Dr. Stephen Farry:

This has been a very interesting discussion. I will reflect on the sobering reality that while the Good Friday Agreement is a remarkable document, in the current context we have to be realistic that it is very difficult to see, with the current state of relations between the two Governments and the parties in Northern Ireland, how an agreement could be negotiated on first principles today. This really puts into context how fragile our politics are but given Northern Ireland is a society of contradictions, at the same time, we have a very fast moving, evolving society, especially in its attitudes and how people are framing their identity. It is important that the agreement is capable of evolving and keeping up with developments in that regard.

My first question is probably one for Professor Tonge, as the academic, to pick up but it may also be for Ms Mercer and Mr. McAllister, if they have anything to say on it. I look elsewhere in the world, particularly to other deeply divided societies, to see how and where peace agreements can evolve either by agreement or force of circumstance. I am conscious that there are more examples of situations that have become more ossified. I am thinking of somewhere like Lebanon where I believe there has not been a census since the 1940s because people there are scared of the implications of the results in undermining the very rigorous consociational model seen in somewhere like Bosnia. In Bosnia in the mid-1990s, around the same time as the Good Friday Agreement, a three-stranded Bosnian-Serb-Croat sharing of power was locked in, which is still with us today and is, perhaps, stopping Bosnia from evolving.

How can we persuade those parties with a vested interest in the current system, particularly, of the need for reform? I am struck by the fact that the Governments, primarily the UK Government, will not move with more radical change unless the parties, collectively, ask for it, especially the two largest parties that benefit from the vetoes in the Executive and the designation. Those parties do not see it as in their interests to reform. How can we manage this process of evolution of our structures outside of a crisis having to force action in that regard? How can we persuade those who have an interest in the status quoof the need for change?

I will highlight what can often be the law of unintended consequences. I am particularly conscious of the petition of concern issue, which was put into the agreement for very good reasons given the history of Northern Ireland over the previous 70 years but has acted, not to protect minorities as such, but to ossify power structures. If we have neutral vetoes, it tends to serve the interests of those who are happiest with the status quoand has hampered those who want to see change. In that regard, I am particularly struck - and I stand to be corrected - that I cannot think of any significant time when the Assembly passed any significant human rights or equality legislation. It has always had to fall back on the Westminster Government, either during direct rule or through other types of intervention, to address those issues. How can we break the cycle of the Assembly being incapable of addressing those issues that cut to the heart of identity, human rights and equality issues?