms. I would suggest that this committee include as a recommendation to Government that it sets out the full long-terms costs of the State-owned LNG terminal.

Mr. McEvilly has covered the conflict between Ireland's climate obligations and fossil fuel infrastructure investment, but I would like to add some words on future methane emissions. Even if they do not show up on Ireland's climate balance sheets, methane emissions represent a serious challenge to tackling the climate crisis. Over a 20 year period methane has 80 times the global heating impact of carbon dioxide. The US Environmental Protection Agency's official estimate of leakage rate is 1.4%. Just last week a study revealed that the leakage rate in the second largest shale gas production basin in the US, the Permian Basin, is 9.4% which is more than six times the EPA estimate. There are other wildly varying estimates, depending on the gas basin in question. For this reason, this committee should recommend that the Irish Government enshrines in law the policy against importing shale gas, and the moratorium on fracking in Ireland should also be made permanent.

There are other concerns regarding a European and Irish dash for gas regarding human rights and the global south more broadly. Europe's drive to get off Russian fossil fuels is to be welcomed, but we must be careful that we do not simply switch from buying our fossil fuels from one autocratic petro-state to another. Qatar is a major and growing exporter of LNG and it is very possible that we could import some gas from Qatar through an Irish LNG terminal. The international human rights NGO, Human Rights Watch, has long documented human rights abuses in Qatar. These include the continued abuse and exploitation of Qatar's migrant workforce, the abuse of male guardianship policies, and the disenfranchisement of thousands of Qataris due to their nationality by lineage. More generally, the fate of the global south and the energy crisis has been largely ignored. As already mentioned, LNG supply markets are incredibly tight and will remain so at least until 2030. If China and the EU decide to buy every shipment of LNG available, the global south, including countries like Pakistan and Brazil, will be caught in the economic crossfire and will be unable to secure supplies for their energy needs. Ireland and the rest of the EU have access to far more resources to be able to cut our gas demand this year and in the coming years. We have a moral obligation not to engage in a reckless gas bidding war with China, which would see the global south lose out twice, once in terms of energy access and again in having to endure even more devastating climate impacts.

I will raise one final issue, which is the current reform of the EU's gas market rules. Gas recently overtook coal as the second highest source of carbon emissions in the EU. This revision is Europe's last chance to prepare Europe's gas market for decarbonisation, namely a rapidly declining gas consumption and the uptake of a small amount of renewable hydrogen for use in those sectors where direct electrification is not suitable. This means facilitating the large-scale decommissioning of uneconomic gas infrastructure and some repurposing of new build for hydrogen. Unfortunately, the Commission's proposals do not set out such a framework. Instead, they propose the promotion of hydrogen is the main way to decarbonise the gas grid. They fail to address conflicts of interest created by transmission system operators, TSOs, and distribution system operators, DSOs, sitting at centre of the decision-making process on Europe's gas grids. In contrast, TSOs and DSOs, including Gas Networks Ireland, are lobbying in Brussels to maintain the existing gas grid and to invest even more money and convert it to hydrogen readiness. They also want to be able to charge gas or electricity users for some of the costs of developing hydrogen infrastructure. Meanwhile, EU energy regulators are sceptical about the case for converting pipelines to hydrogen, and a German think tank Agora Energiewende has concluded that gas distribution grids "need to prepare for a disruptive end of their business model".

I hope it is clear why it is not acceptable that governments allowed TSOs and DSOs to maintain and even expand their disproportionate role in the planning of their own networks, given the clear conflict of interests. Europe needs a fully independent and transparent planning process for the future gas grid, one that empowers regulators, local authorities, energy agencies and all of the other relevant stakeholders. Grid operators need to be prepared to adapt to their changing reality and not avoid a conversation about decommissioning by promoting impossible volumes of hydrogen or other low carbon gases.

I thank the members for their attention. I look forward to further discussing these issues with them.