Professor Ben Tonra:

What is most threatening about today's crisis as Russia threatens Ukraine is that the negotiations to try and resolve the tensions are largely taking place between Moscow and Washington. In Europe’s greatest security crisis since the Yugoslav wars, the EU, at least institutionally, is more a bystander than an actor. The European Union struggles to define a coherent position. All members agreed on three things: that Russia’s invasion, occupation, and annexation of Crimea cannot stand, that Russian destabilisation of eastern Ukraine is unacceptable and that Russian demands to subvert the sovereignty of its neighbours cannot be accepted. Beyond that, however, European agreement tends to dissipate. Each EU member state, no more than our own, brings its own geography, history and values to bear in defining its foreign policy. The EU is a unique experiment in attempting to draw that geography and those histories together in pursuit of shared democratic values and interests. Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, however, throws European divisions into sharp contrast.

The EU has had some successes. EU foreign ministers have met, reaffirmed their opposition to Russia’s attempt to re-create dividing lines and spheres of influence and agreed on a collective diplomatic approach towards Russia and the outline of hard-hitting sanctions if these become necessary. There is also close co-ordination between Europe and the US, bilaterally and through NATO, on what might and what cannot be part of a diplomatic solution. The EU has also increased financial assistance to Ukraine and has allocated more than €17 billion to the country since 2014. A new €1.2 billion assistance plan of emergency loans and grants has just been announced.

The new European peace facility is being used to assist the Ukrainian army. Assistance is also being funded to counter Russian disinformation campaigns and repeated cyberattacks. Yet, European Union countries continue to differ on how they see the threat and on how best to respond. Russia looks very different, depending on whether you are sitting in Dublin or in Riga. NATO has reinforced its deployments in its own member states, such as Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, while Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands have sent military support to Ukraine. Germany, on the other hand, is proceeding to open the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has blocked arms exports from other EU countries to Ukraine and has instead offered to send helmets and medical supplies. Finland and Sweden have, for their part, stepped up their military co-operation and preparedness and debates about their co-operation with, and even membership of, NATO have intensified.

What does this mean for Ireland? It means that we need to take security and defence in Europe more seriously. Obviously, that starts at home with our upcoming debate on the forthcoming report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. It means listening more carefully to the security concerns of our EU partners, just as they listen to our security concerns with respect to Brexit. It means calling out aggression. It means defending the rule of law and existing treaties and, finally, it means Ireland contributing more seriously to debates on EU foreign, security and defence policy, bringing its own values and interests to bear.

I also look forward to the questions and conversation to come.