Dr. Michelle Minihan:

The comparisons around it are essentially that it was the same mechanical failure.

An alum dosing pump failed in Ballymore Eustace. It was the same piece of equipment that failed in Leixlip two years ago. While equipment can fail in Ballymore Eustace and in Leixlip, they responded to fix the mechanical issue but the difference this time in Ballymore Eustace was that there was not an awareness or appreciation of the impact of the failure of the alum dosing pump. It took a number of hours to fix. The plant operators responded immediately to the alarms to fix it but there was not an awareness or understanding within the plant of the implications of that alum dosing pump failure for drinking water quality. When the incident in Leixlip happened in October 2019, the operators responded, shut down the plant and they brought the plant back into production under the protection of a boil water notice because that was what the risk assessment determined was appropriate to protect public health and keep water in supply. The difference in Ballymore Eustace was that a risk assessment was not undertaken, and there was not an opportunity for the HSE to be consulted, the EPA to be informed and the boil water notice to be put in place. Our reports and letters to the Minister and to Irish Water have pointed out that this highlights that the lessons from Leixlip have not been learned or taken on board. At the time of Leixlip we highlighted the importance of ensuring that alarms were responded to and incidents were escalated in a timely manner and that fail-safes such as automatic shutdowns of the plant were put in place if water quality incidents could not be addressed in a timely manner. A number of these were not the case for either Ballymore Eustace or Gorey.