Dr. Thomas Leahy:

I thank Deputy O'Sullivan for the questions. As to why it has been a mammoth, uphill task, there are going to be different reasons for each of the states and actors involved. In particular, when we look at cases from the 1970s, much of the academic research would suggest that for the Republic of Ireland there was a general fear on the part of the Government at the time that any involvement in dealing with cases would have led to some kind of backlash in the conflict that could potentially seep over the Border such as further paramilitary attacks in this State. That is not to justify that at all. That is to say that is the perception I get from looking at the academic research and also some of the files. In particular, in more recent times I get the impression that it is partly about first steps. That is a positive thing about the Stormont House Agreement. Particular victims and survivors groups might not be very happy with the Stormont House Agreement, but from my perspective and talking to different interviewees, it is trying to put things in motion that operate in synch and to give everyone access to at least some form of truth, justice or closure where possible. I still get the impression at the moment that it is partly about first steps and who is going to take the first step. What I mean by that is that perhaps there is an element of fear that, let us say, if the Irish Government did go first it would put it in the spotlight and that considerable blame might be put on it for particular events or activities. That is more of a contemporary thing and that would be echoed in different parties from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the British Government. I refer to the fear that the blame would be entirely on them. That has been partly evident in the debate that has been happening in the UK about amnesties for UK forces because there is a fear about that happening. In a sense, my comment on that, which I have put in the recommendations as well is that in a sense it is not a fear that is grounded in the reality of what the Stormont House Agreement is trying to do, which is for everyone to try to move forward together in tandem with this process. Difficult truths will come out and there might be things people might not want to know in certain States but everyone is going to have an element of that. Moving together in tandem does not mean that any one State or particular side is going to have to fear that the portion of blame will be allocated to it.

Going back to the question on the mammoth, uphill struggle, the tension in both Governments, in Ireland and in the UK, was very much about the conflict during the time and anything that was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as potentially leading to further tension or a further upsurge in violence was, to put it bluntly, not looked at, or just bypassed at the time. I think that comes into play since 1988. I get the perception that there is an element of fear about who takes the first step due to the fear that the blame could be apportioned to them. If one moves forward with a process like the Stormont House Agreement, for all its faults, I do not think that will be the case because there will be an overlook of various cases.

In terms of international best practice, there is often reference to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, but the point I would make is that, universally, the victims and survivors groups that I represented do not want a process where at this time a truth commission comes into play because an amnesty is given first so that people will come forward. We should remember as well that for all the benefits that would have happened from the South African process there would have been victims and survivors who were disappointed that there were not any prosecutions that could have come forward that they might have wanted and they might not have had a universal say in that process. I do not say that should be ruled out. Perhaps after the mechanisms of the Stormont House Agreement come into play that would be up to victims and survivors groups and the politicians as well to have a think about whether they want further truth to come out. It is important to note that in the case of the South Africa process, victims and survivors who should be at the centre of the process did not want that at the time in terms of people getting an amnesty beforehand.

In the case of what we saw in the former Yugoslavia, which led into the international war crimes tribunal and cases, in that respect it was slightly different because there were external actors involved such as the United States of America and also UN forces. That shows there is a justice element to it and in cases linked to Srebrenica, for example, families at least felt vindicated by some of the truths coming out and that they had the opportunity for justice, and if that could not happen then some truth might come out. The Stormont House Agreement gives people options. Victims and survivors can go for a justice option if they want to try to do that. They can go for a truth option by means of the Independent Commission on Information Retrieval or they can decide not to opt into the process. Some people have moved on and do not want to do that. I think that is important. The Stormont House Agreement could become an example of international best practice because it gives victims a choice about which avenue they want to take.

In terms of the British Government ignoring any requests to co-operate in going forward, that links very much to theme 4 in which I talked about there being an opportunity for a select committee or Members of these Houses, in particular in the current climate with the UK in terms of Brexit, to further raise public awareness there about the conflicts and about unresolved legacy cases.

That would mean, if not working with a Government party in the UK, working with politicians in different parties, including in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Where UK politics is in flux there are people there who could be in government this time next year. Establishing contacts with, and raising awareness among, them could help that process as would raising it in the UK media. I note that the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Deputy Coveney, raised Brexit in The Guardian. That is an example of how this can be done, using UK media outlets. On the one hand, Brexit might distract from the conflict legacy process but what I have really noticed, partly from teaching on this topic, among my students but also among the general public in England, Wales and Scotland, is that because of Brexit there is an interest in the Troubles and in affairs and relations between Ireland and the UK. That is an opportunity to take this up and move forward with it. I have not put this in the report but the Government here might as it has done in the past, consider bringing some cases to the European Court of Human Rights if the British Government does not co-operate. That should always be an option. It would be essential.

Can the Deputy remind me of her fourth question?