Simon Coveney (Cork South Central, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I am conscious there are other members here as well but the Deputy has asked many good questions. I know he has to leave shortly to return to the House, so I will try to give him some answers. On the proposals that have come from the British Government in the past 24 hours, the Deputy asked if I believed this is a serious effort to get a deal. I believe it is a serious effort. If he is asking me if this proposal will be the basis of a deal, I do not think it will but there are some good things in it and it is important to recognise that. We have to make a judgment call as to whether we believe the British Government is serious about getting a deal or whether this is simply about positioning for a general election with a view to a blame game if there is not a deal. Our judgment is that the British Government does want to get a deal. We want to work to help it get a deal, obviously through the Barnier task force, which is where the negotiation takes place.

In terms of the proposals, the positives in the proposal are that there is now a clear commitment from the UK to maintain full alignment on the island of Ireland for goods and agrifood products that effectively reduces the need for checks in certain areas. That is very positive and we need to recognise that. It is consistent with much of what the backstop was committed to achieving.

Where I believe there are difficulties is in respect of the customs element of the proposal. If Northern Ireland is in a different customs union from the rest of the island of Ireland, it is difficult to see how customs checks can be avoided. I understand that the British Prime Minister said in Westminster today that under no circumstances will there be any physical customs checks on the island of Ireland from its proposal. It is difficult to see how those two things marry in terms of consistency, but we have to allow a process of discussion and negotiation to take place in the Barnier task force, which is now forensically looking at the paper, and the legal document that comes with it, to see whether it is legally operable. However, they have already given an indication that in their view the customs proposals are very problematic and do not deliver the same outcome as the backstop, which effectively ensured that there was full alignment, both in terms of the Single Market as well as customs, on the island of Ireland. It is important for us to be respectful but also clear that while these proposals are a step in the right direction, they will need to evolve further if there is to be a basis for agreement.

The other element the Deputy raised, which I believe is also a concern, is how we accommodate an Executive in Northern Ireland in terms of a consultative role around whatever mechanisms are agreed to prevent physical Border infrastructure re-emerging. There is a consultative role already factored in to the withdrawal agreement and the Irish and Northern Ireland protocol as part of the backstop mechanism that had been agreed. If there was future change in terms of EU regulation that impacted on Northern Ireland, there was, through the implementation of the backstop, a consultative role for a Northern Ireland Assembly in that regard. What Boris Johnson is proposing is to go way beyond that and essentially give the Northern Ireland Assembly the power to opt in or not to the arrangements that are being proposed. Obviously, we have to scrutinise what he means by that. On initial reading, it would suggest that that means that a single party or a minority of people in the Assembly could effectively block the implementation of these proposals. That is not something we can support under any circumstances. We cannot have a situation where a minority of people are imposing a future on the majority of people through a blocking mechanism. That simply will not work and it certainly is not consistent with the Good Friday Agreement.

It is important that we are honest and upfront about that. That is something on which we are in close contact with the task force because to a certain extent they rely on us in terms of understanding how the systems work within an Assembly and an Executive and issues around the use of petition of concern and so on. While it is an important tool, it could potentially be used as a blocking mechanism for a minority, which would then impose a set of conditions on a majority of people who do not want that. There is already tension in Northern Ireland because the majority of people did not want to leave the European Union. However, the idea that the solutions we are putting in place to mitigate against the damage that has been caused by Brexit for Northern Ireland, and for the island of Ireland as a whole, could be blocked by a minority as well will not be the basis of a deal.

We are open to looking at how a role for an Assembly in Northern Ireland - people who are elected and representing people from all communities in Northern Ireland - can be factored in to any proposals. We are happy to work on those issues, but as we read it today, the proposal from the British Prime Minister, which has been confirmed, unhelpfully, by a number of politicians, seems to suggest that a minority can effectively block the imposition of proposals in the future, which I do not believe will work.

In summary, we are responding cautiously to this proposal. We believe it is serious. We believe it is a step in the right direction to try to get a deal, but we believe there are some elements of it that will need to evolve significantly if they are to be the basis for an agreement in the next week or so. That is the timeline we are on. That seriousness is also reflected in the task force, in President Juncker's office. We all want to try to get a deal. We all want to work with the British Prime Minister and his team, but we have to be honest also and not pretend or get carried away in terms of spin. There is still a lot of negotiation and work to do and the proposal currently on the table from the British Government will not be the basis of a deal in itself. It will need to evolve, particularly on the customs area, and in the other area I mentioned relating to consultation and consent.

In terms of Israel and Palestine, as the Deputy is aware, I am personally very interested in this issue. I spoke a lot about it with different partners and colleagues in New York, especially with the Arab League, but also with many others. There is much political uncertainty in Israel. Following a second general election, there does not seem to be the ability yet to be able to put a government together. It is very difficult to bring forward any new proposals unless there is an Israeli government in place. Some of the commitments that were made in the heat of an election were very unfortunate. I was quite vocal at the time in terms of criticising those commitments.

I believe they propose something that is illegal and would be very strongly rejected by the international community. The idea that Israel would simply annex large parts of the West Bank, making a two-state solution with two viable future states virtually impossible, is one at which the international community expresses very strong concern. I contributed to that. Some people dismissed those commitments as electioneering. I do not think we should simply dismiss them as that. There must be a very strong signal from the international community that any future Israeli government would not have the support of the international community, or at least the majority thereof, in taking that course of action. My view is that the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill 2018 is not legally sound legislation and we should not be pursuing it. That does not mean that The Government and I will not continue to be vocal on the Middle East peace process; we will. We will insist on a two-state solution as any final outcome, offering very consistent criticism of the expansion of settlements on Palestinian land and a series of other issues as well.

I will read from my notes on Turkey's involvement in Syria. Turkey has borne a very heavy burden from the Syrian conflict, including hosting millions of refugees as well as a risk of a spillover of violence. Its concern about the conflict on its southern border is understandable. I have met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on several occasions and I have raised some of these issues with him. However, our messages to Turkey on Syria have emphasised our concern for the protection of civilians and have urged caution to avoid escalating the conflict any further. Civilians on both sides of the border, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, are all entitled to protection and safety.

On Yemen and Saudi Arabia, there is no consensus on an arms embargo of Saudi Arabia at EU level, but the issue has been raised. Such decisions require the agreement of everybody at EU level. Irish efforts have concentrated on ensuring the effective implementation of agreements that EU member states have already signed. These include the export control regimes and the implementation of the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty, which has been signed and ratified by all member states. These obligations require states to assess the potential that arms exports could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law and to consider measures to mitigate the risk of these violations. I understand that several EU member states have said they will not export arms to Saudi Arabia until the war in Yemen is over. That has been an ongoing discussion.

Regarding the Mediterranean-----