Mr. John Dunne:

I want to thank Mr. McGrath and Mr. Kearns and clarify my comments. Mr. McGrath made the point that people in institutional settings who do not have family support are probably more vulnerable in general terms. That is absolutely true. He also made the point that sometimes families are not the best friend of a vulnerable person because, let us say, they foster dependency or do not promote independence. I wish to say on the record that is true. It is one of the things the legislation would help put shape and structure on. It is a minority situation but it certainly can happen.

I know many people who have made the journey and make the point that the fact a person with disabilities is, at a certain point in adulthood, capable of independent or, at least, supported living is usually the product of a lifetime of fighting on behalf of that person by his or her family. At a certain point, the families may just lack the confidence, courage or whatever to be able to let go. To be fair, the system engages quite well and effectively in that regard over time, but I wish to acknowledge it is a legitimate point and concern and it is something with which the legislation will help.

I stated at the outset that I know restraints are an emotive topic. Of course, they are emotive. Nobody likes to be restrained. I did not address this under the heading of restraints. I addressed the reference in the legislation to situations where there is an imminent risk of serious harm. Nobody likes to be restrained but irrespective of whether a person has any sort of disability, if he or she is at imminent risk of serious harm, he or she probably deserves to be restrained, if I can put it like that. The point about the legislation that is being deleted is that it contained several pages on safeguards, limitations on time, reasonableness and whatever else. That is being taken out. Now I might be told by the DSS in a phone call tomorrow that the intent is the law will be silent on it. Actually, however, the law will not be silent on it because the lawmakers will have put it into legislation and taken it out again. A judge cannot ignore that in terms of what is the intent. The intent is either to remove restrictions on restraint in the home, which, frankly, would be incredible and we would not support it, or else to say there can be no restraint in the home. In some situations, there is a need for moderate restraint. I do not think anyone is going to count locking the front door or having a stair guard as serious restraint - we are certainly not talking about tying people down or tying them to radiators - but they can be necessary measures to safeguard a person.

The final point relates to will and preference. It is a tricky one. I have no issue in terms of the 2015 Act and the spirit of it in respect of moving to will and preference but there is a difference. If I decide to buy a low-slung Italian sports car in spite of my bad back and arthritis and all the rest, I live with the consequences. It is a bad investment. Who lives with the consequences if a person exercising his or her will and preference makes a bad decision but does not have the capacity to handle the consequences? The person's family does. All we are looking for in that situation is a space that acknowledges that and says we want to empower people but that there will be situations where it goes wrong and where help will be provided in those situations instead of saying, "We are here doing the good stuff and empowering people but if it goes wrong, you lot over there get up from the corner and sort it out."