Mr. Liam Herrick:

I thank the Chairman. We have also relied on the UN basic principles on the independence of the Judiciary, the Council of Europe recommendations on the independence and efficiency and the role of judges, the European Charter on the statute for judges and the International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors. There is a wide range of international standards from which to draw and which can inform the legislation.

On the question of independence and who should constitute the appointing or nominating body, the current proposals recommend that the Chief Justice, two members of the Judicial Council and the president of the court in which the vacancy arises will form part of the commission. In line with international best practice, the ICCL recommends that the three suggested judicial members of the Commission should be elected by their peers in order to ensure the strongest possible transparency and independence.

The Judiciary must be representative of the society over which it adjudicates. All appointments should take into account the fundamental importance of ensuring diversity and appropriate representation in the Judiciary. This should be reflected in the criteria for appointment to all judicial posts. Broadly speaking, we welcome the approach that is taken in the proposed Bill in this regard. We recognise, however, that as the Judiciary is drawn from the senior members of both legal professions, it will not be possible to address the objective of achieving diversity without looking at the question of diversity among the senior reaches of the Bar and the solicitors' profession.

The process must be transparent. The introduction of clear objective criteria based on merit is welcome. However, the number of recommendations by the commission to the Government should be reduced, in our view, to three for one nomination and five and eight, accordingly. We believe that we should minimise the discretion of Government in the process to the greatest extent possible to achieve the strongest level of public confidence. We also believe that there is no justification for a separate process for the appointment of senior officers of the court - the Chief Justice and the presidents of the superior courts. A separate system for such senior appointments which is more heavily politically dominated, and has a role, for example, for the Attorney General as a voting member, risks undermining the benefit of the general appointment process.

In order for the appointment process to maintain public confidence, there must also be some level of accountability. Where there are welcome provisions here about a report back to the Oireachtas subsequent to appointments, we believe that where the Government decides to deviate from what is recommended by the Judicial Appointments Commission it should have to give reasons. We are clearly recommending that the recommendations of the commission should include a ranking of candidates as well as a smaller number which will greatly enhance independence. It should be noted by the committee that the proposed approach would, in fact, retain a discretion for Government to circumvent the Judicial Appointments Commission completely. Bearing that in mind, it is very important that we strength the process of the commission.

The ICCL sees the proposed Bill as a radical and hugely welcome opportunity to improve the judicial appointment system process in Ireland. If approached correctly, these changes can have the potential to enhance public confidence in both the Judiciary and the rule of law. We make eight recommendations in our detailed submission which we believe can further enhance the approach being taken and we look forward to engaging with the committee and any questions the members might have on our submission.